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The purpose of this study was to critically explore the relationship 
between psychology and society. Many aspects of the powerful 
relationship that was found were discussed. In particular the 
lack of a social structural analysis in psychology was seen as 
vital in shaping how society affected psychology and how 
Psychology affected society. Very little discussion of what 
type of relationship psychology has and should have with society 
was discovered in the literature. Upon a more detailed examination 
of major forms of psychology and alternative forms some 
recommendations for change are made by the author. The 
main criticism and exhortation is for at least some discussion 
and recognition of social structural forces influence on 
psychology and its relationship to society. 
Introduction 
Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is 
little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we become 
insensitive to very many things of great importance. 
Russell (1945, p 8 ) 
Psychology's theories or philosophies of science including Cognition, 
Behaviour, Biology, Social Constructionism and Humanism all address the 
issue of the individual in society. The relationship of Psychology to the social 
world is determined by a series of power relations influencing and being 
influenced by institutions in the larger society. Unfortunately, however, the 
acknowledgment of social-structural relations seldom occurs. 
Psychology uses Empiricism a theory of science that has a scientific method 
based on the observable and the objective. Because this method does not take 
into account the unseen social-historical forces that underlie human society, 
the objectivity and scientific judgement of a psychologist's analysis will 
inevitably be flawed. Social-structural analysis offers a desirable alternative. 
But because Psychology does not use such an analysis, it fails to gauge the 
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effect of society on the individual; its tools of analysis are inadequate for a 
larger, more encompassing study of the human being. The most won-ying 
implications of this inadequacy are: 
1) A science unable to meaningfully help human beings address problems of a 
social-structural nature. 
2) A science with a poor capacity for self-criticism and self analysis. 
In effect, it is not only necessary but of paramount importance to study how 
society shapes both Psychology and the individual. Here is a scientific field 
that has traditionally operated in terms of individualism, reductionism, 
observable positivist-empiricist dogma and hypothetico-deductive 
methodology. These concepts are useful, but only gain practical value when 
considered in conjunction with a social-structural analysis. Likewise, without a 
traditional scientific analysis a social-structural evaluation alone is equally 
dangerous. 
In psychological experiments social context is stripped away in an attempt to 
maintain 'control' and preserve semblance with the natural sciences. This is of 
no practical value, considering the impossibility of studying human beings 
apart from their social context. What results, therefore, is a science that is 
unable to relate to its own society. 
This is not to suggest that what Psychology has achieved is 'wrong' or 
unworthy of praise, indeed, what it has achieved has been through hard work 
and creativity, remembering that it has had to deal with types of complexities 
alien to other sciences. Herein perhaps, lies the problem: Psychology may not 
have yet grasped the true magnitude of its task. For one thing, its principal 
subject (humankind) can only be examined by a member of that subject group. 
By moulding the human into a simple object of study with a cast of simple 
rules and outdated methods borrowed from the physical sciences (e.g., field 
crop science, simplistic Newtonian science), or even by using the rat to draw 
parallels with human behaviour, it has let itself down. Clearly none of these 
methods are adequate for capturing the brilliant complexity of Homo sapiens. 
In reality, Psychology has adopted an outdated form of science from the 
Nineteenth Century. As Braginsky and Braginsky (1974, p vii) comment: 
Few will quarrel with the contention that the present unsatisfactory 
status of Psychology is in great measure attributable to the 
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inappropriate adoption of Nineteenth Century physics as a model. 
This outmoded model takes an extremely rigid perspective, maintaining that 
goals or standards of prediction and control are untenable. As Baker (1992 p 9 
) comments; 
The net effect of this intellectual straight jacket has been 
to depersonalise both would-be scientists in 
Psychology and what they in turn would take to be 
the proper subject matter of the discipline. More insidiously, 
it has created the myth of value-free, atheoretical 
science, the practitioners of which could be 
non-intrusive, totally objective observers of their 
fellow humans; that they could eliminate any 
flow-on effects between themselves and their 
phenomena of interest, and that they could set 
themselves aside in the objective reporting of 
phenomena. 
The end result is a psychology either unable or unwilling to see human 
behaviour and thought in its entirety, ie. in its social-structural context. 
Appraisals made by psychologists are not made on scientific 
judgements alone, but are dependent upon subjective moral and 
personal philosophies. The discipline is woven from the political, 
economic, and other social-structural elements of society. The fact that 
it does not question how this influences its own methodology is the 
crux of the problem. Being unconscious to its own problems, 
psychology is therefore not in a strong position to help with the causal 
social-structural aspects of its patient's problems. It is perhaps possible 
to compare psychology to the 'eye that sees everything but itself'. The 
reason can be logically traced back to the fact that it is a case of the 
brain studying itself, of people shaped by society trying to study that 
society. 
It can be concluded that psychology is unwilling to acknowledge its 
true relationship to society. Three questions fundamental to any science 
that are not being asked by psychology are outlined by Law (1991): 
7 
1. What 1s the nature of knowledge/ knowledge of high 
status? 
2. what particular characteristics keep society together and 
apart? 
3. what is the nature of divisions and inequalities between 
individuals and classes in terms of problems of distribution? 
In Chapter One a description of psychology is given, in terms of 
methods, goals and philosophies. Some major general criticisms of the 
field follow. In Chapter Two some major areas of psychology are 
examined, to see how they are rooted in the underlying philosophies of 
science. Similarities and differences between these major areas of 
psychology will be discussed, and it will be shown how a social-
structural analysis is missing from these major areas of psychology. 
Chapter Three offers a definition and discussion of social-structural 
analysis with relevance to psychology. Alternative schools of thought 
which incorporate this analysis ( to contrast with the forms of 
Psychology outlined in Chapter Two ) are described. In Chapter Four 
the implications of psychology's relationship to society are discussed. 
The organisation of psychology is seen as a significant factor. Chapter 
Five shows how the relationship between psychology and its human 
subjects is held back by an incapacity for self-criticism. The resulting 
dangers for society are suggested through the specific example of IQ 
testing. In Chapter Six the need to reassess our definitions of "fact", 
"truth" and "logic" is discussed. The human sciences reflect a 
fundamental human arrogance which pervades scientific work and its 
assumptions. Chapter Seven outlines Chaos Theory , which 
paradoxically offers new hope to psychology at the expense of the 
traditional view of physical sciences. Finally, Chapter Eight offers an 
overview of problems within the field of psychology, together with 
some suggestions for positive change. 
A area for criticism of this thesis will be the lack of a vast array of 
empirical, hard and fast evidence. This, however, is only further 
evidence to support one of the main arguments of this thesis, that there 
is a fundamental lack of discussion on the subjects broached. If there 
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was plenty of qualitative discussion using a social structural analysis, 
for example on the topic of class and its effects, there would be no 
point to make. 
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Chapter One 
1) Psychology's Methodology and Paradigms 
Psychology is fragmented, overspecialised, method-centered 
and dull. Standard (1962, p34). 
In brief, therefore, it is clear that the scientific method is unsuited 
to Psychology because the subject matter of Psychology is 
conceptually different from that of the classical sciences, for 
which the method was developed. Kline ( 1988, p21) 
... the nature of scientific method, with its emphasis on precision 
and limitations to the questions asked, encourages work which 
is essentially trivial but con-ect and technically faultless. 
Kline ( 1988 p29 ) 
A) What is Science? 
The Deductive Nomological Model of explanation states that because 
scientific explanatory statements are confined to empirical events and 
grounded in universal laws, this "logic" makes them scientific. 
Predictive scientific statements, therefore, must be able to say what 
would happen under any conditions, not only what could happen in a 
particular instance. Such prediction is the goal of science. 
Science comprises of four main aspects of scientific investigation; 
1. Ontology is concerned with 'being' and what we believe to 
exist. What, for example, is the particular object of 
investigation of psychology? 
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2. Epistemology is concerned with 'knowing'. What sort of 
statements will we accept as a justification for what we 
believe to exist? 
3. Methodology is concerned with the 'logic' of inquiry. How 
do we validate and discover what we assume to exist? 
4. Methods concern the 'technique' for collecting data. What 
techniques do we use to get evidence for confirming or 
disconfirming our hypotheses? 
B) General Criticisms 
Historically psychology has been a empirical science, but for a 
considerable time now Empiricism has been under fire. It has, 
nevertheless, survived. Perhaps this is due to the fragmented nature of 
its opponents, or maybe it has grown so firmly rooted in the 
establishment, it has become incomprehensible to operate without it, 
such has been the investment. Rescher (1987 p44.) has this to say about 
empiricism: "Instrumentalistic Empiricism is risk-aversive. Like 
scepticism it is a policy of 'safety first', rooted in the fear of mistakes." 
Some of the main criticisms of Empiricism follow. 
Exclusivity. Many branches of learning do not provide the criteria 
required for scientific thinking. psychology is no exception, and 
empiricist methodology as a result often has little use. In reality, most 
'scientific' pursuits, methods and theories do not fit the formal 
scientific framework, and on closer scrutiny could not be accepted as 
employing strictly scientific methodology. Evolutionary theory, for 
example, does not qualify as a universal law as it cannot anticipate the 
long-term future of a species. The 'law' of natural selection is actually 
an after-the-fact postulate. Only from the observation that a species has 
survived can we say that its attributes are the gift of selection. It seems, 
however, hardly rational ( although Rationalism, as will be argued later 
is an over-valued commodity) to describe the theory of evolution as 
'non-scientific'. Another example is the theory and identification of a 
black hole; this research seems entirely unscientific as technically the 
object of study is unobservable. 
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The inappropriateness of Empiricism is a pressing matter for the 
social sciences. All sciences use non-universal laws, psychology in 
particular, so does this mean they are all unscientific? 
Fallacy of omniscience. How do we know a law of science is true and 
universal if the future may disconfirm it? Although Empiricism seeks 
to describe in terms of 'always' and 'everywhere' the wisdom of such 
an enterprise must be questioned. For laws to attain a high level of 
pragmatic usefulness universality needs to be toned down, since we 
need information about reality that is both tenable and as well as being 
secure and highly informative and definite. 
The adoption of pragmatic laws which work now, even though they 
may not in the future, is perhaps a far more rational and sensible 
approach than seeking universal laws. As Robinson ( 1985 p112 
)states: "The inescapable burden of human fallibility imposes 
limitations on our grasp of the truth.". Humans are undeniably fallible, 
and no matter what our laws and theories are, they are created and 
tested by humans. Psychological laws are more at risk because it is a 
case of the human studying itself, with that same fallible creature 
checking its own analysis. If there is a problem with the instrument of 
analysis, ie the brain, only that same flawed instrument can be used to 
check up on it. In the field of psychology a more flexible, pragmatic 
approach to scientific laws is recommended rather than grandiose 
universal laws which lack this practicality. In short, we cannot say 
whether a ce1tain universal law will hold true in the future, considering 
we cannot say for certain that it is true at the present time. 
Ideographic versus nomethic explanation. The human is shaped by 
elusive complex variables that change from one human to the next. I 
would not take the extreme view and say there are no similar or 
identical variables, but rather that a human is likely to be a mixture of 
unique and shared, the proportions of which are indeterminable. Any 
explanation of psychological attributes in an individual has to take into 
account the 'tailor-made' motivations for that human's behaviour. An 
understanding of the actions of individual X requires not only shared 
knowledge about species X, but also intimate knowledge of individual 
X alone. 
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Irreducibility of social phenomena. In many instances the social and 
historical cannot be described scientifically without using irreducible 
and unscientific social constructions which may not 'exist' in the 
concrete world. The state, nationality and class, for example, although 
very real and powerful influences on the human, are not part of the 
physical world, they cannot be put in a box and observed. They are real 
without having an independent physical existence according to Marx, 
because they have observable and real effects. 
The social nature of science. Scientists are people who work within 
definable, social-historical and personal contexts which are impossible 
to remove from their research. Meaning to be gained from the social-
historical sphere represents human subjectivity, and is therefore 
shunned by science. Psychology attempts ( with little success ) to 
remove the social aspects from its research. Considering the 
impossibility of removing human subjectivity in psychology of all 
fields, a more open-minded outlook to this dimension would have 
greater practical value 
Empirical observation. In order to be scientific observation is made 
according to empiricist thinking. These include the claims that: 
• Theories are subject to observational tests 
• Theoretical propositions are defined in terms of the 
observable phenomena they are introduced to 
explain; concepts are meaningless unless defined in 
terms of observable phenomena 
Whether or not these are desirable conditions to use is debatable, as 
argued by Greenwood (1992 p 133 ): 
Empiricists believe they are not held to make independent 
and meaningful ascription's of properties to postulated 
entities, but rather are treated as intellectual constructions 
that serve as linguistic instruments for the conceptual 
integration of the laws in terms of which they are defined. 
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Greenwood believes these laws of Empiricism set up a circular 
argument: any explanation of empirical laws in terms of intervening 
variables embodies information not already contained in the statement 
of the empirical laws. Thus the only guide to the discovery of new 
empirical laws is knowledge of previous empirical laws. 
Empirical observation, the basis for much theory-confirmation in 
psychology, is in fact no more than a glorified version of 'seeing is 
believing'. Since scientists are limited by their own perception and 
fallibility, inter-observer agreement is not a sufficient criteria for 
theory-confirmation. 'Empiricist' observation is no different 
fundamentally ( apart from the jargon ) from normal observation, and 
offers no new safeguards from human error. In fact, no matter how 
hard it tries, Empiricism still makes use of unobservables, and 
ironically enough in psychology it is these unobservables that are so 
crucial to theorising. 
Operational definitions. Operational definitions are very important to 
operationalism. Operationalism is the belief that the validity of a 
construct rests on the validity of the procedures which were used to 
establish it. psychology typically only accepts statements which can be 
scientifically tested. Unfortunately this is often taken to mean that 
anything testable is "scientific". Drowning people to prove innocence 
or guilt is testable and therefore scientific? Operational definition is 
seen as an inadequate criteria for distinguishing between 'scientific' 
and 'non-scientific methods and areas of research. 
Statistical Generalisation. Even the most illogical experiment can yield 
a statistic, and statistics are only as good as the user. Too often 
statistics yield statistically significant ( usually the .05 level ) results 
due to the sheer weight of numbers used rather than the power of the 
relationship between variables. The significant result is also over-
valued when labelling theories 'true' or 'false'; they should be used as 
support for evidence for or against, but not as the determining factor in 
the last analysis. 
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Prediction and Control. Prediction and control are the two aims of an 
empiricist psychological science. But they are inappropriate goals due 
to the nature of psychology in society. Psychology cannot ( even if it 
was desirable ) control society, rather elements of society control it. 
'Perfect' control comes from perfect domination: fascism, communism 
and totalitarianism for example. Control and prediction are 
inappropriate goals even in the physical sciences, since the forces of 
the universe have proven to be impossible to control or predict. The 
human mind, in its incredible complexity, therefore, poses a huge 
barrier to any scientific efforts to predict, let alone control it. 
C ) Replies to these Criticisms 
1) The reasons for the failure to achieve the empiricist model of 
science may be determined by future research. 
2) Science is at least trying to achieve the model, and we should 
accept scientific explanation as the best we can do. For example, we 
can say that Newtonian theories are true within certain boundaries, but 
we cannot say he is 'wrong' or his laws are 'not true'. Unfortunately 
such a defence of Newton is limited, as it is akin to saying Newtonian 
laws are 'one hundred percent correct and predictive apart from where 
they are wrong'. A more pragmatic appraisal of what is 'scientific' 
should be used; this would include Newton's laws as scientific only in 
the limited terms of human perception. Newton took observation to its 
limit in an effort to prove his laws, but unfo1tunately proof by human 
observation does not provide proof of universal laws. Also, the 
successful application of theories is not necessarily an indication of 
their truth, and the inability to distinguish useful, modern theories 
which are durable from those that are not, is still a problem. All that 
can be concluded is that there is an explanation why a theory works, 
but whether or not this explanation is provided by the theory itself 
cannot be proved. The empiricist method is still taught to be the best 
one, but as it is so inappropriate why is it encouraged? 
Another defence to this criticism is that whatever personal and social 
context a scientific law-maker brings to his or her work is 'irrelevant' 
to the truth of their particular theory. But, since the only meaning a 
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theory has in society is its effect on that society and vice versa it can 
hardly be an irrelevant influence. 
Psychology's methodology places a certain amount of credibility to 
the results found if its methods are closely followed. There may be 
therefore a temptation to accept these results at the expense of common 
sense. 
D) Description versus Meaning 
Good science is often equated with precise quantification and accurate 
expression of ideas. Yet it is more than this, requiring a quality of ideas 
as well as quality of methods. Describing and predicting aspects of 
reality are fine, but if science remains confined by these goals then 
other kinds of scientific investigation are not considered. What ought 
to be becomes constrained by what is; what is becomes accepted as 
what should be when description is valued ahead of prescription. 
Science, as a result, reinforces the status quo. What exists now is 
essentially equated with what should be in a future time. 
The problem of bias and social value in human society ( and therefore 
in research ) is intractable and unavoidable. As social scientists we 
must make human subjectivity and value judgements a necessary 
component of research. If scientific application to human society is to 
have any practical worth, avoidance of these issues is not only 
impossible but also largely meaningless. As Gottlieb ( 1980 p 4 ) 
believes; " ... a completely value-free social science is a social science 
of little value." 
There is a common belief that through a higher knowledge of 
human behaviour and mental processes one will be able to devise 
theories that can practically applied in the same manner that theories in 
physics can be applied to engineering. In this context much emphasis 
has been put on scientific values and promoting strict neutrality rather 
than emphasis on the implications of basic scientific findings. The 
predominant value in psychology is that objectivity is as important a 
goal as the discovery itself. 
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Psychology has been heavily influenced by, but has not actually 
managed to satisfy any of Empiricism's demands. Nevertheless, it has 
striven to be an empirical science. 
E) Freedom from Value, and Neutrality 
Perhaps our best option is to maintain as much sensitivity 
as possible to our biases and to communicate them as 
openly as possible. Value commitments may be 
unavoidable, but we sure can avoid masquerading them as 
objective reflections of truth. Gergen (1973 p312 ). 
The value-free fallacy in psychology, the assumption that a 
psychologist's work is 'unaffected by biases', shows up an intellectual 
failing, leading to flaws in both an experiment and its application. Even 
if today's psychologist could realise that it is impossible to be totally 
value-free he or she would still believe that a value-free science is 
something to strive for. But if it were possible to become value-free, it 
would only serve to alienate the psychologist from the society they 
were concerned with. Morality, for example is a type of value that 
psychology tries to avoid in its research judgments. Williams (1980 p 
83 ) believes this avoidance is leading to a path of scientific oblivion: 
... because morality is so elusive a concept, the careful 
researcher may be inclined to exclude it from his 
considerations, arguing that it is largely a matter 
of personal or cultural style. But I believe we are 
living through an age when morality is becoming a 
stronger and stronger force in the whole world, and for us 
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to ignore it in our decision theory research is for us to 
become largely irrelevant. 
An example of how social value bias affects scientific judgements is 
provided by Freidrichs (1971), who surveyed psychologists on whether 
or not they believed in Jensen's racially based IQ model. He found (as 
would be expected) that most disagreed with Jensen, because 
psychology supposedly attracts those who view people as relatively 
flexible in potential. But age and geographic residence, which should 
not have had an influence on the believability of such a model, 
certainly did. Those in the states of Alabama and Mississippi ( 
Southern States, with a history of deep-seated racism ), agreed more 
with Jensen's model, while those that disagreed were on average 5 
years younger than those that agreed. 
The value-free goal, therefore, is obviously impossible to achieve. 
Important topics which require discussion and analysis of social 
meaning and context have been ignored. It is as though the problems of 
housing, pollution, food, crime, class, etc have become unpopular, 
arrogantly viewed as being 'old hat', 'boring' or 'not fit' for 
Psychology. 'Not fit for Psychology', because to talk about why people 
starve ( a concern for most people in the world ), is to engage in value 
discussion and analysis. Psychology, through the guise of maintaining 
'proper' academic and scientific inquiry by being value-free has left 
these concerns 'behind'. This is unfortunate, considering that the 
decision that psychology should be 'value-free' was the biggest value 
judgement (and so by its own criteria the biggest value error) ever 
known to psychology. Objective solutions to the world's problems can 
be found, but any objective solution becomes immediately value-laden 
as soon as it is relevant to the real world. These objective solutions, as 
a result, are quickly dismissed, because our value judgement tells us 
that they are abhorrent, disgusting and inhumane. Some examples: to 
remove unemployment, 'round up all the unemployed in a stadium and 
shoot them'. Or to stop crime 'chop off both hands of all offenders'. 
On a purely objective and scientific level an infallible solution has been 
found, but on a value-laden level the above solutions are clearly 
unacceptable ( not that this has stopped societies in the past ). So 
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psychology, rather than forsaking its reputation as a value-free, 
objective science has instead given up being a discipline relevant to the 
real world. If it is to become relevant it must become value-laden. 
On the other hand, recent changes in Soviet psychology ( as 
outlined by Gindis 1992 p34 ) are interesting, because they show how 
post-communist psychology is looking at itself in a critical and realistic 
way: " ... one can find sharp and revealing criticism, confessions and 
data which contrast significantly with the previously published 
rhetoric, claims and data." These results now on offer in Russian 
journals hold an important lesson for Western countries; ie we should 
not condemn the psychological science of the former Soviet or present 
Perestroika, because our own psychology is probably just as flawed. 
Note, the Russian experience showed that data derived from 
psychological methods was dependent upon the particular socio-
political situation that created it. Our own social-structural situation 
shapes a psychology that is familiar to us, in contrast to a strange, 
'corrupt' Soviet psychology. It is easy to point a finger at a science 
which is so different from your own, and, in reality, the social-
structural and institutional influences in Western Society have just as 
much power to corrupt. 
The 'value-free' attitude has serious implications for psychological 
self-analysis. psychology, indeed is highly active in analysing itself, but 
the quality of this analysis must be questioned. If institutions and social 
forces do pose a danger to scientific enterprise, psychology due to its 
value-free commitment is in a poor position to acknowledge the fact. 
We are not the unbiased neutral observers Empiricism would have us 
be; we should stop trying to pretend that we are. A value-laden science, 
however, is dangerous and problematic to adopt. The saying goes that 
'if you play with fire your fingers will get burnt'. Psychology's area of 
research is fire and this cannot be avoided, so perhaps the more finger-
burning the better. Its subject of study is not rats in a highly controlled, 
and predictable lab environment, rather the infinite complexities of the 
human brain. Perhaps it is a reflection of human nature ( the 
'psychology of psychologists' ) that psychology has removed all the 
dangers from its study, it is wary of the fire. Without a doubt 
involvement with socially relevant issues is the more difficult road to 
take, but it is the right one. 
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Like the rest of us, psychologists have value-based premises, 
stereotypes and preconceptions so, we should also recognise they do 
not have to be servants of their ideology. I do not propose that 
psychologists assume a detached, disinterested, amoral posture, but 
instead that They must recognise and make public their ideology, while 
at the same time recognising the potential and actual impact of these 
personal biases on their work. Value can work for or against 
psychology, social-structural influences can be a good servant but are a 
poor master. 
F) Obsession with the Physical Sciences 
Psychology is still obsessed with becoming a physical science, to the 
point that its efforts have been desperately channelled into looking like 
one rather than actually becoming one. Standard (1962, p 193) 
recognises this fact; 
The discipline is still much concerned to establish itself as 
a science, but the psychologists naive conception of 
science has lead them to adopt the more superficial 
characteristics of the physical sciences. 
Psychology eagerly embraces the belief that science holds one true 
factual paradigm to answer our questions. This is actually in stark 
contrast with the other physical sciences; physicists now teach for 
example, that there may be at least eleven dimensions to the universe. 
It is therefore reasonable to expect our brains ( which are part of the 
universe ) to also have eleven dimensions. Singular explanations based 
on three dimensions may work as far as human sensibilities go, but are 
unlikely to accurately reflect fact as it exists independently. In 
psychology only three dimensions are accounted for, and further study 
in this area would be dismissed as 'inappropriate'. The lack of 
scientific research on the subject, in contrast to Physics, is a testament 
to how far psychology is from actually becoming a physical science. 
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Psychology forgets that answers are yet to be discovered. How can 
we know for certain what is and what is not plausible? New 
discoveries may very well invalidate all previous assumptions and 
reasoning. Is not sensible to suggest, therefore, that psychology 
investigate a wide range of phenomena, including the seemingly 
ridiculous? ( eg 10 million Americans believe they have been abducted 
by aliens ). Whether such claims are true or false is not important, but 
the potential for new knowledge of the human psyche is awesome. 
For a psychologist to claim a problem is 'unable to be solved' is to 
claim to have a 'deeper understanding' of the problem. Koch 
(1981, p 263) places the future within the realm of his own 
understanding when he says " ... very many of the questions, large or 
small, existential or actional, intellectual or practical which agitate 
human beings are indeed meaningful but undecidable." One cannot 
know if a problem is solvable before serious attempts are made to solve 
it. Indeed, some things may be unsolvable, some areas may not be 
appropriate for study, but to claim to know for certain is arrogant. 
G) Ecological Validity 
Ecological validity describes whether what you measure in the 
laboratory holds in the natural world. To achieve this, psychology has 
tried to control its experimental situation with the extreme example 
being Skinner boxes. In fact psychologists now have such 'control' 
over their experimental situation, that results are often simply a 
product of their own contrivance. But contrived from what? What sort 
of questions are asked? How are the hypotheses formulated? What 
kind of data is accepted into their conclusions? On further scrutiny, we 
see such experiments are designed to provide conditions which will 
make results fit. psychology is not a 'voyage of discovery', rather a 
conformation of expectations. Hypothesis from expectation provides 
the intuitive and inventive for the inqui1y and controls the nature of. 
the experiment. It is in light of this expectation that some observations 
are held to be 'relevant' while others are not; and likewise with the 
methods and experiments. The psychologist with his or her own 
personal biases determine these factors. In an experiment the real 
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danger is that a psychologist has no challenge to their preconceptions, 
due to (a) the degree of manipulation they exert over the environment, 
and (b) the type of feedback they accept. The psychologist designs an 
environment where seldom more than two variables are allowed to 
meaningfully change the environment is designed not to surprise the 
psychologist but to remove anything that might upset the result they are 
expecting. The experimenter risks asking too few important questions. 
This results in very weak proof dressed-up as an overwhelming proof. 
It is no surprise, then, that Psychology's historical achievements and 
worthwhile discoveries are few relative to the work put in. The lack of 
relevance to the real world can partly be blamed on the experimental 
method which refuses to acknowledge the infinite complexity of the 
society it is trying to study. The reality is that it is simply impossible to 
control for all variables ( or even for most of them in a real social 
situation). Historically the answer has been to give up and move the 
experiment away from the complexities of the real world. This may 
have been a reasonable reaction in the interim, but is anyone trying to 
solve this weakness now? This movement of the experiment from the 
real world suits 'scientific' psychology, because it can at least pretend 
to have made scientific 'progress'. Citizens in the wider community 
and those in the psychological institution are self-assured. Therefore, 
that they have a method in psychology which can discover the laws of 
human society, by ignoring what is both human and social. 
H) Epistemology 
Epistemology is the theory of method, or grounds of knowledge. The 
potential problem is that within the grounds of knowledge the methods 
vary as a function of social order and context. As a result, there is no 
way to distinguish between truth and power. Psychology does not 
acknowledge the dangers of such problems when left unchecked. 
Society and psychology believe that scientific laws are based on good, 
solid, objective, scientific methods and thought. It is more important, 
however, as noted by Braginsky and Braginsky ( 1974 p21 ) to: 
... recognise that much of what psychology is today- its theories, 
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techniques, methodologies, and areas of inquiry- has been 
constructed by and shaped by social forces. 
I) History and the problems of causality 
Language is both our greatest achievement and biggest problem. 
Causal statements are prone to jargon and translation problems, and 
proof often comes from theorists disconfirming other statements, rather 
than being certain of their own . 
In the beginning, very little effort was spent on confirmatory methods; 
almost exclusive attention was paid to descriptive methods. The 
framework of Empiricism stressed that knowledge was derived from 
sensory impressions which were joined by the associative process of 
the mind. Statistics were seen to be emulation's of these associative 
processes 
According to Empiricist theory, all that matters in scientific inquiry 
is description, summary and measure of association. Causality is 
equated with (perfect) correlation. Averaging and correlations, 
therefore, have become the building blocks of our modern day 
Multivariate statistics, which are the primary descriptive method in 
Empiricism. Mulaik ( 1993 p176) has concluded that: " . .it is clear that 
the obstacles to a confirmatory approach to statistics grew out of the 
persuasive acceptance of empiricist approaches to scientific method". 
Empiricists deal with things in a piecemeal way, believing that all 
events are independent of each other. But causality as a functional 
relationship must take into account the relation between variables. 
Determining causality works well in deterministic systems, such as 
those Newton studied, but how can this be applied to the complexities 
of human society? Should the New Zealand brain, eye and cognition be 
studied with the same old methods, or do they warrant analyses which 
also take into account an understanding of the particularities of New 
Zealand society? We assume without hesitation that overseas 
methods/models are appropriate and best for us. May be there are two 
cognitive systems for memmy for example and that would explain why 
there are often two theories both with their respective evidence of the 
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model of human cognition, this suggests that there are two systems not 
that one is wrong. 
When reading the annals of scientific breakthroughs one notes that 
they often occur not through a stunning use of logic or methods, but 
rather through lucky guesswork. The discovery of penicillin, for 
example, has had an immeasurable effect on medicine and was 
discovered by chance. But this goes against the rigid methodical image 
psychology is trying to convey. The chance involved in discoveries is 
outlined by Humphy ( 1982 p 104 ) : 
Thus many of mankind's most prized technological 
discoveries, from agriculture to chemistry, may have 
had their origin not in the deliberate application of 
practical intelligence, but in the fortunate 
misapplication of social intelligence. 
Fundamental to any scientific method is proof by replication. This 
involves the psychologist investigating the truth of a claim by 
replicating the original experiment as precisely as possible ( to gain 
confirmation that the first study was not simply a 'lucky result' or hoax 
). Besides several problems that will be discussed later, one practical 
problem stands in the way of the psychologist today trying to achieve 
such a replication namely, unwanted variables, which have and will 
continue to plague psychological research. 
The conception of what science is must change in the scientist, 
psychologist and society at large before a significant benefit can be 
realised for all involved. Sampson ( 1977 p241) states: 
Psychology acts as though it has discovered something 
fundamental about persons, it holds this something aloft 
as an ideal to be achieved. By ignoring the cultural 
and historical conditions that present this as an ideal, it 
fails to provide an adequate assessment of alternatives 
or implications that derive from its ideal. 
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In the context of Positivist Empiricism, psychology has failed to see 
the pressure of societal influences on itself as a human institution. The 
methodology of Positivism places such restrictive and unrealistic 
demands that it rules out many genuine areas of theoretical advance. 
Positivist Empiricism is an inappropriate model for psychology, indeed 
a generally poor one for any science. The ineptitude of this model will 
be illustrated using the example of Chaos ( Chapter Seven), a theory 
which has exciting ramifications for psychological research . It 
envisages a future where Psychology would no longer be scientifically 
disadvantaged relative to other sciences; no longer would the study of 
the human mind lack scientific credibility due to its difficult nature. 
Psychology could retain an honest scientific methodology and 
paradigm which would possess real credibility relative to other 
sciences, instead of the blind worship of a past model of natural 
sciences. 'Past' because mainstream natural scientific theory has 
moved on from Newtonian concepts of an ordered and predictable 
universe, to the general acceptance of the infinitesimally intricate and 
difficult worlds of quantum physics. 
The areas of concern of Logical Positivism and Empiricism as 
models of human behaviour are; the mechanistic view of human nature 
and the neglect of social context. The search for 'universal' laws and 
the belief in the psychologist as a neutral observer 
Each of these concerns is explained: 
1) Human action is governed by social rules ( norms ) which people 
generate to understand their world. This is undervalued by most 
qualitative research in psychology, which instead focuses on a limited 
range of proximal variables. 
2) These variables are easier to measure and control, but produce 
results which are of limited application to the real world. 
3) The universal laws of the physical sciences are immutable, but this 
is not so in the social sciences as these laws are confined to the specific 
social-cultural time and space in which they occur. Psychology's aim 
should be to understand these processes rather than to seek universal, 
immutable laws of human behaviour. 
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4) The final tenant is that findings are value-free. This is very 
important in applied psychological research where findings will feed 
back into policy-making areas. A clear understanding of this is needed 
to reduce psychologist's dependence on existing normative 
assumptions. 
Opponents of Positivism outline several critical flaws in the theory; 
How do we distinguish true beliefs from false ones? Even if there is 
'truth', it does not necessarily follow that we will be able to have 
access to it; and if we could have access to 'truth', we could not speak 
clearly about it due to our limitation of language. 
J) Refutation 
Refutation is the process by which a theory is shown to be false using 
scientific means. Usually this involves predicting what will happen 
after manipulating several variables. Refutation is supposed to be the 
fundamental criterion by which any theory is judged when being 
classed as scientific. There is no problem having refutation as a tool of 
scrutiny for a theory. There is, however, a problem with the power that 
refutation has been given. If a theory is refuted does that make it 
useless and defunct? The major limitation of such logic is that any 
refutation is in fact based on a refutable theory itself. Many of the 
useful and necessary theories we use today have been refuted already! 
It is inherently dishonest of science to keep refuted theories afloat, 
which according to their own criteria are no longer true, universal or 
acceptable. Science finds that most laws do not live up to the label 
'universal' but the laws are nevertheless retained because of their 
practical worth. Parts of Newton's theory, for example his prediction of 
the moon's orbit, have been shown to be incorrect. His theories, 
however, are still held to be universal. A law may be refuted, therefore, 
but still be useful to society. Furthermore, it is impossible to state you 
have refuted anything considering what you use to refute them with 
(observations and knowledge) are themselves themy-dependent. The 
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'all or nothing' idea of universal theories does not work, and science 
knows it. Psychology's laws must be recognised for their weaknesses 
and their strengths. Psychology must learn to use them where 
appropriate, not dismiss them completely on the basis of one 
refutation. Newton is still rightly regarded as one of the great minds of 
history because of the pragmatic worth of his theories. The attitude that 
laws must be universal reflections of some kind of 'absolute' must go. 
Falsification is an interesting idea in principle, but when observing 
psychologists at work one gets the distinct impression that proving 
their theories false is the furthermost thing from their minds. Instead of 
seeking to refute their theories, they are determined to defend and 
extend them as much as possible. Psychologists desperately want their 
theories to be confirmed, so they shy away from testing their theories 
in real world situations. The incredibly fragmented nature of 
psychology and the sheer number of theories would suggest that 
refutation is not commonplace. Hence, psychologists rarely go for bold 
conjectures; they are cautious for fear of being found wrong and left 
isolated. 
Although the falsification method is flawed in the way it is used, I see 
it as an inherent goal of science and as a necessary part of psychology. 
The use of refutation must be tempered so as not to shelve theories 
prematurely but still show up their flaws. But, undeniably, fallibility 
has failed to produce the needed tool for sifting the poor from the good. 
Little (1986 pl84) comments that "Falsification is an unsound 
principle of theory choice, since it is an extreme principle that requires 
the rejection of any theory with false consequences." This is perhaps 
unavoidable in psychology. Refutation proves something false in one 
situation, and here we are often not dealing with clear-cut 'black and 
white' results, but rather many shades of grey. Perhaps a pragmatic 
standard, in terms of a theory's usefulness to humanity, would be the 
better test of a theory. 
K) Statistics 
Statistics are used widely by psychologists, and while I believe them 
to be a useful tool, I also feel we have come to rely on them too greatly. 
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Publication criteria for getting research into journals over-emphasise 
statistical proofs. If a submission does not have this 'necessary' 
statistical analysis the chances of it being published are unjustifiably 
less. 
Statistics often detemiine the acceptance or rejection of a given 
hypothesis. But a simple statistical test, while useful, should not be all-
pervasive. With such a complicated subject matter, psychologists need 
assessment procedures of a high quality. Indeed, statistical tests do not 
need to be eliminated, rather replaced with better ones, ie, tests which 
are suited to the job of studying humans within their society. At the 
present, psychology largely uses the one dichotomous significance test, 
where evidence is interpreted as against the null hypothesis, if p is no 
greater than .05 and for the null hypothesis if larger or equal to .05 . 
The fact that the .05 level has become so crucial has less to do with 
practical significance than with comfotting psychologists with a 
definite and reassuring cut-off point. This familiar .05 figure has 
become too powerful. .06 is just as worthwhile, since it is a case of 
personal arbitrary distinction of what 'should be' significant. And even 
though there is no sharp division between .051 and .049, this difference 
could potentially be crucial in psychological decision-making. How 
can we claim to know? 
The use of numbers and statistics to overcome problems can lead to a 
greater chance of committing what is known as type one and type two 
errors: 
• Type one errors are claims of relationships where none exist. 
Where the hypothesis is accepted and the null hypothesis is rejected 
when it should not. 
• Type two errors are the failure to detect relationships, or the denial 
that they exist where they do. Where the hypothesis is rejected and 
the null hypothesis accepted when it should not. 
Statistics can only be useful if they are used in a pragmatic and 
realistic way. There is a difference between what is statistically 
significant and what is practically significant, and this difference can 
work both ways. On the one hand, a difference too small to be 
statistically different does not mean that it is not enough to be 
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significant in real life and vice versa; a significant statistical difference 
may not be great enough to produce a noticeable difference in real life. 
L) Conclusion 
The Fad-ridden Character of Research characterises psychology. 
Success and advances in Psychology tend not to be built on prior ones. 
New theories or findings are usually not refuted; they simply linger for 
varying amounts of time then quietly fade away. This is the real pattern 
of research in psychology, as opposed to the classical model that it 
would have us believe it follows. Smith (1980), and Meehl (1978) have 
written articles that neatly summarise these ideas. Indeed research 
performed in psychology may be statistically significant, of perfect 
design and well-worded, but is often trivial and pragmatically 
worthless. 
Psychology uses the laboratory which has fundamental weaknesses 
that are difficult to overcome; for example the experimenter bias, 
where beliefs of the researcher affect interpretation of both variables 
and results. Realising the difficulty of applying the01y to social reality, 
psychologists may choose simply to ignore reality. Hence, an 
insufficient amount of attention is paid to social context. 
Another major weakness of psychology is that university students 
make up a disproportionate percentage of the subject pool. Indeed 
many results may be skewed due to the over-representation of students 
in samples which do not accurately represent 'society' as a whole. 
Armistead (1974), Boutilier et al (1980), Carlson (1984) and Lynn et al 
(1984) all summarise these problems. 
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Chapter Two 
Some Major Forms of Psychology 
A) Introduction 
Psychology's relationship to society is an extremely encompassing 
topic. Is it meaningful, therefore, to talk about one single, unified 
discipline? If not, would the separation of psychology into different 
branches of study change our view of psychology's relationship to 
society? This is an issue that is not debated enough. Some of the more 
powerful sub-disciplines are currently being scrutinised using a social-
structural analysis, and this is revealing that social-structural/social-
historical influences are not being taken into account. It has become 
apparent that through this the interests of the status quo in society are 
reflected, while the areas of psychology that do challenge this state of 
affairs are usually the least powerful ones. 
B) Organic and Reductionist Arguments 
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These arguments maintain that our behaviour is completely 
determined and explained by genetics. Thus, the 'tools' for 
understanding behaviour lie in the knowledge of the individual 
building blocks that make up the human. 
Reductionism reduces behaviour in its effort to control and predict. 
Simple physiology can never, however, be the final reduction of 
psychological theory, because it cannot explain either the meaningful 
or trivial actions of human beings. Science can indeed reduce all 
human systems into non social entities such as the visual system and 
neuron's etc, but the problem is that every single function of the 
human, biological and chemical included, exists in a social life. There 
is no such thing as a concrete intelligence or visual system without 
people who perform such activities and they are the only ones who give 
such actions meaning. These actions take place in an enormous and 
ever-changing society where reduction is a futile task. Human activity 
is largely social, and this exists independently of biology. In other 
words, biological rules are not always the most important ones. The 
reductionist theory, for example, cannot meaningfully explain the often 
biologically counter-intuitive complexities of life, such as why a 
person may burn themselves to death in public in protest. 
Popular genetic theories in psychology include Sociobiology and 
Evolutionary Theory. The power of these ( if they do exist ) seems to 
decrease as humans increasingly modify the physical environment to 
suit their needs. For example, Recombinant DNA Technology, the 
ability to add or remove genes in living cells, can alter the potential of 
human growth. As a result 'instant' evolution is possible. Sinsheimer 
(1978 p27 ) outlines the beliefs of reductionist and organic based 
theories: 
The basic process of scientific analysis is to fragment 
a phenomena into its components and analyse 
each part and process in isolation, and thereby 
develop an understanding of the subject. 
This has worked well for the physical sciences, but for psychology 
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the focus must be on all ties of the science to society and culture and 
on the impact of scientific knowledge and technological advancement 
on all human life. 
C) Behaviourism 
Behaviourism, although not inherently evil, is no way for the future. 
As it name suggests, this is the study of changing and predicting 
observable behaviour. Obvious problems arise when applying 
Behaviourism to humans, and naturally the school of thought has come 
under fire. An example, if we try to understand pain, the observable 
behaviour available to the researcher is c1ying, clutching the painful 
area, etc; but this does not tell us what meant by pain; it does not 
describe pain. The behaviour is not the pain. Likewise, just because A 
and B learn the same thing does not mean that they learn it in the 
same way. 
Behaviourism is a the01y of reinforcers and punishments. These 
'increase' or 'decrease' the likelihood of a behaviour, but as we will 
see reinforcement theory is essential circular. A reinforcer only 
becomes a reinforcer, for example, when the rate of response is 
increased to get it. Response increment, therefore, can be defined as 
'that which follows reward'. Only when behaviour change has 
occurred can one actually specify the reinforcer. Or for example, take 
the simple idea that we are more likely to do things that we find 
rewarding; If a person feels guilty and wants to punish him or herself, 
does that punishment itself become rewarding? If it is, then will they 
want to stop punishing themselves because they want an unrewarding 
experience? A behaviourist may define 'reinforcement' in terms of 
'behaviour which reinforces'. This is an obviously circular argument. 
What is deemed to be a 'reinforcer' or 'punisher' is often determined 
by bias, subjectivity, or a desire to prove a hypothesis correct. The 
increased frequency of a child eating sweets can be attributed to the 
child's liking for the taste of the reinforcer. An alternative ( although 
here incorrect ) explanation could be that the sweets are an unpleasant 
stimulus and the child eats them quickly to reduce exposure to them. 
This problem of finding out whether the sweet is a reinforcing or 
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punishing stimulus could of course easily be resolved by asking the 
child. But the point is that observing and measuring behaviour alone 
cannot with any confidence give meaningful results. Also, predictive 
power may be a threat to an individual's sense of autonomy and 
freedom, and a subject may willingly reject reinforcement. In addition, 
knowledge of a particular theory allows an individual under 
observation to avoid being 'correctly' analysed by it. The cognitive 
power of the human imagination should not be under.:.estimated. 
That which cannot be observed is 'not fit for study' in Behaviourism. 
This seems both unrealistic and undesirable, and the faith in the 
infallibility of human observation misplaced. Implicit in the 
behaviourist ideology is the assumption that humans are 'passive' and 
'inert', shaped entirely by external environmental forces, while states 
of mind, personalities and feelings are ignored. This cleverly removes 
from sight all the difficult areas which do not give easy answers; 
through logical positivism it makes the study of the human perfectly 
achievable. 
Behaviourism produces experiments where all stimulus factors and 
response measures are controllable and quantifiable. It is no wonder, 
then, that the behaviourist will get the answer he or she wants, because 
everything else is ignored. The only meaning the behaviour under 
scrutiny is allowed to have is that which the experimenter creates for it. 
This would seem to make behaviourist research rather open to biases 
and inaccuracies. In fact, the behaviourist experiment is an interesting 
piece of Psychology in itself, because it shows us many basic 
assumptions about human nature. Behaviourists attempt to prove what 
they think is right, and by setting up the conditions ensure they do, 
rather than finding out what does exist. The use of observation to 
interpret behaviour could lead to endless different explanations ( in 
contrast to the physical sciences ) and also requires interpretation of the 
social situation for a meaningful and accurate analysis. To 'remove' 
observational ambiguity behaviourists have employed the rat or pigeon. 
In other words, to investigate humans 'more accurately' behaviourists 
have decided not to study them! This is an efficient way of producing 
an accurate and phenomenally large amount of data, but data with no 
meaning or relevance to human concerns. The experimental 
33 
psychologist seems determined to transform all human actions to non-
human ones. 
Skinner, of course, claimed never to have read or answered his critics. 
Instead of 'Radical Behaviourism', perhaps his work could be better 
summed-up with the label 'The Blind Leading the Blind.' His attitude 
is that he has better things to do than clear up others 
'misunderstandings'. Which, in other words, means that no matter 
what others do, show, confirm, or argue, he will never be shown to be 
wrong. Somehow he apparently has a 'better grasp' on the universe and 
special foresight into the future that does not require him to lower 
himself to the level of considering the research of others. Skinner's 
attitude in its glorious narrow-mindedness will, however, ultimately 
put a seal on his obsolescence. 
The human painted by Behaviourism is able to be exploited, duped 
and degraded in the name of science; a useful tool for the dictators past 
and present. It is unfortunate the behaviourists have chosen to 
rediscover the tools of totalitarianism. The belief that they can be 
assured to be used for good ends, or that punishment can be avoided as 
Skinner believed, is naive. As Braginsky and Braginsky (1974 p157) 
rather contemptuously comment about behaviourists; "If their 
philosophical and ethical prowess is at all similar to their scientific and 
intellectual processes, the prospects are not pleasant." To illustrate this 
unpleasant reality Braginsky and Braginsky cite studies such as Bucher 
and Lovans (1968) use of cattle prods as a treatment on autistic 
children. 
Behaviourism justifies inflicting pain on its patients (in the form of 
punishments) as being in society's 'best interests'. That such aversion 
therapy moulds society into what it wants is the ultimate goal. But what 
behaviourism forgets is that what society 'wants' is never agreed and 
changes from moment to moment. What society wants is in fact 
determined by the most powerful and exploiting groups of society. 
Therefore Behaviourism's vision of achieving the society that 
everybody will want seems an impossible and an unwise pursuit. But 
because behaviourism has proved so effective in the past at achieving 
what the powerful want it is has continued to be used. Behaviourism's 
power in its relationship to society remains not by solely scientific 
means, but also by social-political ones. 
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D) Cognitivism 
Cognitive psychology is now mainstream Psychology. The image of 
the human, cognitive science offers, is even more dehumanised than 
the behaviourist rat, now humans are in some forms of cognitive theory 
computers. These theories conceive of the person as the 'computer', as 
one big information processing machine. Cognitive psychology is a 
sophisticated reworking of positivism as it still rellies on the same 
tenants of positivism such as objectivism, reductionism, absolutism 
and an allegiance to natural science. Cognitive psychology attacks the 
heart of humanistic consciousness, meaning and internationality. 
Cognitive theory shares with behaviourism many of the same 
problems. As with all descriptive methods the actual pragmatic use or 
understanding that can be gained from such methods is limited. 
Debates take place, for example over whether the articular loop or the 
acoustic code is used in peoples reading, this can tell us little however 
that help teach reading to people where this research is supposed to be 
relevant? The model simply describes the experimental findings but 
offers nothing meaningful to the study of reading. What such a 
theoretical model is capable of producing are large sums of money in 
the forms of research grants. 
Cognitive psychology concerns itself with memory especially. 
Memory models produced by cognitive psychology are produced to fit 
data because the experiments measure a very narrow band of human 
experience, not the environmental aspects. 
Cognitive psychology believes people respond to how they define 
stimulus situations, not to the objective properties of those stimulus 
situations. It perceives the mind as being made up of clear and distinct 
forms. The simplistic assumption underlying cognitive psychology that 
results, therefore, is that clear and distinct forms of mind produce a 
clear and distinct understanding of reality. By inventing these simple 
meanings psychology loses sight of the rich and complex original 
senses. Yet, the subject exists in a social setting where such a simple 
mapping of clear and distinct forms of mind and behaviour is not so 
smooth. 
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Sampson ( 1981 p732.) comments about the link between cognition 
and the social structure: 
... consciousness and thinking reflect something about the 
subjects perception and experience, yet they also reflect 
something about the objective world within that individual 
works and lives . 
... to understand cognition therefore requires that we grasp 
both subject and object, if we stop our analysis at the 
individual subject we participate in the same kind of 
distortion that he or she reflects, yet if we ignore the 
subject in favour of the object, we miss the important 
constituent that the subject's active consciousness 
contributes. 
Cognitive Psychology pays exclusive attention to the individual's 
mental operations. In other words an 'I think' rather than 'we think' 
discipline develops. Objects are products of individual mental 
operations and the world is thought to be solely constituted by the 
individuals thinking and reasoning processes in Cognitive psychology. 
Cognitive psychology does not, however, describe the full relationship 
of human mental processes to society. It is lacking in terms of the 
social 'we think'. It should change to recognise thinking also as the 
product, socially and intellectually, of collective endeavour. Inherent in 
cognitive thinking is a strong current of Social Constructionist thought, 
in that the objective world is ignored (although not completely denied 
as in Constructionist thinking.) But the real world does play a very 
crucial role in beliefs, intentions and opinions. Too much attention has 
been paid to descriptive hypothetical models of the mind and not 
enough time has been spent analysing the environment in which the 
mind is shaped. Psychology should be investigating the social-systems 
in which human behaviour takes place. Indeed cognitive psychology 
would be balanced if it were to recognise the relationship between the 
human mind and its society. 
An inclusion of the social structural and historical elements into a 
cognitive analysis would seem crucial, because the individual is not an 
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active subject acting on a passive world; rather the two interact. The 
lack of this balance may reflect the historical struggle for ascendancy 
Cognitive psychology had with Behaviourism. Cognitive psychology 
emerged the premier paradigm in psychology. From this struggle 
emerged two polarised arguments. Behaviourism in general believes 
the individual to be a passive receptacle upon which an active world 
writes its messages, Cognitivism takes the opposite position of saying 
the environment is largely passive in determining the individual. Due 
to the competitive and capitalist nature of science saw both sides take 
extreme positions. What needed to be developed was an interactionist 
theory as Sampson ( 1981 p735.) states: 
... the objects, situations and environments that enter our 
interactionist formulations as social and historical products 
and not as simple derivatives of individual consciousness, 
or individual behaviour, or occurrences that just somehow 
happen to be present. 
An interactionist account bases explanations on the interaction of 
both society and the individual on each other. This account is far more 
appropriate for the study of humans who are inseparable from their 
society, especially in terms of their mental events. Claiming the 
superiority of mental over material or vice versa is to deny the reality 
of interaction. The human is only free to exercise mental control over 
their environment as long as the material conditions allow. The human 
is restricted in their ability to manipulate their environment by material 
limitations. That is why any psychology that denies the role of the 
environment and the social-historical features of that given society is 
inappropriate, inapplicable to people's lives and simply wrong. For the 
worker in a low paying job with a family to feed, how much do their 
mental events determine their objective world? Is it not rather a case of 
him or her trying to cope with their objective reality, being limited by 
it, and trying to fight off depression because of it? What must be asked 
is who is psychology serving, the average person, or the powerful elite? 
Cognitive psychology somehow believes that people are free to engage 
in mental gymnastics while being unconcerned at the changing physical 
world. It is not that the individual mental processes do not occur or that 
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they do not have power over the objective world, but it is, however, an 
interactive process between the individual mind and the society it 
exists in. By failing to address the material concerns of the real world 
psychology does not challenge the status quo. For example when a 
depressed person goes to a psychologist the psychologist will usually 
address some inner state of mind or poor attitude that the individual 
will have to change to become 'healthy' again. In this way psychology, 
as Sampson ( 1981 p735) states: 
... serves the existing arrangements of power and 
domination within a society when people accept 
a change in there subjective experience as a 
substitute for changes in their objective reality. 
Psychology serves society by deflecting the partial blame which is 
society's , by trying to 'hoodwink' the population into believing that 
that it is entirely within the power of the individual to change their 
objective world through mental improvements. Now of course the 
individual can do that, power within the individual does exist, but 
change in the material conditions is necessary as well. Without dual 
change human potentialities are unable to be achieved. The positive 
and healthy mind is very helpful to improvement; I do not wish to 
detract from that; but the objective and physical world plays a 
considerable part in limiting and accelerating progress independently of 
the individual's mental state. 
Theories such as cognitive dissonance themy reflect the interactionist 
values as a basis for treatment of people. Rather the theory of cognitive 
dissonance requires only an inner change for improvement of mental 
well being, and the adaptive person someone who can manage that 
inner change. For example, being able to imagine what is really dull 
and boring as exciting and fun is seen as an adaptive process by 
cognitive dissonance theory. This of course parallels the process of 
false consciousness and the desired work ethic in society. Cognitive 
dissonance theory encourages those that have abandoned trying to 
change reality and who instead try to change themselves to fit that 
reality. This mental manipulation Cognitive Dissonance believes is the 
way of solving the material strain. But surely it would be better for 
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people not to deny the social reality of their lives, and learn to adapt to 
things the way they are by setting realistic improvements. Cognitive 
Psychology does not have an 'incorrect' observation of how mental 
events are construed indeed it is very accurate; but by looking at 
Psychology's ideology we can see how it reinforces the status quo. 
Psychology spends much of its time and research ingeniously 
discovering and describing how the mind works, but without offering a 
critical insight into the meaning such work conveys. It merely tells us 
that the way it has described is the way it is meant to be. But without a 
meaningful analysis it is impossible to determine between the way 
things are and the way they are supposed to be. 
Cognitive dissonance also relies upon a society that cannot tolerate 
contradictory contradictions. The thought that people act in 
inconsistent ways, in other words, does not fit well with the cognitive 
model of the human. 
E) Social Constructionist Theory 
To the social constructionist there is no 'real world' or objective 
reality that exists independently of human symbolic language'. Harre, 
however, turns the social constructionist argument on its head by 
pointing out that conversations are in fact a constituent of reality, that 
these discrete and locatable conversations must have rules of common 
understanding, reality, because otherwise no one would be able to take 
part in them. The discourse is maintained by partners sharing the 
common conversation. Without this shared linguistic reality there can 
be no conversation. 
According to the social constructionists experience is conducted 
through interactions within personal social-historical contexts; 
consequently no one account can be considered more accurate than any 
other. The first half of this statement may seem easy to agree with, but 
the second seems ridiculous; why can't someone's else's view be better 
than another's? Social constructionists deny that theoretical 
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descriptions in natural or psychological science are 'linguistically 
objective', such theorists as, Greenwood (1992), state there is no way 
of comparing reality with mere descriptions of that reality. It is argued 
however that just because we are unable to compare and know physical 
or mental reality does not preclude that world from existing. Such 
limitations of the human in relation to understanding reality is not 
evidence against its existence. The social constructionist is confused 
into thinking that because we cannot recognise the truth as the truth 
that it cannot be discovered. Ironically, this theory is a product of the 
arrogance it seeks to criticise. For just because humans have no way of 
determining whether one theory is closer to reality or not for certain, 
does not mean some theories cannot be judged closer to that reality 
than others. What grounds are there to judge that all theories are 'just 
as valid' as each other? In suggesting this, the social constructionist is 
professing to be able to know all worlds of experience equally as well 
as their own, which is counter-intuitive to the basis of social 
constructivism that one can only know their own social reality 
correctly. 
Ultimately, Social Constructionist the01y is useless as it practically 
suggests there is little point to anything, so science is supposedly 
floundering on its own subjective world. Psychology should instead 
take a realistic and pragmatic approach, realise its difficulties and use 
its inevitably human decisions to its advantage. Given two competing 
theories, one is closer to reality than the other, even if psychology does 
not know for sure which one. Taking the one which works best, gives 
society benefit, while criticising and estimating it against new evidence 
and theories. 
A social constructionist once triumphantly declared to me, "there are 
no universal rules or universals!". But I, in my humble way, could only 
point out to him, that he had just in fact stated one. If the best ideas 
humans can have are imperfect, subjective and opinionated this does 
not mean that the perfect, objective and neutral reality does not exist; 
and that we cannot learn about it. Reality is not dependent on humans 
understanding it accurately for its existence. Social constructionism 
does give an alternative to empiricism, but whether it is adequate is 
highly doubtful. 
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F) Conclusion: A Summary of the four Forms 
The diversity of psychological science first brings into question 
whether it makes sense to talk about 'psychology' as a unified 
discipline. But commonalities between the major forms of psychology 
can be found in their relationship with society. These commonalities 
are that: 
1) Psychology has an exclusive focus on the individual. 
2) Psychologists rarely confront the fact that their theories are not 
independent of their position in society. 
3) Psychology's theories replicate the status quo for seldom does 
psychology investigate the influence that society has on its concepts. 
Psychology sees society to be a vague and amorphous background 
that should be disregarded while one fathoms the laws of the human. 
This is the way psychologists view themselves and their work, as being 
'independent' of society by using 'objective' formulations independent 
of their place and time in society. Psychology needs to create a 
different relationship with the society it exists in, and to foster 
conditions that encourage meaningful criticism of its own work. By 
being self conscious it can help to develop consciousness in others 
fields. Smith (1976) highlights psychology's lack of collaborative 
research and knowledge of other fields. Yet ironically psychology 
worships the physical sciences, but, without really engaging the 
physical sciences on a meaningful level that could help its science. The 
emphasis on quantification, one of the few things adopted from 
science, has encouraged an unthinking psychology. Positivism, with its 
obsession with observable quantification, has been too dominant in 
Psychology, not allowing other epistemology's to gain acceptance. 
The potential is always there for society to become the victim of 
science, no matter how unlikely it may seem at the present. What has 
changed to prevent another holocaust where science, theory and society 
combine to perform the worst of horrors? Mc Connell ( 1970 p74 ) 
provides perfect example of that potentiality. Although he may not 
intend oppression he encourages the use of tools that create it: 
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No one owns his own personality. Your ego, or individuality, was 
forced on you by your genetic constitution and by the society into 
which you were born. You had no say about what kind of 
personality you acquired, and there's no reason to believe you 
should have the right to refuse to acquire a new personality if 
your old one is antisocial. 
This chapter is ended on these disturbing views to demonstrate the 
dangers for individuals in society from psychology, especially if 
psychology does not recognise the dangers to itself from society. The 
dangers therefore will be realised if psychology does not recognise its 
full relationship to society. 
Chapter Three 
The alternatives Psychology ignores 
A) Introduction 
This chapter discusses the following theories that are not used by 
Psychology greatly. The reasons their lack of use are not entirely to do 
with their actual scientific credibility but rather their perceived 
credibility. They have, however, much to offer psychology. They are 
based on a recognition of the role, to differing degrees, of the social 
structure which is summed up in the following points: 
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1. Human subjectivity is constituted within and through social 
structures. 
2. People are also the products of the social structures they inhabit; 
they are not merely a set of social roles. 
3. People experience unique configurations of social experiences 
and have an ability to reflect on these experiences. 
The lack of the social structural viewpoint leads to inherent dangers 
such as a lack of a complete self-critical view. The crucial point here is 
that psychology is extremely critical when it comes to analysing its 
own work but only in terms of its own methods, not in terms of its 
meaningful relation to society. The danger is as Sarason (1981, p 56) 
states," ... that they (psychologists) can only avoid dealing with these 
issues only at the expense of becoming unwitting victims of them." 
What are, for example, the implications of rewarding psychologists 
monetarily in terms of career advancement for publishing journal 
articles? The danger to scientific credibility is that the reward for the 
achievement becomes more important than achievement itself. This 
argument may seem weak if the conclusion has been reached that it 
does not matter as long as they are motivated to do research'. But 
psychology has a duty to be the best science it can and as a science it 
must be capable of thinking with a depth and breadth which includes 
societal relationships. 
The reason for the incompatibility of psychology to study the more 
pressing problems of society lies in psychology's methods. Coons 
(1990, p 140) agrees:" ... we have assumed that if a subject is not 
amenable, to a nomothetic, hypothetic-deductive method, it has no 
place in the science of psychology". To adopt a rigorous method and 
structure is vital for developing a useful science. But one which 
discounts alternative and conflicting methods and theories without 
examining them critically is dangerous. A science which only accepts a 
single paradigm is non-progressive. Breakthroughs and discoveries of 
the future may require alternative methods and theories working in 
combination with the dominant ones. 
Handy (1987, p 161) re-states again the crucial importance of a social 
structural basis to criticism, as she reviews criticism of the field: 
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... one of the most common themes they raise is 
the discipline's failure to deal with the 
historical and political contexts of human 
behaviour. 
This reluctance to incorporate human social creations in criticism or 
analysis even extends to the terminology of psychology. The term 
subject by its nature transforms people into objects. "Object" also 
gives the impression the experiment is isolated from real life. Social 
structural is seen as a 'Sociological concern'. Psychologists consider 
Psychology as a profession "more highly esteemed" than Sociology. 
Consequently there is a reluctance to focus upon topics perceived as 
'Sociological' in order to retain professional identity. Not that that is 
necessarily a bad thing, but if the repercussion is that social structural 
influence is ignored it then is a bad thing. 
The western view of a "benign social order" which provides 
adequate opportunities for people to develop their potential has 
strongly influenced psychology. Human behaviour is explained by 
internal, personal characteristics rather than by situations or 
relationships. Failures are therefore attributable to personal 
shortcomings. The need for a comprehensive understanding and 
intervention on the social structural level is seen as redundant. 
Stemming from the Industrial Revolution, this individualist attitude 
was extremely effective in maintaining capitalism. Whether this is a 
good or bad thing for society must be examined carefully. Such an 
examination is naturally part of psychology's role, indeed it is duty 
bound to such a role. But in the final analysis psychology has not 
performed such a useful task. It is condemned to a lack of any 
meaningful comment or acknowledgment of the issues of social 
structure. 
B) Ideology 
The term 'ideology' refers to the values, interests and underlying 
social practices that a particular emphasis serves. Psychology's 
ideology, tends to be idealistic, whereas others, such as sociology's, are 
usually materialist. Materialistic conceptions view society as one 
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section of society exploiting another. Ideology is seen by materialist 
schools of thought as a tool to spread false consciousness amongst the 
exploited to keep them from fighting against such exploitation. 
An ideology has several components outlined by Ryan (1971, p 10): 
first their is the belief system itself, the way of looking at 
the world, the set of ideas. Second there is the 
systematic distortion of reality reflected in those 
ideas. Third is the condition that the distortion must not 
be a conscious, intentional process. Though they are not 
intentional, the ideas must serve a specific function, 
maintaining the status quo in the interest of a specific group. 
C) A Definition and Explanation of Social Structure 
While scholarship and science have a logic and momentum 
of their own, because of ominous, internal contradictions and 
the relationship between data and hypotheses, they cannot 
be abstracted from the social context. Hall (1983, p 86) 
On a micro level a psychologist's relationship to society is crucial to 
the experimental and theoretical outcome. Psychologists, like all 
others, are products of their own society and ignoring this does not 
mean that its influence is removed. To remove social-structural 
influences specific to each psychologist is impossible and undesirable. 
The analogy of the art work being made up of figure and background is 
an appropriate metaphor for the society and the individual. Psychology 
tends to see the figure as it were as all important without paying much 
attention to the background. The background is seen as 'noise' to be 
ignored. A more realistic and effective view would be to see the 
background and figure as inseparable. As the background still affects 
the way you see the figure even if you are looking at the figure and vice 
versa. Spence ( 1985, p 8 ) comments on this relationship: 
"Psychologists are the products of their society and time, and their 
construction of social reality is shaped by the world view and values 
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and culture they were reared in." To deny such values in research is 
ridiculous and self-defeating, because to deny value, is to deny 
meaning. All psychological judgements are value-based and subject to 
their own particular social historical experiences. Terms such as 
"rigidity", for example, may describe a "flaw" in the cognition, of one 
culture, whereas in another culture the behaviour may be described as 
stability. 
Psychology's failure to have an adequate awareness of fundamental 
social-structural forces results in difficulties in identification of 
relevant causal factors in the problems of the individuals it serves. 
Social-structural forces are not amenable to the present hypothetical 
deductive method as they are unobservable and cannot be found in any 
given individual in their entirety; even though the hypothetico 
deductive claims it deals with the unobserved. They are real without 
having an existence located within the individual, and most importantly 
their effects are real. The physical sciences justify studying such 
phenomena as black holes, magnetism and electrons by the same 
standard. Psychology has not increased its width of investigation to 
such areas class, which are unobservable, and still does not use a social 
structural analysis. By ignoring such a crucial influence, psychology 
will not see problems in their proper depth. Bramel and Friend's ( 
1981, p 871) comment on the analysis of Psychology of Mayo's ( 1933 
) study of the industrial work at the Harthorne factory illustrates 
Psychology's methodological blind eye: 
... conflict between workers and management is always 
due to something other than the basic antagonism of 
interests in the exploitative capitalist relations of 
production. 
In this study the primary causal agents were class-based but Mayo 
glossed over the antagonism-indeed he replaced the disruptive 
elements of the study where possible to ensure the right result. By 
ignoring other valid, indeed more appropriate, social structural forms 
of analysis psychology produces a biased and an incomplete 
understanding of human behaviour. 
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Psychology must not only learn to recognise social-structural forces; it 
must also learn to combat the threats these forces pose to science. Its 
existence as a science is largely determined by the funding and legal 
support from the government. Most crucially psychology must come up 
with arguments to preserve itself as a science, receiving the profits of 
free-market economy, while at the same time preserving its 
independence from this ideology. If its supply of funds, is the 
government, becomes free-market oriented, psychology's future will be 
one of trying to fend off arguments as to why its funding should be cut. 
These economic attacks require an economic defence. 
Threats from free-market ideology which directly work on those that 
allocate funds to reduce the funding for psychology include: 
• Subsidisation of social sciences is wrong because it stops the 
market place from determining the value of research. 
• Spending money on psychology is a poor return when other groups 
such as national security or hospitals are powerful vote getters. 
That individual and family concerns are none of the government's 
business; indeed they are an attack on the rights of the individual'. 
It does not matter how ridiculous such ideological demands are, they 
are real, prevalent and dangerous. Psychology faces the danger of being 
rationally appraised as a poor fiscal and political return. Hiding in 
universities will no longer save it, for the free market ideology has also 
been forced on the university. Once in place such ideology is very hard 
to remove. Psychology must be prepared to dig in and get the best out 
of the system it can. 
The ridicule of social science on a political level is exacerbated by the 
Press. In the minds of the public, psychology already has an image of 
being silly and trivial. People will therefore selectively pay attention to 
images and stories which confirm their misconceptions. The public and 
political worlds are where psychology requires some fairly active and 
radical image surgery. Psychology's relationship with society must be 
confronted if it is to maintain political, social and ultimately scientific 
credibility. Without such political and public support, the potential 
reality of a strong psychological science will be lost. Psychology is not 
advertised by ground-breaking discoveries or contributions to peoples 
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welfare as other sciences. News seems to be instead characterised by 
sex scandals! It is as though psychology enjoys the fact that the public 
knows little about it or the people in it; a sort of 'mysterious science'. 
Perhaps the motivation for such aloofness is that, in being deliberately 
coy, psychology does not have to reveal what type of science it really 
is. This distant attitude, however, does little for public understanding 
and subsequently its ability to help the public or get public funding. An 
example is supplied to highlight the previous points. 
In 1975 a rather inventive educational package was in place in 
American schools entitled "Man a Course of Study" or Macos. Besides 
the sexist title, it was a rare example of psychology preparing a useful 
application to a wide audience. Macos used cooperation-operation in 
trying to get school children to improve relations between people, with 
critical thinking as its learning mechanism. Unfortunately a Senator 
decided, in a wave of anti-communist sentiment, that this was a 
communist-inspired plot to brainwash children and demanded it be 
scrapped. Cooperation and critical thinking were not values cherished 
by the Capitalist system, nor did they fit with the American ideal of the 
individual as paramount, they were seen as synonymous with 
communism. The dominant values inhibited by the public and 
encouraged by the institutions were that only through competition 
could society become strong. In due course an investigation was held, 
the course removed, those responsible for employing these social 
scientists were fired and publicly humiliated. A politician wants votes, 
the media want a selling story and the relationship between political 
ideology and psychology is demonstrated to the public's detriment. 
Even if psychology should remain value free it cannot. Thus 
developing policies to utilise value would help psychology. The 
argument against adding subjective value to its work is that if 
psychology sticks its neck out, like the people behind Macos, it will get 
it bitten off. But until psychology becomes helpful and learns to fight, 
it is worse than useless for the common good; it is against the common 
good. Psychology must learn to carry the fight outside of the abstracted 
world of scientific theory bashing ( on topics which amount to 
meaningless psycho-babble) to a pragmatic real-world footing. Before 
psychology attempts to become relevant as a discipline again, separated 
from agendas other than its own, psychology has to learn to stand on 
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two feet on a materialistic footing. That means enlisting political, 
social and economic security and support. Psychology must become a 
political and social animal to avoid being at the beck and call of other 
social, political and economic animals. Psychology at best will do 
nothing on its present course, because it is too scared to stick its head 
into the real world, let alone do anything about it. 
Manicas' s Definition of Social Structure 
To judge the importance of social structure there must be an 
understanding of what exactly social structure is. Peter Manicas (1980) 
offers a admirable definition of social structure. The following points 
are made by Manicas to outline the notion of social structure: 
1. Social structures are the products of interactions of humans. 
They are social products themselves which are distinct from 
'natural' structures in that they are theoretically at least 
meant to have a concrete independence from the social 
world. 
2. A person does not have to fully grasp what a social structure 
is for it to have an impact on them. 
3. Social structures only exist in virtue of the activities which 
constitute them; they are not independent but 
interdependent. 
4. Social structures are real in that they have real effects, ie. 
they constrain, limit and enable the actions of individuals. 
5. Social structures pre-exist the individual. 
6. 'Structuration', is what happens in the reproduction of 
social structures. 
7. Social structures are constituted by human action and yet at 
the same time influence this human action. 
8. Social structure, it is argued, is not the same as human 
action, just as people and society are two different things. 
9. Different philosophies identify different roles that social 
structures perform, these include fulfilling, developing and 
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helping, through to oppressing, exploiting, and alienating 
humans. 
Bhasker ( 1978, p 16 ), provides an example, of how a social structural 
analysis may interpret a situation when he claims: 
... people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family, or work 
to reproduce the capitalist economy. But it is nevertheless the 
unintended consequence of, as it is also a necessary condition 
for, their activity. 
Manicas believes that the primary way to understand social structures 
is as causes. Manicas believes that social structures have three causal 
aspects to them: 
1. Meaning, which makes shared communication possible. 
2. Moral, which includes norms, rules, various modes of legitimation. 
eg, Social Control. 
3. Power, which is the ability, to act, to do and influence others. 
As has been mentioned before social structures are seen as 
potentially doing one of two fundamental things to society. One, social 
structures help bring about consensus and equilibrium or two, they are 
seen as bringing about disequilibrium and instability. As we shall see, 
the following theories make much use of social structure to explain 
human action but do not always agree on its role. Psychology has 
traditionally ignored the social structural in its analyses but how subtle 
reinforces the view that social structures are inherently good and 
functional for human society. 
The Relevance of the Social Structural to Psychology: An 
Example 
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In Sennet and Cobbs (1973) book, The Hidden Injuries of Class, the 
influence of the social structural is demonstrated on the individual. 
Without such a sociological analysis such social influences may be 
construed as being entirely different. 
Sennet and Cobb believed that the working class were the greatest 
supporters of the social system and the harshest on themselves. This 
support comes even though they are relatively disadvantaged 
economically in society. The reason that they have more reason to be 
conservative on social economic issues than higher class people is that 
the working class are hanging by a thread economically and so 
criticism can be disastrous. 
Psychologically, the working class Sennet and Cobb found, thought 
that if they fail they thought it was their own fault. This belief is 
reinforced by Psychology justifying social class inequalities as being 
the result of natural biological differences. But such biologically based 
arguments such as Social Darwinism, do not apply in the social world 
as an accurate description of who does well. The social race is 
inherently unfair and loaded from birth, it is not simply a case of 
'survival of the fittest'. An example of how this race is loaded from 
birth is provided by Sennet and Cobb( 1973, p82 ). They interviewed 
and observed classrooms in America, and one teacher said to them 
when questioned why she gave preferential treatment to two fairer 
skinned children: 
Its not true of other children that they generally have less 
potential. Its a question of not developing their ability like 
Fred and Vincent. I know your right, I tend to encourage 
them more despite myself, but its obvious to me these little 
boys are going to make something of themselves. 
I wonder why? Psychology itself has described how attribution's 
learnt at school provide a different schooling experience for boys and 
girls, girls locating within themselves the reason for their failures, 
whereas boys believe that it is the circumstances. The other children in 
the aforementioned example obviously will learn that their 
performances will not be greeted with the same enthusiasm reserved 
for Fred and Vincent. The other children lose the expectation the 
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school will help them and they believe instead that life will begin when 
they get a job. This is precisely what the system and status quo requires 
to reproduce the social machinery to ensure its continuation. The 
requirement the social system needs is a willing and eager work force 
to exploit. 
Teachers act on their expectations of what the children will become, 
make these expectations become reality. Children feel responsible for a 
situation they did not create. In school some do poorly and others do 
badly. Is this fair? The children didn't create the situation. Why should 
they be changed? Who gave society the right to make them enter this 
maker and breaker of personality and achievement? The intentions of 
society may be good but this is not a justification for failure. 
Sennet and Cobb believe the lower class pay a large price not only in 
monetary inequality but in the hidden injuries of class. Dissatisfaction, 
resentment and an under valuing of themselves in general are such 
injuries. They justify a hard oppressed and exploited life by believing it 
is all for their children. Unfortunately this usually is a forlorn hope as 
there can only be, for example, 90 workers 10 supervisors and one 
manager in a factory. Accordingly it does not matter how hard they 
work the proportion of workers to supervisors must remain the same 
for the profit of that business to be maintained. Their children have less 
chance compared to a managers child, of getting that one managerial 
position. Sennet and Cobb believe a conflict between freedom and self 
respect is set up in which to maintain the life chance, largely illusory, 
for their children, they sacrifice both their freedom and self respect. 
This injured dignity serves a purpose in maintaining the legitimacy of a 
reward system: 'If you work very hard you'll get what you want, to be 
better off than your parents'. And if the impossible dream is reached 
then what? the parent is cut off from the child because in becoming a 
Professional, for example, they don't talk like their parents, act like 
their parents and are not interested in the same things as their parents. 
The parent who needed that dream of freedom is cut off from those that 
achieve it. 
The system due the logic of capitalism cannot deliver on its promises. 
Yet the working class feels responsible for what has happened in their 
lives. Psychology generates theories of individualism to remove its 
guilt for not addressing real and fundamental issues such as this in 
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society. Individualism, as shall be discussed later, serves to avoid a 
whole range of troubling and irresolvable conflicts which are partly 
psychology's responsibility. Psychology appears to be fair and 
impartial and this is used as a rationale for the harmful individualism. 
The Summary of Social Structural Influence and its 
Importance 
In conclusion, the individual differences can be quite feasibly 
measured as long as it is recognised that individuality stems from the 
social context as well as within the individuals. The analysis of people 
is therefore one of a comparison of socially produced individuals rather 
than a comparison of asocial, purely biological entities. An example of 
the value and appropriateness of the social structural explanation is 
provided by Henriques et al (1984). They studied the premature sexual 
maturation in Puerto Rican children. Several hundred female children 
experienced accelerated growth which leads to full sexual maturity in 
four year olds. The reason is the oestrogen supplements in the feed of 
the chickens which constitute a staple food for the Puerto Ricans. This 
has resulted in confused social relationships in which the citizens are 
not sure how to cope. It is not the biological changes which led to such 
confusion, but the realisation that social conventions based on normal 
biological patterns are inappropriate. Similarly, while sexual changes 
are clearly biological the underlying cause is politico-economic. 
Consequently the solution is politico-economic, removing the 
oestrogen supplement will require a political and social solution. 
It is important to remember society and its members are not 
independent of each other, that there is two sides to the story. Just as 
society influences the individual so the individual is able to influence 
that society. Individuals should be seen as knowledgable, creating and 
sustaining society and themselves through purposeful and reflexive 
actions. For psychology an acceptance of the role of social structure 
means a need to look beyond the direct effects of traditional research to 
a more comprehensive analysis. In particular the influence of social 
structure to constrain and produce the reality of peoples lives. Only by 
doing this will psychology hope to control the social cultural 
environment within which it performs science. It is not that psychology 
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does not have a strong relationship to society but that it has the wrong 
one. 
D) Marx 
The Marxist model is one of the more famous models of society which 
uses a social structural approach. Marxist themy is a reaction against 
the more traditional view of society as being run on cooperation and 
good will. It believes that society is instead exploiting and alienating 
and therefore a society of conflict. It is important not to be confused 
into thinking that this conflict is what the Marxists want, but rather it is 
how they see society as it exists. Marxists do not view the state as a 
cooperative institution which promotes the general welfare and protects 
people's rights. The state and other institutions are seen as being 
controlled by the ruling class and therefore the ruling classes benefit. 
Psychology as one of those institutions is seen as a protector of the 
status quo where the ruling class is maintained at the expense of the 
majority. That is the reason why Marxist's believe Psychology does not 
address the important issues of today's society. Marxist psychology 
would not be value free and unbiased. Marxists believe that it is 
essential to have value and bias in psychology to identify the needs of 
the majority over the ruling classes and to be socially relevant for that 
majority. For Marxists one of the greatest actions psychology could 
perform for society, for the Marxist's, is to increase people's 
consciousness, their critical insights and awareness, to teach people not 
to just accept things the way they are but to struggle to actively change 
things. The relationship between psychology and society would 
become revolutionary rather than confirmatory and replicating of the 
existing inequalities. However, psychology is not revolutionary and the 
reality it describes is defined by the ruling classes of the capitalist 
society, not independently by scientific considerations. 
Marxist theo1y is one of economic determinism, that is, the 
fundamental economic relations of society are the basis of all things in 
that society. Psychological knowledge in this present relationship 
between society and Psychology serves the status quo as Marxist, and 
Neo Marxist perspective's identify. In this way psychology influences 
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society and society influences it. That is, the role of truths is 
established by psychology as a controlling and numbing feature upon 
the individual. Industrial and Organisational psychology is the area 
which deals mostly with the economics in psychology, but this sub-
branch of psychology is probably the area receiving the greatest 
criticism from Marxists. Implicit in Industrial Organisational 
psychology is the belief that economic activities are in the interests of 
the whole, that the workers and bosses are not two antagonistic parts, 
of which one must exploit the other, but that they share the same aims 
and work for a common good. It is in light of these implausible 
idealistic attitudes that sociological features of analysis such as 
Marxian False consciousness and Marcusian ideas of one 
dimensionality should become part of psychological analysis. The idea 
that psychologists have somehow avoided capitalistic influences is 
delusional. Marxist analysis investigates such influences in detail; 
therefore an understanding of their economic analysis is worthwhile. 
Psychology has taken the viewpoint of the dominant capitalist system 
and in so doing it has alienated itself from using Marxist analysis. The 
incompatibility of the Marxist view with western capitalism leads 
science to view the Marxist theory's with disdain and hostility. 
Viewing Marxist theory with disdain and hostility is no crime and 
indeed several parts of it, in particular the utopian idealist viewpoints 
of the inevitability of societal development, I view with disdain and 
hostility myself. It is crime in psychology's case, however, because it 
views Marx with hostility and disdain not from a scientific viewpoint 
but from a political viewpoint. Indeed Little (1986), showed how Marx 
used an entirely scientific method in his analysis of history, and how 
Marx in fact criticised other analyses for their lack of a grasp of the 
hard cold realities of life. 
Marx also showed how proof and justification is naturally different 
between the physical and the social sciences. This difference in 
justification arises from the problem that the social sciences cannot 
make use of experimental replication as accurately as the natural 
sciences. While Marx's theory is often criticised as being unscientific 
for using unobservables, most of the physical sciences also use 
unobservables to explain observables, e.g., atomic structure and genetic 
theory. Furthermore limiting investigation to the purely observable 
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commits the cardinal sin of blocking inquiry. Marx went one step 
further than physical science in his use of unobservables, he not only 
tried to describe them but tried to give them meaning as well. Marx 
criticised natural science for merely describing the unobservable and 
the observable. Indeed, if science is conceptualised as different theories 
about facts, which are no more than informed opinion anyway, Marxist 
analysis should be justified as scientific. It is of course debatable how 
good a theory his is but it is a scientific analysis. 
Class and Stratification 
The following points outline the key concepts of class and stratification 
which Marx used extensively. 
• Marx's theories rest on the premise that all societies are class 
societies. 
• Economic reward, political powers and social prestige come from 
these classes. 
• The classes are created in the way in which production is organised. 
• As soon as humans are able to produce more than they need to 
survive it is possible for classes to emerge. 
• One class, the majority, produces the wealth of another, the 
minority. 
• The minority class seizes the surplus goods produced; therefore, the 
minority exploits the majority and gains power and wealth. 
• This produces a class struggle which characterises all societies. 
• All aspects of society reflect and justify basic class structure. 
• The superstructure of ideas and institutions reproduces the 
economic base. 
• Revolution occurs when the material conditions hold back 
economic development, and/or, people are aware of the opposed 
interests inherent in a class society. A new ruling class emerges 
with a new means of organising the means of production which is 
more efficient than the previous means of production. 
That is the course followed by history of human society as Marx 
describes it, it is a history of class struggle. 
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Materialism 
Marx believed that the only real analysis was a material one; that the 
'superstructure' and 'base' which make up society are reflections of the 
economic, material world. Thus, a Marxist viewpoint of psychology 
should include a materialist analysis. Although one may argue that 
materialism does not determine all aspects of society, it is, however, 
undoubtably responsible for a significant amount. Marx's primary unit 
of analysis is the commodity, which is something which is bought and 
sold for value and can be observed. From this empirical base he sought 
to explain the history and relations surrounding commodities. The 
exchange of commodities, as Marx described, were organised into the 
Mode of production. 
Mode of Production. 
The following points outline the mode of production. 
• There are two important classes, the Bourgeoisie, the owners of the 
means of production, and the Proletariat the workers in that means 
of production. 
• The difference between the value of labour and the value of product 
produced by the proletariat is surplus value. The surplus value is a 
measure of the exploitation of the proletariat because the 
bourgeoisie seizes the surplus value for their own from the work of 
the proletariat. 
• Wages remain at this level of exploitation unless forced up by 
scarcity of workers, or lowered due to competition. 
• The crucial difference between the classes is ownership of the 
means of production 
• The proletariat must to survive work at any pnce, whereas the 
bourgeoisie can employ or sack whoever they want. 
• The bourgeoisie has no choice in whether to exploit the proletariat. 
For to remain competitive against opposition bourgeoisie, and to 
remain bourgeoisie, they must produce surplus wealth. 
Psychology is in a society where the deep-seated structural goal of 
profit outweighs all others. But yet psychology's view is that economic 
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realities are responsible for nothing, when clearly their importance in 
the role of motivation and self image and almost all areas of the human 
condition are crucial. Marx comments on the importance of the 
material reality to analyse people: 
... the social structure and the state are continually evolving 
out of the life-process of definite individuals, but 
individuals not as they may appear in their own or 
other peoples imagination, but as they really are, ie' as they 
are effective, produce materially, and are active under definite 
material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent 
of their will. Marx ( 1993, p 103 ). 
The materialist view of consciousness, which holds that 
primary elements of society and its actors are the 
social relations of production, rather than any innate 
capacities. Brown ( 1984, p 43 ). 
Science, Marx believed, like all aspects of the superstructure, is not 
independent of the conditions of the material world. Lack of 
independence from the funding source, however, was probably hard to 
see in the post World War two years when funding was relatively 
greater and so had few restraining aspects to it. In today's competitive 
academic world the ties must surely be more apparent and are 
discussed by Marx and page 88 of this thesis: 
The production of ideas, conceptions, of consciousness, 
is at first directly interwoven with the material activity 
and the material intercourse. Marx ( 1993, p 103) 
... the class which is the ruling material force of society, 
is at the same time the ruling intellectual force. Marx ( 1993, p 104) 
The class which has the means of material production at 
its disposal, has control at the same time over the 
means of mental production. Marx ( 1993, p 104) 
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Thus those without access to control or ownership, which were one in 
the same for Marx, had their ideas subjected to those that did. Namely 
the ruling class makes room for thinkers who Marx ( 1993, p 105 ) 
said; " ... make perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself its chief 
source of livelihood." The rest of society's attitude to this process of 
indoctrination becomes more and more passive for Marx, because they 
have less and less time to make up illusions and ideas about 
themselves, due to the pressures to sell their labour. The resulting class 
differences produce an economic determinism whose influence on 
people's actions are all persuasive. 
Class effects are investigated rarely by psychology. Marx used a 
realist justification for class being a real entity. This was that class is 
real by its effects. Often in physical science unobservable are credited 
as being real only by the real effects they have. Magnetic fields, 
electrons and blackholes, for example, are proven to be real by 
observing their effects. Therefore arguing that class is non scientific 
because it cannot be observed would also remove many commonly 
used scientific postulates. So in fact Marx was quite clearly justified in 
using class as a scientific postulate considering the amount of evidence 
available by measuring the effects of class on observables. 
The value of Marxist themy to psychology could be great, but 
unfortunately many aspects of the human experience of life which 
Marxist theory discusses are ignored by psychology. Marx's 
interpretation of the meaning of such influences on the human life may 
be wrong. But debate over the pivotal concepts he has identified, or 
even over whether they exist is lacking in psychology, to its detriment. 
Marxist theory provides an excellent explanation through the mode of 
production of inequality and the attached psychological influences and 
effects this has using social and historical means. There is almost a 
total lack of a social and historical analysis of psychological problems 
people face. Marxist themy at least, at the very least, attempts to 
explain and describe meaninfully such relevant psychological 
processes and effects. Not only is a Marxist analysis a powerful 
explanation, but it provides a causal explanation which is sadly lacking 
in descriptive psychological theory. 
False Consciousness 
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To be socialised means, for Marx, that one has absorbed 
predetermined conceptions of the way things are and ought to be. One 
may resist the process, but to occupy a certain position such as a 
psychologist, you need to transverse successfully the rites of passage 
and acceptance. For most people the process of socialisation is so 
successful that they do not question, ie. have no self consciousness 
about the forces that shaped and continue to shape them. In psychology 
these questions are strenuously avoided so psychologists can remain 
paragons of the scientific community. For to raise them is inappropriate 
and commits one to the oddball category. Koch ( 1981, p 258 ), sums 
up false consciousness and the degree of influence it has had when he 
states: "our gift for the mismanagement of our minds is perhaps the 
genius of our racel" Psychology's defence of its unthinking stance is 
that it does not have to question the social structural forces on itself 
because those forces have no effect on psychology. No effect, because 
psychology is value free and neutral, divorced forever from the social 
world if the correct methodology is followed. This defence is flawed 
because firstly this goal is undesirable and secondly it is impossible! 
Psychology must instead learn to deal with the relationship of the 
individual to society, which is deserving of serious study. Psychology 
tries to study the individual in isolation, this is naive as you cannot at 
any instance have one with out the other. Even Social psychology 
which claims to investigate the relationship between society and the 
individual in fact does not. Social psychology instead examines the 
here and now influences of isolated variables on the individual and 
ignores any macro or social structural influences. 
Society has built up an image of science and those who made, into a 
false image, a false consciousness fed to the public. It is an image of a 
world where science is the most appropriate model to describe and 
solve problems in it. Humphy ( 1982, p 104 ) gives his opinion of the 
famous mathematician Dodgson as an example of where societal 
claims of the greatness of science are debatable: "Charles Dodgson the 
mathematician shared his pen amicably enough with Lewis Carroll the 
inventor of Wonderland but the split is neither so comfortable nor so 
complete." And of course interesting little bits of evidence and trivia of 
those most famous minds abound, but naturally are not taught to be 
associated with the holy scientific minds of the past and present. 
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Examples such as Newton having a complete Topographical map of 
hell he had so "brilliantly" derived from information from the book of 
revelation. Or the fact Pythagoras did not invent pythagoras' s theorem; 
it was around before him, and he just used it more, or the fact you can't 
see the great wall of china from the moon with your naked eye, a piece 
of cold war hangover propaganda. And, no Pluto is not the furthermost 
planet from the sun and will not be so while I am alive. This is not in 
the publics general assessment of famous people and facts because it 
would attack the reassuring and carefully crafted image of science. 
Marxist conceptions of Psychology would describe psychology's 
relationship to society as being one of denying power from the average 
person. Knowledge is a form of power in Marxist analysis, as the ways 
in which problems are conceptualised influences the actions towards 
them. Society from a Marxist viewpoint, gives psychology influence to 
further the oppression of the working class by justifying capitalist 
society and values. Psychologists are then able to benefit from this 
exploitation as :aon owners but partial controller's of the means of 
production. psychologist's relationship to society for Marxists is 
therefore one where psychology haves and others do not. 
Marxism states that capitalism is full of inherent contradictions and 
Psychology is no exception to this. In particular it appears to help 
people, but it can only do this through becoming an institution which 
restricts and alienates people. That is all interactions between 
psychologist and patient are power relations, where people seeing a 
psychologist are subservient. The psychologist exploits their patient by 
charging a fee which creates surplus value. The psychologist being 
simultaneously exploited themselves if paid by an institution, because 
they are creating surplus value that goes to that institution. These 
points show that psychologists do not work in a scientific vacuum, they 
must compete with others for a scare economic resource. 
Psychology is linked to the larger society by the function of 
replicating class structures. Capitalism denies lower class students 
access to the resources of psychology through fees and lack of 
encouragement. If it seems that the education system which Psychology 
is part of is fair and gives all an equal chance, which in turn justifies 
the existing social classes and inequalities. Psychology's relationship to 
society is as part of the larger education system which favours those 
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who are already privileged, and puts further obstacles in the path of 
those who are disadvantaged. This runs directly against the myth that 
schools stimulate talent without regard for ascribed characteristics such 
as class or gender. Because as Marxist's argue cognitive differences 
only offer a partial explanation of differences of achievement in 
education and intelligence. Differentiation between individuals, for 
Marxist the01y is largely a function of class structure, of learned 
abilities and attitude. For example, IQ tests reflect the ruling class ideas 
for Marxists, and are a tool for dividing along class lines. Naturally 
those that do well in them are those from the ruling classes who have 
had the best opportunity to master them. 
Alienation 
Another pivotal concept of human motivation which seems to be 
completely ignored by psychology is the Marxist concept of alienation. 
Alienation is the key term which links the political-social-economic 
world to the personality. It is the process identified by Marx of the 
individual not feeling part of society, having lost interest and being 
remote and apathetic, all due to the oppressive relationship of the 
human to production. The basis for alienation is as follows: humans 
have the capability to control nature by creative activity and humans 
have the ability to work out a conception of what they want and put 
this into practice. Consequently work can be an expression of human 
intellect and creative capacity, unless it is alienated by either being 
merely concerned with survival, or organised in such a way that it is 
debased and made into a burden. Such alienation for Marx was the 
barrier to realising individual human potential. Marx believed for work 
to be an expression and a means to realise human capabilities there 
needed to be a) abundance of basic needs, b) the abolition of work 
divided into meaningless tasks, and c) the removal of economic 
domination and exploitation. Capitalism is for Marx the most efficient 
system yet for creating alienation. Under capitalism the human ability 
to work and create is now a commodity forced to be sold for the 
cheapest price. The harder people work the more they are exploited in 
terms of creating surplus value for others. Combined with false 
consciousness these terms would seem to be vital for any discipline 
that wants to understand humans and their relationship to society. Koch 
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( 1981, p 260 ) has also 'rediscovered' the concept of alienation. He 
writes: 
Objects of knowledge become caricatures, if not faceless, and 
thus they lose reality. The world of any given of it, is not felt 
fully or passionately and is perceived as devoid of objective 
value. 
Psychology's role as an institution labels those not contributing to the 
capitalist system as deviant. That those not entering and not producing 
economic benefit for society are seen as misfits whose behaviour must 
be corrected. For example, and as will be discussed later in a 
consideration of individualism, the poor are seen as being unable to 
delay gratification or are incapable of managing their own affairs. This 
is used as an explanation of why the poor are poor. But if real, such 
factors are the result of being poor, not the cause. Alienation is a 
concept and aspect of the human psyche that needs to be investigated 
by psychology. 
Conclusion 
The key points of criticism of psychology by the Marxists are as 
follows: 
1. Psychology uses a narrow empiricism which does little to 
investigate the social whole. 
2. Psychology has an underlying acceptance of the status quo. 
3. The individual, not the system, is exclusively held responsible for 
the positive and negative things that happen to them. 
4. The determination of mental illness is based upon the ruling class 
ideas and reflects their interests. For example who is crazier the 
schizophrenic who believes he or she has a nuclear bomb inside his 
head, or the well adjusted military person who makes nuclear 
bombs, works around them everyday and who has the capability of 
dropping that bomb? 
5. One of the motivations behind working in a mental illness field is 
to make money, gain power and prestige through institutional 
badges of merit, not only to cure mental illness. 
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6. Psychology does not critique itself in a meaningful way; it lacks a 
real world consciousness. As such Psychological theories are a-
historical. 
Criticism of psychology must be tempered by the fact that while the 
institution of psychology works for the status quo, mental illness is still 
very real whether socially constructed or genetically determined. The 
importance of Marxist analysis is understanding the social functions of 
science. Marx's theories have been ignored by psychology not because 
they are wrong in some of their predictions, but because in their 
explanation of human actions and thoughts they attempt to give 
meaning based on an economic determinism that psychology is not 
comfortable with. This meaningful analysis, whether it is incorrect or 
correct, is not the point; the point is that psychology does not even 
debate Marx's theories. Not only Marx's theories but any such socially 
relevant topics, because they are seen as inappropriate. 
Finally, Marx's theories were far from complete with only one of his 
intended seven volumes, Capital, ever finished. So instead of a broad 
theory, his readers have only received one area in depth. Volumes on 
international trade, the state and politics for example were never 
completed before Marx died, so it is no wonder that Marxists place so 
much emphasis on economic theory. It is interesting to think what 
would have been thought of Marx and his theories if they had been 
completed, especially when one considers the main criticism of Marx 
is that it is crude economic determinism and has a lack of flexibility. 
E) Marcuse 
A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom 
prevails in advanced industrial civilisation, a token of 
technical progress. Marcuse ( 1973, p 337 ) 
Marcuse, in his definitive book One Dimensional Man (1964), argues 
that science and technology, of which Psychology is part, is seen as the 
embodiment of all reason, hence all opposition is seen as unrealistic 
and irrational. Psychology plays an important part in labelling such 
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resistance as deficient or deviant in this process. This loss of negativity 
and the power of critical thinking is crucial for Marcuse. Because 
science, psychology included, is in consequence able to pursue 
scientific progress without anyone raising the question of whether it 
should. As Leo Marx (1973 p 26) asserts: "The American belief in the 
inherently beneficial character of science no longer can be taken for 
granted." 
The 'mind set' which replicates the social order of scientific 
rationalism is labelled by Marcuse as One Dimensionality. One 
dimensional society is sustained by positivism which has triumphed 
over negativism. Psychology, as Marcusian analysis believes, is an 
agent of positivism which is the arch rival of negativism. Negative 
thought for Marcuse was determinant, a process where truth is 
revealed. Positivism is the opposite, hiding the truth in an unrealistic 
cloak. Positivism however is seemingly validated by increasing 
technology, seen by the one dimensional individual as harmony 
between theory, practice and truth. But the one dimensional society 
does not question these developments, caring little for the 
consequences. Therefore, scientific progress for Marcuse can control 
and enslave both the individual and the society bringing horrible 
consequences in its name, for example the atomic bomb or the death 
penalty. Yet nobody stops to think if progress is good or bad, or 
consider its application in the real world. This is the nature of 
psychology's relationship to society for Marcuse, that of a larger 
technocratic tyranny. An example of that technocratic tyranny is the 
unprecedented ability of industry to produce new technologies at such a 
pace and with such an impact as to make them impossible to monitor. 
Consequences in such a fast paced progress cannot be seen ahead of 
time and the past methods of science cannot be relied upon to 
understand or control such changes. The rationalism of today's society 
propels science to discover the irresistible new technologies without 
pausing to stop to think whether they should. 
New Forms of Control 
Marcuse warned of the dangers of science to our basic human rights, 
and although rationalism appeared to enhance them, this is not always 
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so. What could be more rational and dangerous to humans rights than 
the suppression of individuality in the mechanisation of socially 
necessary but painful performances. In essence, the regulation of 
competition amongst unequally equipped individuals in the economy is 
a freedom that is not a freedom. As capitalist society has matured, it 
has seemingly removed the need for traditional rights and liberties. As 
Marcuse ( 1973, p 337 ) writes: "The rights and liberties which were 
such vital factors in the origins and earlier stages of industrial society, 
yield to a higher stage of this society: they are losing their traditional 
rationale and content." According to Marcuse freedom of thought, 
speech and enterprise were incorporated into the replacement of the 
obsolete intellectual and material culture by a more rational one due to 
its greater productive capability. Now when advanced western society 
delivers what people want, it seems irrational to embellish such rights 
at the expense of potential benefits gained without them. As a result, 
the greater the capabilities of society, the greater the reasons for 
removing individual rights, so as to be able to continue these 
technological progressions. Consequently, the relative success of such 
societies allows them to rationally demand acceptance of its principles 
and institutions and reduce the promotion of alternatives which go 
against the status quo. When non-conformity is squashed in a bid to get 
a rising standard of living, such trampling of human rights seems 
justified because the person who is non-conforming is socially useless 
and irrational. This is especially so when they risk the tangible 
economic and political advantages and threaten the smooth running of 
the status quo. 
Quite simply Marcuse's materialism is an analysis of capitalist 
modern society when things are good, ie., the psychology and 
motivations behind people's thoughts and actions when things are 
materially advantageous. In contrast, Marx provides an explanation of 
peoples motivations, thoughts and actions when conditions are 
materially more grim. Likewise, Marx identifies false consciousness in 
people whose material position is weak, while Marcuse identifies the 
false consciousness in people whose material conditions are more 
favourable. Both show how false consciousness is an active process 
which effects humans thought and behaviour in both boom and bust 
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economic periods. The two differing commentaries on false 
consciousness are not antagonistic but complementary. 
Freedom 
Freedom is one of the most fundamental rights an individual should 
have, but what that entails changes over time. Economic freedom at the 
turn of the century was the ability to enter the marketplace as the owner 
of ones labour. But now to be economically free is to be free from the 
economy and not have to enter that marketplace. Likewise, political 
freedom is the freedom from politics over which one has no control. 
Intellectual freedom means the restoration of intellectual thought and 
breaking free from public opinion and indoctrination. The freedom of 
enterprise is not altogether a blessing, it is the right to work or to 
starve. If an individual had no longer to prove themselves on the 
market as a free economic subject, the disappearance of this freedom 
would be one of humankind's greatest achievements. 
Traditional rights and freedoms have lost their rationale, but the 
freedom of thought and speech are essential critical values. However 
once a rational society is achieved the existence of that society seems 
to cancel the premise of needing individual rights and liberties. If the 
desire to obtain individual rights and freedoms sounds unrealistic it is 
not because they are utopian, but because of the strength ranged against 
them. The more rational and efficient the administration of society 
becomes, the more unimaginable is the means by which the individual 
might seize their liberation from such a society. 
Needs 
For Marcuse society has developed both true and false needs. 
• False needs are needs which are superimposed. They perpetuate 
toil, aggressiveness and misery. To love and hate is what you have 
been taught to love and hate by the technocratic society. 
• True needs are the needs which have an unqualified claim for 
satisfaction. These needs are the vital needs of nourishment, shelter 
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and clothing. The satisfaction of these needs is necessary for the 
realisation of all other needs. 
Marcuse believes that in the last analysis, the question of what true and 
false needs are must be answered by the individuals themselves, but 
only in the last analysis; that is, when they are free to give their own 
answer. As long as individuals in society remain indoctrinated and 
manipulated they cannot give their true answer. Psychology plays it 
part as one of the 'tribunals' which decide for people which needs 
should be developed, thereby distancing the individual from their true 
needs. Any such organisation for Marcuse is reprehensible as it only 
serves to spread false needs and one dimensional thought. 
Social control is achored in modern society by the new needs it has 
produced, usually in terms of commodities. A one dimensional society 
convinces people they need the latest commodity, but society's price is 
high enough so that only so many can have it. Consequently the desire 
to have these goods keeps labour going, as a certain amount of money 
is needed. Added to the economic pressure is the reinforcement by the 
media and education that the pursuit of these commodities is a just 
reward and goal. The highest productivity can be used to perpetuate 
that labour. People are working for free time and goods to free 
themselves of labour, but to earn more freedom they must do more 
labour. Such domination in the guise of affluence and liberty extends to 
all spheres of life. For in pursuit of liberty people are condemned to 
non liberty and toil. Not only that, Marcuse also believes that the mind 
is geared to accept such toil uncritically through one dimensional 
thought. 
One Dimensional Thought 
One dimensional thought is the state of mind in individuals, a 
variation of Marxist false consciousness by which the one dimensional 
society is sustained. An example of one dimensional thought is when 
liberty in is equated with the range of choice. The range of choice is 
not, however, a degree of freedom; rather what can actually be chosen 
is determinant of how 'free' individuals are. Marcuse ( 1973, p 141 ) 
sums up how something that is seen to be the embodiment of 
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'freedom' in society can really an enemy of that freedom by saying: 
"The free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the 
slaves." Free choice does not signify freedom if these goods and 
services sustain control over lives and cause alienation. 
For a true analysis, more than one dimensional thought is needed. 
Psychology looks at things in a one dimensional way because the social 
structural aspect is left out of its analysis. The psychological view is 
endorses the one dimensional view uncritically with a simple minded 
scientism. Likewise, other traditional institutions besides academia, 
such as religion, that were traditional forms of critical thinking are now 
only ceremonial and encouraged by the status quo. Social historical 
analysis is also vital as it has a fundamental influence. As Gergen 
argues, because( 1973, p 309 ): "An analysis of theory research in 
social psychology reveals that while methods of research are scientific 
in character, theories of social behaviour are primarily reflections of 
contemporary history." 
The Historical Aspects of Knowledge 
The eighteenth century brought marked increments of knowledge 
from the physical sciences. This produced the belief that one could 
apply scientific methods to human behaviour for correspondingly good 
results. As a result it was reasoned that if general principles of human 
behaviour could be developed, social problems and conflicts could be 
removed from society for the benefit of all. But universal facts of 
human action cannot really be developed, because the facts upon which 
they are based do not remain stable. Psychological knowledge cannot 
transcend the social historical boundaries. The laws of society will not 
ever be universal. In a sense psychology is in a 'feedback loop' with 
society, psychology studies society, which feeds back to society, which 
then influences psychology, because psychology is part of that society. 
One Dimensional thought is the price and difficulty of breaking the 
rational logic which bounds our conceptions of what is possible. The 
rationale of one dimensional thought is so hard to break, because all 
areas of society are linked, economic systems mirror scientific etc, by 
logical and intelligent progress. But the logic behind such one 
· dimensional progress is ultimately that 'all progress is good', which 
makes it a sick and false logic to those it apparently serves in society. 
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Rationalism and Logic 
Are rationalism and logic appropriate goals for psychology? Because 
the irrationality of capitalist society's rationality means the productivity 
of a society is destructive of the development of human needs; an 
example is peace being maintained by the constant threat of nuclear 
annihilation. People recognise themselves in their commodities where 
the object world becomes part of a person's self-concept. From this 
'commodity worshiping' it is easy to see how social control as a tool of 
domination is exercised in the needs of the individual. The ve1y 
mechanism which ties the individual to their society has changed from 
the overt physical control of totalitarian societies, to the rational appeal 
of a successful society which can fulfil material needs. In a one 
dimensional society that need is to consume goods and live a 
comfortable life and in this needs name exploitation can be justified. 
There cannot be public services, for example, which may hurt private 
profit, hence a challenge to such changes to the health system to 
maximise profit at the expense of health is seemingly irrational and 
unfair. Progress cannot be rationally be challenged, so progress is the 
perfect instrument of domination. Indeed what could be more 
reasonable than the regulation of free economic activity amongst 
unequally equipped economic subjects. Or the impediment of national 
sovereignties that get in the way of international economic unification. 
The inner self, where opposition to the status quo is born, is gradually 
whittled down, and the dimension of negative thinking is lost. Reason 
is achieved by a material process through which advanced industrial 
society silences and reconciles the opposition. 
Marcuse argues that the impact of progress turns reason into 
submission to the material facts of life and psychology produces and 
reinforces these facts. The individual identifies themselves with an 
imposed existence and alienation ensues. Later at a more progressive 
stage of alienation, the false consciousness of rationality becomes the 
true consciousness and accordingly that ideology becomes the reality. 
Ideas, aspirations and objectives that, by their content transcend the 
established universe, are in one dimensional thought either repelled or 
reduced to terms of this universe and redefined by the rationality of the 
given system. For example, the alluring output of the entertainment and 
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information industries carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, 
certain intellectual and emotional reactions which binds the worker to 
the producers. While indoctrinating and manipulating, these products 
are immune to their own falsehood. 
For Marcuse the defining aspects of society are as follows: A union 
of productivity and destructiveness and the surrender of negative 
thought to the powers that be. Furthermore the preservation of wealth 
in the face of unprecedented misery is rationalised as the driving force 
behind society. Consequently, confronted with the achievements of 
society, critical theory and the individual are left without a rationale to 
transcend this society. 
F) Realism and Reality 
There is an assumption still prevalent in psychology that is described 
by Osbeck as follows ( 1993, p 338 ): 
... that an objective world exists out there somewhere that lends itself 
to observation and which can be broken down into quantifiable 
terms permitting statistical comparison, which is still meaningful, 
true, accurate, to the world from which it was divulged. 
The obvious limitations of our imperfect minds make it clear that this 
statement cannot be completely true apart from the existence of an 
objective world. For as humans we have not achieved the qualitative or 
quantitative scientific progress required to understand reality totally 
accurately. Psychology must be pragmatic instead. Currently 
psychology is a matter of observing phenomena as accurately as 
possible and delivering predictions about what is likely to happen in 
certain circumstances. Realism believes however that objects in the 
physical, psychological and social exist with properties independent of 
our theories of them. A more extended discussion of these and the 
following points about realism and where they were taken from can be 
found in Greenwood (1992), Rescher (1987) and Aronson (1984) 
Realism recognises the social dimensions of human actions and 
Psychological states but without the social constructionist denial of a 
physical independent reality. Realism avoids the methodological 
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senility of Empiricism while at the same time preservmg the 
fundamental scientific quest for knowledge. 
Scientific Realism 
Scientific Realism maintains as Greenwood (1992) believes that the 
linguistic objectivity of scientific theories Empiricism denies. It 
believes the proof of a given theoretical proposition is independent of 
the semantics used to explain it. Operational definitions play little part 
in Scientific Realism in the determination of meaning and theoretical 
propositions, as opposed to Empiricism. Or that a testable prediction 
has to be stated in scientific theory. For example when attempting to 
create predictions of emotion, scientific theories must be used in 
combination with auxiliary theories, which incorporate cultural specific 
knowledge of what that 'emotion' constitutes. The meaning of 
propositions is determined by theory and the descriptions are quite 
independent of the empirical laws they attempt to explain. The 
psychological state is not always causal in human action for the 
scientific realist even though it may be present. 
Realism accepts that descriptions of reality may be false, that they 
are symbolic guesses, which make the science of Psychology possible. 
A theoretical concept may be socially constructed but that does not 
prevent us from believing that it can represent a more realistic and 
accurate description of reality than alternative theoretical possibilities. 
Scientific Realism and the belief in the ability of science to describe 
reality, must be tempered, by the gap between scientific theories and 
reality itself. Indeed the realism espoused by science is often more of 
intent than achievement as science changes its mind relatively regularly 
according to what are perceived as the facts at the time. Nor does it 
seem warranted to suppose a future juncture will be achieved when 
science correctly characterises physical reality. Science should be seen 
as estimating reality, but that estimation is not necessarily accurate. 
Observation is still the main method of conformation and analysis of 
phenomena yet clearly observation is no longer adequate to determine 
reality accurately. This leads to a position which believes that 
theoretical entities do exist independently, but that they do not actually 
exist necessarily in the way current science claims. Science does 
however have the right general idea, that indeed there is a loose 
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connection between science's ideas and reality. The result of this rough 
consonance is that science can be improved but not perfected. For even 
though the attainment of the ideal is impossible the pursuit is still 
worthwhile. For, the benefits and value of a realist position for 
Psychology lies not in the attainment of the ideal, ie discovery of the 
'real', true world, but in its pursuit. In fact, realising science's 
limitations as a human activity, does not make the pursuit of truth 
useless; indeed it does not remove truth's existence. The alternative to 
pursuing truth is to pay the price of ignorance. For there is a possibility 
one may be completely accurate in describing reality, but more 
importantly, the pursuit of truth produces the ultimate good for science 
in terms of worthwhile results. 
Conclusion 
The basic assumptions of realism can be summed up as follows: 
• There is a mind independent physical reality. 
• We can know something about that reality by gathering accurate 
information about its nature. 
• This descriptive knowledge of reality characterises itself, in terms 
of referents that are independent and do not hinge on some 
particular human perspective. That reality is independent of the 
particular ways and means used by inquiries in forming their 
picture of what is real. 
• We can, however, only use our own concepts to address our own 
issues. 
• The evidence which inform us about the reality independent of our 
conception of it is provided by a theory's ability to predict and 
explain a large number of phenomena even if they are 
• 
unobservable. 
• On the relationship between theory and observation, realists believe 
there is much more to perception than the experiencing of data. 
Observation contains many assumptions of a highly theoretical 
nature. 
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An explanation of human action should be constituted by human 
beliefs, motives and bias, for those are the meaningful part of humans 
for psychology to study. This does not mean however that 
psychologists are locked in a world of unrestrained bias and 
subjectivism. However, they should accept that there is a world outside 
of us, independent of our own conception. Different theories however, 
can be judged by a pragmatic standard against each other to see which 
is the more useful. In other words by competitively comparing different 
theories of the world humans can make progress in understanding that 
world. The methodology of psychology should be designed to help us 
understand this objective world by taking into account our own 
limitations, and hopefully turn them into strengths. The methods of 
psychology must not proclaim as they do now that they can conquer the 
subjective self and will lead to a scientific utopia. Theories should be 
understood as resting on the pragmatic idea that if we did not take our 
experience to serve as an indication of objective facts, then we could 
not validate any objective claims whatsoever. 
G) Psychology's Relationship to Society 
There are many concerns arising directly from a consideration of the 
relationship of science to society. These as follows: 
Damage to the Environment 
Damage to the environment through psychology, although probably 
not as great a concern as in the physical sciences, is still an important 
aspect of psychology's relationship to society that needs to be 
recognised. Especially so, since Psychology is, or should be 
responsible for monitoring the effects of technology on the human 
population. Drugs, food additives or noise pollution are a few 
examples of where Psychology should be involved. There are plenty of 
instances where the products of technology should not be allowed to 
spread on society in an unregulated or uncontrolled way. Questions 
such as 'who has the right to monitor'? 'Whose interests do they 
serve'? 'Is there too much restriction of science'? All such questions 
arise when considering the relationship of Psychology to society. 
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Slippery Slope Technology 
Technology provides a means, and a potential, to perform acts 
against people's morals or wishes. Psychology can also assist such acts 
by legitimising or making available techniques by not acting on 
knowledge that this may hurt some people in terms of psychological 
damage. In particular, there has been tremendous debate over whether 
experiments without informed consent should be allowed and what 
potential harm can arise form such experiments. How exactly does 
entering an experiment with or without consent change a subject's life? 
The subject or the psychologist may not even be aware of changes 
when they have happened. The problem is that to get a realistic setting 
and reaction, the experiments must be conducted without the subject 
knowing what the experiment is about, or even that it is an experiment; 
to achieve this deception must be used. 
The trite remark that 'any progress is good progress', is out of date, 
simply because some forms of knowledge are incompatible with our 
ability to deal with them either socially, morally or humanely. 
Economically Exploitative Technology 
The discord reflects an increasingly obvious discrepancy between 
what science provides in the way of certain verifiable knowledge 
and what mankind would have in the way of a meaningful 
existence. Marx ( 1973, p 73 ) 
Should large amounts of public money be used to fund projects 
which psychology works on? Especially if some of the public may not 
like the consequences, or agree with the beliefs of the psychologist? Or 
if only a few of the public will derive any benefit from research. 
Is it right that a psychologist should make money from those he or 
she is trying to help? Is making money exploiting those who have been 
exploited and are coming to the psychologist to seek help. How much 
payment and from what source is appropriate?, and what strings are 
attached with such payment? All these issues will be dealt with in 
much greater depth in chapter four. They are issues of economics and 
how they shape how psychology works. The economic relation is one 
of the more obvious relationships psychology has to society and one 
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which profoundly effects it as a science. Unorthodox research, for 
example, is less likely to be funded due to the perceived greater risk by 
funding agencies. 
Human Subjects Research 
Psychological research is restricted necessarily by societal norms and 
morals. For example, psychology has trouble justifying giving lethal 
injections or toxic chemicals to its human subjects. The tolerable limits 
of physical and psychological deprivation or pain cannot be 
investigated, even if the subjects volunteer. This is a powe1ful and 
fundamental aspect of the relationship of psychology to society. 
Society's moral rights and standards protect the individual and cannot 
be overridden. Here is a psychological-social factor which governs 
what psychology can and cannot do and covertly influences how 
psychologists are allowed to think. 
Subversive Knowledge 
Subversive knowledge is where knowledge conflicts with ruling 
ideology or where society believes scientific knowledge is not 
particularly attractive to its self concept. If knowledge flies in the face 
of what society holds dear such knowledge can provoke an extreme 
reaction. Psychology has the potential to discover knowledge that could 
be particularly disturbing for the society. Psychology also has the 
responsibility of picking up the pieces of a persons mental state if they 
have found knowledge that will severely harm them. 
Accidents in Psychology 
This potential relationship to society of an emergency tends not to 
happen very often in psychology. Psychology's role is to prevent such 
accidents from happening by identifying what the human is capable of 
and what series of events may produce disaster. One hot topic at the 
moment is the escape of a super bug and altering the gene pool though 
Recombinant DNA; the fusing together of DNA, inserting it into 
bacteria and multiplying indefinitely, possibly creating a killer bug. 
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Other techniques of genetic engineering which are possible right now 
are to insert a gene into a germ cell- cells that transmit their genes to 
our offspring. This creates a permanent alteration of the types of 
genetic information that constitutes our species. This is not allowed by 
science but who can really stop someone doing this? 
Prejudicial Science 
The implications of psychological knowledge are not restricted to the 
scientific world. In intelligence research, Sociology argues that such 
knowledge has the potential to be interpreted in such a way as to 
further certain philosophical-political movements at the expense of 
individuals in society. If scientific knowledge or theories that are 
developed are perceived to support one section of society over another, 
then the potential for conflict is great. If one section of society is 
suitably enraged by the position of another, the psychological 
establishment may be included in the backlash. The relationship of 
psychology to society is therefore a complicated and interactive one. 
H) Conclusion 
It is clear that society is deeply affected by science and technology in 
complicated, ambiguous and even disturbing ways. Scientists are not 
the perfect judges of what is acceptable to society and the use of lay 
people alone can also be disastrous. Indeed, if you give an individual 
group responsibility often they are harder on that group than an 
outsider. Creating both lay and psychological representatives, seems 
the only acceptable position. At all times psychology should remember, 
to paraphrase Robert Kennedy, that the greatest value of science is not 
what it does for Psychologists, but what it does for society. 
I) Summary 
In the social sciences there seems to be two extreme responses to 
every argument, macroscopic verse microscopic, matter over mind 
verse mind over matter and social bias verse biological bias for 
example. Each perspective views the same problems from a different 
set of assumptions. The different assumptions, or ideologies, determine 
how psychology conceptualises, defines and deals with the object of 
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study. Psychologists alienate the human through reifying the process of 
life by abstraction and methodology. Psychology's specialisation 
becomes a trained incapacity that differentiates humanity into concepts 
that give only a limited explanation. A pragmatic synthesis is what 
psychology should strive for. Hopefully it will develop the ability to act 
effectively on human concerns rather than to promise. How and when 
that synthesis may come about does not seem clear, but this is no 
excuse for not trying; at least trying to achieve it would be a nice 
change. Psychology looks at relationships under certain specified 
variables, usually not relying on a more broad description and 
interpretation of the relationship between the context and the behaviour 
in question. Such an outlook can never capture the meaningful 
relations between society and its individuals. 
Chapter Four 
Implications of Psychology's Relationship with 
Society 
A) Psychology Perpetuates the Status Quo 
The relationship between psychology and society is powe1ful, but it 
is a relationship limited poor value for psychologists and even less 
value for humanity. Psychology is achieving its goal of affecting 
society, but it is not achieving the best for society's individuals. What 
psychology in fact delivers is not only not good enough, but even at 
times, diametrically opposed to the goal of benefiting the individual. 
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Psychology shies away from seemingly interfering subjectivity and 
hides under a mantle of scientific 'purity', when in fact the social 
structural influences exert considerable influence amongst its ranks. 
For example psychology does not investigate the relationship it has to 
those that financially support it as part of its scientific activities. 
Psychology is at best shy to admit to its larger institutional functions 
and at worst lies about its more insidious capabilities and activities. As 
Prilleltensky ( 1989, p795 ) comments: "Psychology and society are 
involved in a network of mutual influences that contribute to shape 
each other." 
Why is psychology's relationship to society, then, one of denial? 
Primarily, it is a form of false consciousness, resulting from poor 
education, the use of a poor scientific method and mainly because 
those with power are trying to keep it from those without. While 
psychology has entered the competitive market economy, it has lost 
sight of the effect this society has on its science. Indeed 'capitalism' is 
a dirty word in psychology, which means other valuable and 
fundamental terms such as 'commodity' or 'market' are simply not 
used. These and many other essential concepts of human motivation 
are left out of psychological analysis because they are seen as 
inappropriate for scientific study. All these prime motivational factors 
which would have been accepted had a materialist analysis been used 
instead, have seemingly been ignored and attacked by a cult of 
individuality. Consequently, with such tunnel vision focusing 
exclusively on the individual, and not society, it is no surprise that 
Psychology is far from recognising and understanding the major 
problems of society, the factors that really motivates people are 
unmistakably tied to the material and economic world. 
Psychology has yet to recognise the fact that the assumptions it makes 
are a reflection of the society in which its professionals are socialised. 
In terms of Marcusian critical analysis, it is unable to critically examine 
the dominant parts of society of which it is a part of. Instead, some sort 
of compromise position is maintained, whereby ignoring some of the 
major influences on human lives, psychologists somehow expect to be 
able to understand these same influences! By failing to examine this 
interplay between social structure and individual subjectivity, 
Psychology can be justly charged with reinforcing the status quo. 
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Because as Handy ( 1987, p 162 ) states:" ... the emphasis on 
individualism may help legitimate dominant groups within society by 
obscuring structural inequalities behind a facade of equal 
opportunities."! believe that psychology must acknowledge and use 
rather than ignore the social structural forces in society. Not to do this 
is to avoid doing anything meaningful towards helping people combat 
negative social structural forces, as well as reinforcing the existing 
social structure of exploitation. 
B) Psychology Reinforces and Replicates the Status 
Quo 
What Psychologists Do 
Many assume that psychologists spend most of their time 
scientifically observing and explaining human behaviour and thought. 
However, unfortunately this only consumes a fraction of their time. 
Mostly psychologists give lectures, grade papers, attend conferences, 
write reports, sit on committees, seek positions and promotion, conduct 
therapy or consult, and then spend a large proportion of their day, as is 
natural, away from their job. The reality is that psychologists largely 
engage in activities which maintain and improve their economic status. 
The psychologist when interacting with society inevitably does so 
from a biased position. Three major positions of ideology and bias are 
listed. 
• The psychologist as moraliser uses and believes in personal 
morality. 
• The psychologist as scientist, uses and believes in 
psychology's organising body, institution, methodology and 
paradigm. The psychologist accepts implicitly the morality 
of the larger organising body. 
• The psychologist as mediator or therapist believes that one 
side is right. This is to assume that the true answer to the 
problem is out there to be found. 
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As part of society psychologists have an obligation to help clear up 
some of the problems they have created or enlarged. But the social 
implications of new developments are not considered as seriously as 
they should because psychology's applications were produced in a 
scientific environment where social context was not taken into account. 
Accordingly, even though psychology's applications may be developed 
with the best of intentions, its applications cannot be guaranteed to 
work for those good intentions. For example, Industrial psychology has 
used personality tests to steer people into dull, oppressive jobs, 
including or excluding them from various types of employment. This 
has had a negative influence upon many lives. Underlying many of 
psychology's applications and therapies is an inherent belief that the 
solution of people's problems lies totally within. This is different from 
teaching people that the responsibility of getting better or helping 
themselves, lies within them, but realising that the problems they face 
are not necessarily caused by them. For the social system is 
fundamentally exploitative and oppressive. Psychology must realise 
that people are limited by the economic and rational factors placed 
upon them by the situation they are in, while still getting people to 
manage the situation they find themselves in to further personal 
growth. 
The nature of science is that it refers back to a normative standard or 
average, which has a consequence of discriminating against the 
extremes. In society these extremes are usually minority groups which 
are unfairly isolated by society. Consequently, if the true relationship of 
psychological science to society is not understood, the design and 
application of psychological techniques will be made without an 
awareness of the pragmatic and practical consequences to all members 
of society, not just the average person. 
Behaviour modification for example requires value judgements to 
decide exactly what needs modifying. However, such judgements are 
not made in splendid scientific isolation and purity of reasoning. The 
net effect of ignoring influences which are non scientific in the process 
of making judgements is to naturally let their influence run unchecked. 
Prilleltensky ( 1989, p 795-796 ) outlines the two options Psychology 
has, and which one it takes: 
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... psychology can influence society in two opposite directions: 
a) It can reaffirm or reinforce existing policies and 
consequently ratify the status quo, orb) it can criticise the 
social order and thus foster changes, practically the former 
outweighs the latter. 
And Prilleltensky ( 1989, p 800) further explains this process: 
.. .immunity to ideological influences within the profession has 
obstructed an in depth examination of the interaction 
between the social forces and psychology. The penetration 
of the prevalent ideology in the realm of psychological 
knowledge often results in not only an uncritical acceptance 
of the status quo but also the active endorsement of it. 
Industrial psychology is a particularly reprehensible example of this 
endorsement: it describes the capitalist means of production as an ideal 
which 'naturally' people become part of, and that it represents all that 
is good in human behaviour. Simply by describing behaviour in an 
industrial setting means that psychology is linking capitalist work to 
the human as a natural psychological process. In reality, however, it is 
a process of social-historical influence, social structural forces 
operating on individuals to make them exploitable or to exploit them. 
If psychology studies the industrial world with an analysis that is 
uncritical, without a social structural component, then that world is 
seen as natural and given. As a matter of fact, ideals may be so deeply 
rooted in an individuals consciousness, that to resist them would seem 
nonsensical. Many other views of the capitalist system, (Marxist, 
Weberian) see it as exploitative and oppressive. Industrial Psychology 
has made work a functional thing, as Industrial psychology is a form of 
functionalist psychology. Functionalism believes that all actors and 
actions in society have a purpose, a function which is good and 
intended for that society and its inhabitants. For example the alcoholics 
on park benches have a purpose because they teach children not to 
drink to excess. Unfortunately this school of thought paints inequalities 
and misfortunes in society as being natural and inherently necessary for 
the smooth running of society. This may be partially true but it does not 
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make it right! This prominent ideology in psychology highlights its 
exploitative function verses its potential to become a liberating, 
subjective and meaningful discipline. 
An example of how psychology supports the status quo is given by 
Sarason (1981), when he outlines psychology's involvement in the 
development of the interstate highways in the United States of 
America. Psychology in this instance 'lovingly' ( Using Sarason own 
words), adopted support for such a network of super highways. 
Psychologists at the time saw no need to investigate any of the 
important potential effects on people such as: 
1) Where the people living in the Ghettos would be forced 
to go to. 
2) the potential removal of a sense of belonging-without 
roots 
3) the effect of suburbanisation. 
4) the effect on the railroad system. 
5) the effect on family life and organisation. 
6) the social and environmental health of cities would 
decline. 
All of these potential effects, of course, occurred. It was not that the 
policy was mindless, but that psychology sided with the status quo 
without critically questioning the project. Naturally, psychology's 
rationale for support of such a project was based on the belief that 
economic growth is necessary and good and whatever contributes to 
economic growth contributes to individual well being. 
Without an in depth or qualitative analysis of social structural forces, 
there seems no sensible reason how anyone could be against such 
'progress'. The attitude that 'all progress is good' is a shared ideology 
of both psychology and society. 
Capitalism bends its will upon systems such as health, education, 
one by one, to fit its mode production. Against such an intrusion 
psychology has not put up a stern defence; rather it has taken the easy 
option of adopting a position of supporting the capitalist system with 
no genuine debate over whether it should. 
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C) Psychology and Society are m Relationship of Mutual 
Benefit 
If the institutional worlds of science and of politics 
have been badly mixed up over the past quarter-century, 
it has been less a case of violation by superior 
force than of mutual seduction. Price ( 1978, p 89 ) 
The capitalist system gives Psychology rewards and power for its 
compliance. Coons (1990, p 140) has this to say about Psychology's 
desire for rewards: " ... the personal comfort of psychologists is taking 
place over formal goals of developing knowledge and applying it for 
the betterment of society." There is an unstated acceptance of the 
social order by psychology in return for respect from that order. 
Psychologists like anyone else want to improve their job status, job 
security and income, and this inevitably affects psychological science. 
That is, to make money and retain a professional identity survival 
tactics are needed. Simply ignoring structural effects such as class does 
not mean that they will have any less influence. If anything they will 
become more powerful as the unchecked effect on psychology grows. 
The prime motivation of Psychologist's has become to sustain 
psychology's place in the market, not to reform the system for the 
benefit of others. Indeed, the financial means not only outweigh the 
academic ends, but the ends have nearly ceased to receive 
consideration. 
One social reward structure which has a direct and tangible influence 
on psychology is research funding. Research in a capitalist society 
requires substantial funds, which come largely from the government or 
from private social organisations. As in any transaction involving 
money, psychologists are entering into a situation of economics and 
they cannot just help themselves to a 'free lunch'. As a result no 
academic activity is free of economic strings. An outline of these 
'strings' is needed. In the post-war years governmental funding 
increased and psychologists adopted the 'take now and ask questions 
later' approach. When the funding was reduced psychologists found 
themselves in a position of having to justify their research to their 
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institutional masters. Psychology entered the transactions of the 
capitalist system and therefore became part of the exploitative and 
alienating means of production. Hence, psychology's aims are not to 
help the majority in society escape from exploitation, or address the 
problems these influences produced, because the wider desire of 
capitalist society does demand it. Rather, psychology's purpose was to 
control its citizens to reproduce the status quo. As a result, a 
psychologists labour is sold like any other commodity on the market. It 
is a relationship of increasing commitment and competition. But like 
any actor on the market, psychology cannot control the process and 
will have to make more and more scientific sacrifices in the interests of 
staying economically viable. Creation of wealth has become and will 
continue to be the motivating factor for psychologists, not necessarily 
because they are inherently greedy, but because in a capitalist society 
this demand cannot be helped. Generating surplus wealth is an urgent 
motivating factor in ever increasing force. Psychology has learnt that 
how many dollars it gets is ultimately dependent on how useful it is to 
the exploitative powers, and so if has had to become more and more 
competitive. Even if psychology can survive as a profession, the 
integrity of psychologists as independent scientists working for the 
interests of the individuals will not survive. The clear message is that 
to get a reward mainstream publications are required, as opposed to 
maverick explorations, or criticism. The discipline, and its 
practitioners, must conform to the economic realities of life at the 
expense of the scientific. 
By using a poor analysis of its work, one that ignores economic 
factors, psychology will claim that the aforementioned effects are not 
happening. Through its unfortunate refusal to incorporate into its 
analysis any notion of social-historical forces psychology fails to see 
the materialist influences acting upon its work and the behaviour of 
those it studies. Indeed educational cutbacks are probably endorsed by 
psychologists as 'necessary rationalisations' of the education sector, 
that the university and schools must become businesses to be 'fair' to 
the rest of society. But is it fair when the educational sector ceases to 
provide independent institutions which search for knowledge that 
serves society? Those responsible for the sale are part of the cult of 
free-market rationalism. But what of the alternative? The problem is 
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that if psychology makes a stand it will suffer the consequences, not 
least of which will be a loss of funding. But, it will at least have 
integrity and the best interests at heart of those that come to it for help. 
It will be in a position to genuinely help those who seek assistance by 
being a science which understands the reflective influence of the 
society and the individual on each other. As a science it will now make 
real progress. Unfortunately, this is probably a dream as psychology 
continues to pat itself on the back while largely ignoring other critical 
views. 
The relationship between psychology and the powerful elements of 
society has been one of mutual benefit. The benefits are partly 
responsible for psychology's inability to look at the science-society 
relationship in a critical light. The inability to examine this relationship 
credibly will be discussed later. 
D) Psychology as an Institution 
Organisations are replete with competing ideologies, and 
goals must function within turbulent environments with 
complex technologies and threatening political climates." 
Bjoe ( 1982, p 18) 
Myth-making is an adaptive mechanism whereby groups 
in an organisation maintain logic frameworks to attribute 
meaning to activities and events. Bjoe ( 1982, p 18) 
Psychology is located within an institutional framework where 
benefits are gained in terms of power and privilege. Psychology's 
relationship to society is that of an institution of society and, therefore, 
any knowledge produced is institutional knowledge. The institution 
restricts those who would be psychologists to those who have entered it 
and passed the rites of passage. Also the institution is supported by the 
existing social order which expects compliance of that institution to 
perform and replicate functions. Likewise, the status quo is also 
dependant on the institution for its support. 
Because it is an environment of mutual benefit psychology finds it 
very hard to challenge the existing social order. More precisely, if there 
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was to be a major change to the methods and analysis of research 
which separated psychology from its institutional shelter, psychology 
would suffer the equivalent of a nervous breakdown. Such a change 
would be too much for psychologists, set in their comfortable 
institutional ways to come to terms with. Furthermore all previous 
work done would have to be reassessed as to its true value, and it is 
these thoughts of the anticipated chaos which is partly stopping such a 
reorganisation. In particular, psychologists who have the biggest 
reputations and the greatest power to make such a change possible are 
also the least likely to do so, because they have the most to lose. 
Bramel and Friend (1981, p 887), outline this attitude when 
commenting on the Hawthorne studies: 
... why should they (psychologists) bother to go back to examine 
the basic research documents if the authoritative 
interpretations appear so consistent with their cognitive 
world and material interests. 
Psychologists, it seems, have fallen prey to their own disconfirming 
observation bias. By ignoring the influence society has on itself and the 
problems it addresses, psychology is unable to address the social-
structural aspects of individual's problems. This has led psychology to 
serve, as Sampson ( 1981, p 780) believes: " ... an isolating, atomising, 
individualising and alienating function." In society the psychologist is 
put on an empirically privileged pedestal above the lay person. But a 
reason why psychology is a more vulnerable science than most is due 
to the amount of psychology eve1yday people do. It must, therefore, 
strive to be different and superior to the lay person, desperately ttying 
to distance itself from real society and its genuine concerns. Money and 
poverty for example are almost dirty words. Psychologists find it 
difficult to maintain their professional territ01y whereas other sciences 
have little fear of a takeover. Everyone in a society is familiar with 
psychology: physicians, teachers, clergy and children all use and know 
it to some degree. Psychology is in effect an explanation of what 
eve1ybody already knows. The result of this is that psychologist's are 
trying to perfect their role as a scientist whereas it should be a role of 
perfecting science. Weiss asserts that ( 1973, p 93 ): 
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What is really crucial is that as a social institution supported by 
those most satisfied with American society and unwilling to take 
seriously major criticisms of it, the university has simply refused 
to use its virtual monopoly of brains to stand apart from society 
and view it critically . 
... the university and the college are part of the ruling establishment 
and work entirely in its uncritical spirit. Weiss, ( 1973, p 94) 
Institutional knowledge is developed by power relationships of 
competition for financial gain, and any knowledge gained is used for 
the same goals. The knowledge formulation, in psychology's case 
scientific "facts", is a process of agreement and opinion. Individuals 
with the most power have the most say in determining knowledge; 
others who have not entered the system of the institution are denied any 
influence in this process of knowledge production. The wider society 
therefore, is denied the power of deciding reality. From this situation 
of power psychologists are able to mould themselves into a position in 
the marketplace from where they can command reward and power by 
making their knowledge-production exclusive. After several years of 
impoverishment students of psychology see others their age are 
working and relatively wealthy and find such a proposition ve1y 
attractive. Accordingly, the desire for power is produced by this 
relationship to society. 
Psychology does not map onto the real world particularly well. Or, in 
a more sinister light, psychology uses terms of reference apart from 
ordinary people's experience to place a divide between those who know 
and those that do not. If science matches reality, then science becomes 
accessible. If the ordinary person felt as though they could participate 
the in power psychology holds as an institution would cease to exist. 
The tradition of separating scientists into institutional departmental 
boxes has been challenged by interdisciplina1y research. Sewell (1989) 
reviews such a challenge by a group of psychologists, statisticians, 
anthropologists, political scientists, psychiatrists and sociologists in 
investigating the effects of bombing on Japanese citizens. He 
concludes that, although this interdisciplinary study, among others, was 
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relatively successful, this fact was largely ignored due to the threat it 
posed to the institutional structure. Interdisciplinary research goes 
against the status quo of several departments in competition for the 
resources available. Not only is interdisciplinary research analogous to 
departmental funding, it is also threatening to the departmental 
structure itself. Its benefits, especially in theory development have been 
pushed aside, because a model of cooperation is inconsistent with the 
societal goals of strength through competition. This idea that 
competition and adversarial interaction are good for all of society 
including science is securely established. Such a common theme of 
strength through competition and individualism runs rife in the social 
dogmas including the American Constitution, Social Darwinism, our 
education system and adversarial politics. It is yet another example of 
Psychology's scientific potential relationship to society being sacrificed 
for its economic relationship to society. There is, however, nothing 
inherently wrong with competition as long as it is not seen as the only 
alternative. Darwinism and Capitalism both serve to make each other 
seem natural, inevitable and without alternative. Psychology, far from 
being willing to analyse Capitalism in meaningful terms, or even 
maintain a neutral stance, has through such applications as Industrial 
Psychology actively tried to improve the efficiency of this existing 
system. 
The Issues of Funding 
... on the campus yesterdays partner now appears increasingly as 
today's oppressor, indispensable but stingy, and ever more 
intrusive. Miller ( 1978, p 33) 
Educational institutions are being changed from communities of 
colleagues who work together because they share interests, 
values, and goals to collections of individuals that function 
as groups through formal controls and contractual 
arrangements. Bevan ( 1980, p 200) 
The funding of psychology is perhaps the most apparent and tangible 
relationship psychology has with its society. The character of this 
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relationship is competition for a scarce resource. In meaningful terms 
this means there is not enough money to go around. The link is simple: 
when funds are increased, research is increased and the more 
psychologists are employed to work. Institutional groups (eg 
companies) such as the government represent structural forces which 
do not necessarily speak or work for the common good. To survive 
therefore, psychology must perform and analyse research not on criteria 
of a strictly scientific kind but according to other vested interests. In 
particular, whether if the funding is of a certain nature then will the end 
result be a psychology of that same nature? 
In the university system psychology adopts the larger societal 
methods of payment and competition even though officially the 
university is supposed to be an exception where money does not stand 
in the way of science, Hall ( 1983, p 90) puts it this way: 
University develops its reward structure on the assumption 
that the faculty is an aggregate of atomised, identical 
persons who should be evaluated on the basis of 
individual achievements based on universal criteria. 
They have rejected the idea that a department is a 
community of scholars of a network of overlapping 
relationships and that knowledge is a dialogue and a 
product of collaboration. How, they argue, could you 
give salary increases and promotions in such a system? 
One must question the priorities of psychology and the university in 
general. For, as we can see, the university is not set up as a system to 
produce the best students and the best science, but rather to get the 
most efficient system of payment. This is the economic reality of 
psychology, and it influences all areas of the field's contact with 
society. Why are people not up in arms about this? Once again an 
insight to the reason can be found in social structural analysis 
Psychology does not disrupt the prescribed view of the dominant 
structures in society, and thereby keeps everybody 'happy'. 
In the scramble for money the more outrageous claims are the ones 
which are likely to attract and be heard over the many voices 
clamouring for funding. For it is said a half truth like a half brick flies 
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further. Instead of funding being allocated on scientific merit, it is 
delivered on the grounds of the fantastic, only further hurting 
psychology's reputation. The aims of the science as a whole are in 
jeopardy; a potentially benevolent relationship with human society has 
become a potentially malevolent one. 
Ash ( 1992, p 198 ), has this to say about how the lack of attention 
paid to the nature of the funding: 
Researchers tend to underestimate the broader social 
and cultural contexts such as funding sources and 
the relationships of particular research topics and 
goals to larger societal pressures or issues. 
Indeed, certain areas of study are more attractive to the funding 
organisations and will be funded. Research that is not so attractive will 
not gain this support. Because psychology and psychologists are in 
effect part of the capitalist system of monetary reward, one can see the 
scientific problem that arises. Naturally, as a means of survival 
psychologists are attracted to doing the research that will be funded. 
Thus rather than research being motivated for scientific reasons is now 
motivated for financial means. Psychologists must be careful now to 
prove their worth to funding agencies lest that money be further 
reduced. By accepting the big dollars in the past we have sold the 
future of our science down the river. As a consequence psychology is 
wholly reliant on keeping the good will of interests non scientific. 
Psychology must now learn to say 'no' and be strong enough to give up 
what has been given by saying 'yes'. For as Benjamin Franklin once 
said 'those that give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary 
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.' 
And yet why are such matters of the nature of funding and its 
implications seldom raised? McNicol (1988, p 277) answers as 
follows: "It is difficult for the academic departments or their 
institutions to ask these questions of themselves, and so they have 
tended to go unanswered." The apparent lack of a motivation to ask the 
questions, who is funding us and why? is explained in more forthright 
fashion by Scriven (1980, p 66): 
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The pigs have got their snouts in the trough and everyone 
else can be counted on either to keep quiet so as not to 
jeopardise their chances, or to be dismissed as crying sour 
grapes. 
Theoretically condemning the nature of funding as corruptible and 
unscientific is tempered by the knowledge that pragmatically their is 
little option but to accept such funds. It would indeed be in 
psychology's interests to have a perfect system of ample funding with 
no ties but that is impossible. The problem of monetary price and 
exchange for scientific work is not easily solvable either, as it is in the 
interests of the funding institutions to exert influence and control. 
So what can Psychology do if the situation is unavoidable? The 
answer is that it must actively and therorectically acknowledge its 
economic relationship to society. It must learn to become political and 
enlist economists in its ranks. It cannot remain purely psychological if 
it is to remain in credit both financially and morally to its clients. 
Perhaps if the funds are used for the benefit of the public on a 
meaningful level, goodwill and funding will be increased. To gain 
more power as a lobby group at a governmental level would require 
psychology to have a practical and meaningful effect on peoples lives 
for their good cannot longer afford to be socially irrelevant. To remain 
morally and financially in credit it must 'play' the system at its own 
game, and any thought of benevolent governmental funding has to go. 
Instead, it must learn to become aggressive in a financial way if it is to 
become a science which acts for the benefit of the greater good. The 
paradox is that to stop economics controlling its science, psychology 
must not ignore economics but learn to control it. 
There is danger, however, that psychology will become a victim of 
its own success. First, if psychology becomes successful it will come 
under direct public pressure, and second it may be patronised or 
punished for the anticipated use to which the new knowledge might be 
put. For these reasons therefore, the production of knowledge within 
psychology is partially determined by outside pressures rather than by 
the psychologists themselves. Psychologists must take these pressures 
into account. 
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The lay public should have the power of veto in deciding what public 
money should be spent on, science funding included. This does not 
restrict freedom as the psychologist is still free to pursue private 
funding or use their own funds. If the idea a psychologist is good 
enough it should pay dividends. It falls upon the psychologists to 
improve their voice in the funding ear. It will not do so by seeing itself 
as pure science without relationship to society. 
In America while Ronald Regan was President. A special screening 
panel reviewed each social science research proposal to assure it 
passed the politically defined, litmus test of the 'National Institute of 
Mental Health'. Before psychologists are given the privilege of 
studying humanity an understanding and improvement of what really 
motivates psychologists and what to what extent non scientific interests 
effect scientific ones is needed. 
Journals and the Motivation to Publish 
Editors of research journals want experiments of new case studies 
because they sell. Endless repetition in their journals does not attract 
the psychological community to buy their journal. The number of 
published journal articles correlates to psychologist's status, pay and 
promotion opportunities. So if journals are interested in new research, 
then it is to this that psychologists will pay most attention. Influential 
journals will naturally endorse the mainstream, (naturally), because 
mainstream articles sell to the mainstream, which is the richest and 
biggest market. The unresolved problem, however, is that it is not 
questioned whether this approach is the correct one to take. Research is 
motivated not by the desire to further science, a but by a desire to 
succeed in the most prestigious journals and thus secure financial 
stability. The articles published are determined not by what is the best 
science but by what will sell and the two do not always go together. 
Kressel (1993, p51) produced a succinct series of points outlining 
what increases a psychologist's chances of being published and 
therefore the driving motivations behind publishing which contrast 
with the lofty goals of furthering science: 
1) A void originality and imagination. 
2) Strive for a dry passive and rigid style. 
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3) Publish and be dammed, ask questions later. 
4) The outcome of the research must be certain before money can 
be invested in the experimental set up. 
5) Select the topics to be studied by their ability to fit 
experimental designs. 
6) Select quickly finished topics which minimise investment 
relative to return. 
7) Select college students as subjects. They are cheaper and 
respect the professor which increases the likelihood of 
significant results. Using students ensures replication. 
The perceived business of publishing is somewhat different from 
reality. Cognitive dissonance plays a wonderfully ironic role as 
students of psychology and psychologists themselves come to accept 
this system as the right system, modifying their belief systems to match 
their behaviour. Ironic, because they are often students of cognitive 
dissonance. Dannette (1966, p 345) looks at this fantasy world not as 
an avoidance of pain but as a continuation of reinforcement: 
... the compulsion is to forget what we are really doing because 
of the fun we may be enjoying with our apparatus, our 
computers, our models or the simple act of testing 
statistical null hypotheses. 
Conclusion 
Funding is an issue which is difficult to sort out. There is a definite 
danger in being funded by outside influences, especially when that 
funding represents the survival of the field. I have no answer that 
would free Psychology from its dangerous liaison with capitalist 
society: on a pragmatic level the issue is not easily resolved. Yet 
psychology must be attractive to societal funding to enable it to do 
many things including the power to change the world it lives in. But it 
ca not forget its primary obligation to work for human beings. For the 
same funding that allows psychology to progress may drive psychology 
to a progress that is more damaging for humans than no progress at all. 
Therefore, psychology must figure out a way to remain attractive to 
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funding agencies without becoming the pawns of those agencies. 
Psychology must at all costs retain its dignity and that of its human 
clients. Hence, the question must be how does psychology and the 
larger university maintain its ideal of being an educational institution; 
without solely becoming a big business? The solution starts with 
changing and addressing the relationship of psychology to society's 
structures and institutions. It is perhaps an impossible task, and there 
appears to be no answer. Yet if the problem was thought about and 
solutions were attempted, this would make for a welcome change. As 
Scriven (1980, p 66) asserts " the scientific imperative in psychology 
is self scrutiny." 
E) Psychology Min-ors and Becomes Society 
The dominant reality of psychology is a cult of competition, where 
everyone fights to be heard, by operating with inherent self serving 
motivations. If the motivation for psychology's actions are for the 
benefit of humans this is desirable, but if psychology's actions work to 
further benefit the status quo then this is detrimental. Relying on facts, 
accuracy and logic will not deliver the ability to discriminate between 
the good and the bad uses of psychology highlighted above. What is 
needed to maintain the safety of those we t1y and help is value 
judgements. It will at least maintain the motivation to help those who 
need help. 
Psychology mirrors society in that it feels pressured to bring in a vast 
array of new courses (commodities) as a reflection of being part of the 
free-market economy. Competition, however, amongst the different 
departments and schools of psychology for resources is encouraged and 
theorists whose findings are consistent with the status quo are 
rewarded. For example Piaget's well-known individualistic model of 
the human, has dominated Vigotsky' s more obscure environmental 
model of human cognitive development. 
The Government determines student fees in which leads to 
fragmentation and an undue elevation in the status of more 
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economically costly courses. The justification in charging Dentistry 
students much more than others, is that they are either rich already, or 
are going to be in the future. Note that this is in itself a replication of 
the status quo as only the rich can pay such high fees. The deterrent for 
the poor entering psychology is the prospect of a huge loan debt or 
working to fund their degree. The obvious disadvantage of this is less 
time spent working on their degree. Likewise the educational process 
of completing a psychology degree works to favour the chances of the 
economically secure sector of society, and the status quo is 
perpetuated. Therefore, the matter of who becomes a psychologist is at 
least partially determined on economic rather than intellectual grounds. 
The need for government to organise and control the populace is 
parallels psychology's preoccupation with control and prediction of 
behaviour. The world of material commodities is like a carrot on a 
stick one works for them but never quite has enough to be satisfied. 
This is mirrored in reinforcement theory where work earns the promise 
of a small reward at the end. Yet more reward simply means more 
exploitation. Psychological laws are not only determined by laws of 
human nature but also by laws of economics. 
F) Individualism 
One is strongly inclined to say that in Psychology's haste 
to become a science, and respond to the institutional 
request of education, government and industry the 
individual has been lost. Williams (1980, p 93) 
Individualism is of great import in psychology. Here, the healthy 
human mind is described as autonomous and free to develop so long as 
it does not infringe on others. It is assumed that society provides a 
benign setting for the individual to develop, and that human behaviour 
is best explained by individual characteristics, desires and motivations. 
The rights of the individual are protected it is assumed by the state. 
Though a contradiction in terms, psychology's obsession with 
focusing exclusively on the level of the individual, has left the 
individual out in the cold. This attitude of individualism believes the 
victim is said to hold within them the causes of their misfortune. How 
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realistic this belief is, is highly debatable. For example, the lower 
classes major problem is a lack of money not their 'deviant value 
culture'. Yet when trying to explain why countries are poor, terms such 
as 'achievement motivation' are still bandied around. There is no 
reference to the system which makes individuals stay poor, and victim 
blaming is seemingly cloaked with kindness and concern. Governments 
like to encourage an attitude of individual blame for the position of a 
person so it has justification for removing costly support and services. 
Often those that blame the victim have the victims best interests at 
heart but they propagate the problem by victim blaming; As Ryan 
(1971, p 22) states: 
"Individualism pervades our most crucial assumptions so thoroughly 
that it is hardly noticed, and appears one with altruism and 
humanitarianism." Contradictorily the Government exerts more and 
more control over its citizens through taxes and information agencies. 
So while the society lays the responsibility with the individual, it also 
simultaneously gives the individual less and less control over their 
destiny. Therefore, while the individual has to accept responsibility for 
the system, they have to also be subservient to its needs. 
The individual is not only under attack from individualistic thinking 
in governmental policies, but also in psychological policy. Rarely does 
one find that psychological test results are used by the test taker for 
their own self understanding and respect. Usually tests are a justified 
means of competition. Psychological testing is not, therefore, for the 
benefit of the people that use them but the institutions that do. Just as 
hospitals should not spread disease and the police should not cause 
crime, so psychology should not attack the rights and well being of the 
individual. 
The current psychological view is that when something goes wrong 
someone is to blame and that this person must be punished. With 
individualism the guilty person is responsible for their crime and 
rehabilitation. Such views justify a lack of action being taken to 
improve systems to help individuals because the systems carry no 
blame. Rather than change the school system for example, the 
disadvantaged are given compensatory education, basically giving 
them more of the system which failed them in the first place. 
Individualism's response to people failing in the system is limited to 
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g1vmg them more of what compounds and is responsible for their 
problems. As an example, and as a consequence, there are many 
programs to assist cultural minorities but few to address racism. 
Capitalist society cannot help the poor in regards to solving their 
problems; it would be illogical for capitalism to do so. The reason the 
poor are poor is because the rich are so rich, for the rich to become rich 
and they must produce surplus profit which requires exploitation of 
either their own society or others. Who would expect the rich to 
literally cut their own throats to save the poor, and yet this is what 
individualism believes will happen. The problem cannot be solved by 
individualistic logic. Psychology, which has adopted the principles of 
'individualism' and 'helping the individual' will find that the two 
interests are not complementary. There may well be a reason for 
adopting individualism, although is seemingly implausible thing to do 
if helping people is the goal. This is the unpleasantness in thinking that 
society is to blame and that it has something to do with victims failure. 
Likewise, if a person is successful, it is far more attractive for that 
person to think that the credit for this lies totally within themselves. 
Blaming the victim is then a subtle compromise between self interest 
and charitable concern. For example, the middle classes do not want to 
attack the system which has been so good to them but feel it is right to 
help those less fortunate. This basic human motivation of avoiding 
pain, and searching for a more pleasurable explanation details 
psychology's role in such a victim blaming society. The blaming of 
victims for their own problems is therefore the solution to this 
contradiction. Psychology's particular solution is to analyse victims, 
scientifically and objectively to see what it is about them that made 
them so vulnerable. Consequently, the scientific psychological 
analysis, like the middle and upper classes beliefs, averts placing due 
blame on the system that got psychology where it is today. 
Psychology's particular role is to show the poor, the homeless, 
jobless, etc; to be inherently different for victim blaming to be 
successful. The 'get quick rich' books, or the 'secret of my success' 
books never fail to amaze as it is always the successful authors 
'attitude' that was the reason for their success. Yet rationally there 
must always be in a factory, 90 workers, 10 supervisors, and 1 
manager. The authors of such books worked hard, but so did others 
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work even harder with more talent and motivation, but still not 
achieve. Why? The answer is simple. The world is not a fair place, and 
working harder only increases one's chances, luck and privilege play 
the greater part. Psychology produces the 'personality types' and 
identifies them, scientifically so it can be shown why they succeeded. 
Unfortunately, if everyone was to improve to achieve this 'personality 
type' then relatively nothing would have changed. The factory still 
requires that the majority are exploited by the minority and that there 
can only be one manager. The secret to success has little to do with 
'achieving' personality types, hard work, intelligence or motivation; 
rather, luck and privilege are determinant. The failure of psychology to 
identify and 'push' this reality is a reflection of its role as replicator of 
the system which needs to produce relative human failure to exploit so 
ensuring that the scramble for resources is unfair. 
Psychology overestimates the amount of control the individual has on 
the situation, which negatively affects the underprivileged while 
favourably affecting the privileged. To what degree we should blame 
ourselves or those around us is debatable. The point is that this issue is 
not debated in psychology. It has taken an extreme position for 
insidious or for foolish reasons and the consequence of such rampant 
individualism in psychology is that equality is no longer a goal. 
Psychology's practicing philosophy of the self places the locus of 
causality for maladaptive behaviour solely within the individual. As a 
result the implications of ignoring social structural influences on the 
individual are serious indeed as the poor learn to be poor and expect 
little else. There is a vast literature on the Psychological differences 
between the poor and the middle class in terms of values, child rearing, 
delayed gratification, aspiration, sexual practices and the like. What 
most of the people who discover these effects fail to do is ask why is 
there a difference in these various factors between classes? Could it be 
money? Groucho Marx, was asked, what is the difference between 
ourselves and the rich? His reply was 'the rich have more money'. The 
obvious fact that the amount of money a person has determines their 
lifestyle habits and subsequent cognition's and psychological states 
carries very little weight with psychology. Superficial reasoning allows 
psychology to blame the lower class for being lower class, and reports 
low scores on different psychological and intelligence scales as 'proof'. 
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If a person had every single characteristic of a poor person that 
Psychology has identified, and also had a million dollars, then they 
would be no longer considered poor. The point is that it is not the 
psychological characteristics that determine a poor person being poor 
or the underprivileged minority's being underprivileged; it is money. If 
psychology was to solve all lower class and underprivileged attitudinal 
problems, the problems would remain for them, that they would still 
have no money. Archibald (1989, p 62) emphasises the determining 
role material considerations have: 
... whether or not and to what extent individuals change 
their social relations and themselves depends 
upon a number of circumstances. For one thing they 
must be objectively capable of doing so. 
Identifying factors of the underprivileged is ridiculous and hypocritical, 
for if the as a group shared such characteristics f the rich and the poor 
shared the rich characteristics, the poor would be labelled as the 
deviant class and the rich as the adaptive class by psychology. The 
most ridiculous aspect of Psychological research on underprivileged 
groups is that, in labelling the underprivileged as having non adaptive 
attitudes, they fail to realise that it is a material condition of the rich's 
success that the poor have no success. Indeed for all that is held dear by 
a society to continue to survive, libraries, great schools of art, 
democracy etc, then there must be the poor, the underprivileged and the 
minorities. There are inequalities in our society simply because 
capitalist society will not survive without them. Consequently, those 
with the power to change society to remove such inequalities would 
lose that power and wealth if they did. Accordingly they do not. The 
fundamental psychology of society and the individuals in it is that for 
the system to change to help individuals it must first destroy itself. For 
such a contradiction to remain, ideologies such as individualism and 
false consciousness must be maintained. A simple psychological and 
material fact is those that have do not want to lose it, those that do not 
have are taught they do not want it. A simple fact, but a fact which is 
so fundamental to human action and thought yet beyond the 
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psychological mindset. This is why change for the underprivileged is 
so hard to achieve. 
An example of how without a material analysis psychology 
misconstrues the causal reason for failure is the supposed inability to 
delay gratification of the disadvantaged. But as Ryan (1971, p 277) 
states: 
A victim of his environment, the ghetto child begins his school 
career, psychologically, socially and physically disadvantaged. 
He is oriented to the present rather than to the future, to 
immediate needs rather than delayed. 
The apparent weakness of the inability to delay gratification is in fact 
an understandable and adaptive response to the situation the individual 
finds themselves in. 
Another contradiction inherent in psychology occurs when making 
statements about individual differences. The evidence is gathered from 
large groups of individuals in respect to their average performance. 
This seems somewhat ridiculous, as it makes conclusions of the 
individual's personality and motivation by equating the individual 
performance with a group average. The subtlety of whether the 
individual's score or response in an experiment is any different from 
another group average is completely lost. This empowers individualism 
to place blame squarely on the individual for a group trait while 
refusing to let that individual be any different from the group. 
Sampson ( 1977, p 779 ) outlines they historical role individualistic 
influences have when he states: 
The liberating effects of such self contained individualism 
soon pale and become imprisoning and reason destroying, 
when they become the driving force of history; at a time 
when major social issues demand interdependence. 
There are tragic consequences as psychological practitioners work 
on the basis that the individual is the source of the problem. Hence the 
working class blame themselves for lack of success and accept others 
authority over them because they have apparently 'developed their 
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potential'. There have been some scarce but excellent psychological 
studies to outline such consequences. 
• Lewis (1978), showed how the lower middle class were not 
successful in terms of the American Dream but felt superior 
to the poor by denigrating them as lazy and immoral and 
failing to see that they were both being exploited from birth. 
The lower middle class according to Lewis needed the poor 
for self esteem and a sense of progress rather than becoming 
angry at their own exploitation. 
• Richard Sennet and Jonathan Cobb (1972), through their 
interviews with working class men, revealed how these men 
blame themselves for their lack of success and accept the 
authority of others because they feel they have not 
developed to their full potential. 
• Rubins (1976) study revealed that even where working class 
wives had hard working, non drinking, non abusive 
husbands, unlike their mothers, they could not understand 
why they were unhappy, so they assumed their was 
something wrong with themselves. They could not see that 
they were dissatisfied with sex stereotyping and sex 
stereotypical scripts for male and female. 
Modern psychology still believes that the strncture or situation that 
perpetuates conditions of concern in individuals should not be 
changed; if progress has not been acquired, then it is the individuals 
fault. For example, in New Zealand the closure of rural services is 
rationalised and justified by an underlying Government argument that 
it is because the rural people fail to use the facilities as often as the 
city. Whereas a balanced view, removed from pure economic 
rationalism, would see that when applied to hospitals such reasoning is 
immoral. 
In certain social contexts individualism can be very liberating but in 
other circumstances imprisoning for the individual. That is why it is 
vital not to deny the importance of human agency but, at the same time 
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to get psychology to put individual activity in a social context as well. 
A broader search for solutions to human problems is needed which 
should include the social context. For example as well as trying to 
eliminate racism from the hearts and minds of people, psychology 
should try to eliminate the conditions which foster such acts. If 
psychology can turn its attention away from fruitless tinkering with the 
victim and fix its sights on the real targets through redistribution of 
money and power to those that need it, it will help. This redistribution 
would go against capitalist inclination. Therefore it seems that no easy 
solution is in the offering. However the first step is to see the problems 
of inequality in their true materialist light. 
Individualism comes from the desire to implement scientism. 
Psychology needs to concentrate not only on changing the individual to 
fit the environment but, also on changing the environment to fit the 
individual. The distinction between society and the individual is 
entirely arbitrary misleading and dangerous. As Sampson comments 
(1981, p 737): 
.. reduce conflicts to subjective misunderstandings, 
to misperceptions and psychological factors 
within the individuals, serves primarily ideological 
functions by eliminating from our analysis the 
contradictions that exist amongst groups in the real 
world. 
Twisted Humanism 
Humanism is the view that all people should have the same rights 
and privileges. Twisted humanism installs the belief that inequalities 
are the direct consequences of differing individual powers and efforts. 
The inequalities are explained away in psychologically as a lack of 
resolve, or lack of achievement motivation and generally a weak 
character. Once again such an explanation of inequalities is hardly 
rational. The logic of competition and profit requires that you can only 
have so many foremen in a factory. To pay a higher foreperson's wage 
ten workers are needed to be exploited at a greater level. In a factory of 
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one thousand where one thousand have high achievement motivation 
there still can only be so many foremen. In advanced capitalist 
countries some people make a lot of money but to do so a greater 
number have to be exploited whether in less developed countries or in 
the home economy. Yet flawed humanism describes those that do not 
make it as lazy, incompetent and not deserving of what others have got. 
Psychology's relationship to society is to formalise perceived 
weakness and label them as specific to the working classes. 
Undoubtably people do have all that psychology has identified and 
described, but it would make no difference if they all didn't have weak 
traits; there can only be so many successes (economic and relative) to 
failures in capitalism for capitalism to survive. That is an internal 
contradiction of capitalism, one of many Marx has identified. Sennett 
and Cobb (1973, p 258) indeed believe that: "Psychology of personal 
worth has come to have its uses in maintaining inequality and 
economic productivity along class lines." In essence, what Psychology 
has identified as the means to overcome inequalities, namely, inner 
intellectual growth and development, will not rid the world of 
inequalities. Pragmatically, the meaningful link between poverty and 
inequality is money. Consequently if a poor person becomes wealthy 
they no longer suffer the disadvantages of poverty, mental or physical. 
By working to remove inequality psychology could achieve far more 
for mental health than a mentalistic analysis. Indeed, psychology far 
from identifying the correct causes of mental anguish, gets things 
around the wrong way. Psychology believes the consequence of the 
maladaptive mind is an increase in physical and material deprivation. 
The reality is however that those deprivations in the real world are 
more likely to be causing the deprivation in behaviour and thought. 
Psychology as a tool to help people is therefore defective at its very 
core and needs to be replaced with a pragmatic and realistic science 
which addresses the fundamentals of humans lives; alienation, false 
conciseness and their economic causal base. 
G) The Training and Education of Psychologists as 
Part of a Social Structural Process 
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The training of psychologists provides another aspect to the function 
of psychology's relationship to society and another reason why 
psychology replicates the status quo. Psychology fosters in its training 
the attitude that using the scientific method gives a certain way to get 
the right results. The 'right' method is the Hypothetico-Deductive as 
discussed in chapter one. Therefore, a failure to display competence in 
this method is to fail to gain entry into the profession and to limit 
severely the chance of publication in a journal. To fail in these regards 
is to fail to have a voice in the process of determining psychology's 
path. Using only the accepted methods will gain a student the most 
reward and understandably the student will accept those methods as 
best. As psychology itself teaches, how you act is how you think; 
actions shape attitudes. As Coons(l990, pl41) maintains: "filling 
students with today's "facts" is training them for rapid obselesance". 
The student of Psychology is not taught that alternative and critical 
forms of thought are legitimate sources of knowledge. Indeed rather 
than teaching its pupils to be critical of the method they use, 
psychology teaches them to be critical of theirs and other's work in 
terms of how far it has deviated from the methodologically accepted 
way of producing knowledge. 
The student that does not follow the prescribed topics and courses 
and come out with the prescribed answers will be seen as unsuitable for 
professional courses. As Wiessman (1973, p 105) notes, this leads to a 
situation where; " ... the student's recognition and acceptance of his 
subordinate status stem not from respect from his professor's intellect, 
but simply stated from an acquiescence to authority." This is more or 
less the result of a university system which mirrors and is part of the 
oppressive and antagonistic society. But how university departments 
can give the students the freedom to choose and investigate their own 
interests is not an easy question to answer. For the faculty cannot 
simply wave a magic wand to cope with limited funds and large 
numbers. Unfortunately this material pressure produces a scenario 
where success and survival depends on the numbers of students, which 
increases number of the faculty and subsequently the amount of dollars 
it receives in funding. Hence, psychology becomes a production line 
where the type of course taught is largely determined by the dollar not 
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by what will produce the best students and work. Course will be 
chosen due to their ability to draw numbers. 
Students are taught to ignore the problem of using college students 
and rats as subjects, but this does not remove the problem. College 
students make up the wealth and vast majority of human subjects. 
Now, nearly all researchers report this as a weakness and pay tribute to 
the problem it raises. But it seems as though this problem is viewed as 
an old established dilemma where nothing can _be done, and that 
therefore, the attitude becomes one that nothing needs to be done. It is 
clear however that even if the problem and bias is acknowledged, it 
does not lessen its effect. Psychologists can go on about it forever but 
until something is actually done the problem continues. In my own 
training I was told not to mention the reliance of students as a criticism 
in my discussion as many share the same weakness in using a student 
sample and that it has all been mentioned before. This was 
unquestionably accepted as the attitude to adopt. 
Students whose strengths are computers and statistics are more likely 
to feel at home in psychology than those who would pursue theory in 
Psychology. Jones (1986), identified a change in students orientations 
to research that occurs during years of graduate training. He believes 
that psychology confers honour and reward on those that conform to 
the accepted norms. Naturally students respond and play the game as it 
is meant to be played, until by the PhD level the Psychology 
department has graduate puppets on a string. 
Naturally such a system of training lends itself to the Marxist ideas of 
alienation and false consciousness, and university work now seems to 
equate with work outside the university. Feelings of alienation towards 
work performed at university would seem well established as the 
students have lost control of their work and the work has become 
external to the worker. Subsequently the work does not satisfy the 
individual and the work develops into a oppressive experience. 
Weissman (1973, p 109-110) states the following about student 
experiences: "Though alienated they do not comprehend the source of 
their alienation. They accept the alienation and conformist patterns of 
the university as natural, inevitable." 
It is surprising that despite the problems in psychology, little attempt 
is made by psychologists to address them. Indeed the psychology of 
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psychologists, fascinating and interesting as it would be, is rarely 
considered. Psychologists are, it seems, unable to apply their own 
concepts of group think with its pressures of conformity to themselves. 
Kressel ( 1993, p 49) has an outline of what a student of Psychology 
will realise is what will get them the greatest success. 
• Young Psychologists should stick only to one sub- field, and one 
only. 
• Disciplinary criticism is an 'old mans game' to be encouraged only 
in those who have paid their dues. 
• A good experimenter is one who can demonstrate a good effect no 
matter how small. 
• The students who do research on a 'hot' topic will get the jobs. 
• High level statistics are preferable to careful data collection and 
creative research designs. 
• Psychologists and Scientists are the only ones who say anything 
worth knowing about human social interaction. 
The university with its fundamentally transitory population is ripe for 
getting the 'squeeze' from society. Students now look upon the world 
of work not in realistic, critical terms but in more favourable terms 
where they, while being exploited, are going to be paid to do work, not 
pay to do work as in the university. 
The mass lecture system is the only possible solution touted for the 
problems faced due to rapidly increasing numbers. But only at the 
expense of the student. The students are processed in large numbers by 
the far from perfect lecture. The content of the lecture course consists 
of a lecturer who must concern themselves with three or four lectures a 
week using the same notes from year to year with only minor changes 
and until what they teach is shown to be outdated, and changed again 
to a modified form. The marking and laboratories are handled by 
graduate students. From here it can be seen that the ideal of high 
quality education has become the nightmare of standard questions and 
standard answers and all real intellectual contact between teacher and 
student is lost. As a consequence relative capabilities and interests of 
the individual student cannot be developed by the lecturer. The only 
benefit of such numbers, of course, is financial. Students have become 
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the product, a means to an ends, not an ends in themselves and 
although this is cynical it is true. Students in the past may have been 
shocked at such a system, but now are used to the idea that intellectual 
relationships amongst people are subservient to material concerns. 
What does the future hold if the pure intellectual relationship between 
students, student and lecturer has been so degraded already? Weiss 
(1973, p 9) believes that "The student is pushed toward a mindless 
apathy all but his career." Thanks to internal assessment the large 
increase in work quantity does not give the student or the lecturer time 
to think about their work to the same degree. The old system with its 
big end of year exams was flawed, but has been replaced by internal 
assessment which has its own flaws. Not only does internal assessment 
have new flaws, but the old disadvantages of the previous system still 
remain The massive amount of output from students work is basically 
a waste. With internal assessment it is the hear and now the student can 
only be concerned with, forgetting all of last fortnight's crammed 
factual information. As for the textbooks, they are but a simplistic 
parade of trivialities. They simply describe and oversimplify, where 
debate and counter debate is needed. Their obvious money spinning 
capabilities to a captive audience provide the real reason for their 
existence. Weiss again (1973, p 100) "We grade students as we grade 
beef with no thought for improving the product as we stamp the 
product." 
The university itself is a system which determines the class and 
social position of the individuals in it; certain groups of society have 
the motivation and expectation of success instilled in them from 
childhood. A relative material advantage ensures achievement even 
before getting to university. 
Are University Staff, Teaches or Researches 
There seems to be an inherent problem of whether psychologists in 
universities are there as teachers or researchers. Once again no one 
seems to give much thought to the matter of whether lecturers should 
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be both or just one or the other. But as Weiss (1973, p 102) points out 
the problem remains: 
We hear it said again and again that there is no conflict between 
research and teaching. This would be true were it not for the 
simple fact that undergraduate teaching requires wide ranging, 
but not superficial generalists; whereas the only way to 
schololary fame and higher wages is through steady and constant 
focus on a narrow area. 
Indeed McNicol ( 1988, p 278 ) has a more cynical view of the 
priorities of most psychologists in universities; "Few of us embarked 
on an academic career because we wanted to teach." There is a danger, 
therefore, that the staff will place more emphasis on their research and 
find that they can kill two birds with one stone by teaching their 
research interests rather than teaching the students a more appropriate 
content. With such strong emphasis on research it is more convenient 
to teach what they are researching. Howard et al (1987, p 50) sums up 
what is important between research and teaching when they say 
" ... recent measures of departmental quality have been based solely 
upon counts of publications in the American Psychological 
Psychological Association." So, instead of teaching receiving at least 
an equal emphasis, the amount of research published in the 'right' 
journals becomes the overriding concern as it determines psychologists 
financial position and job placement. 
Generalist or Professional specialised 
Should psychology as a discipline encourage a broad generalist 
approach or a specialised approach? The problem seems to be that, 
bearing in mind our subject matter and the desire to help people, both 
seem equally appropriate. Arguments against more specialised courses 
include the observation made by McNicol (1988, p 278) that; 
"Integrated Professional courses restrict the types of student they 
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attract. If we are to be effective we should draw our members from the 
widest social-economic mix possible". The Professional course also 
tends naturally, endear a 'them and us' mentality. In psychology this 
spells danger as treating a fellow human being as a lower being than 
yourself tends to create problems. It may be acceptable to be as 
arrogant as you like with a piece of inert matter or a patient 
unconscious on an operating table as long as you are efficient, but in 
psychology the subject matter knows, understands and reacts to such 
elitism. 
Even if a psychologist specialises narrowly they, (to be effective) will 
have to see how this specialised area of their study fits in with the 
larger picture and understanding of their society. If they are a 
Generalist this is not a case of learning all things for all people. It is 
rather the ability to see how the knowledge they produce effects the 
larger world and society, which requires foresight and training. Yet 
even if psychology was to be a general, science this does not mean 
there cannot be subset organisations within psychology. There is a need 
to have an overview organisation to tie together the common interests 
in Psychology. The American Psychological Association is intended to 
be such an organisation, but as the report to the Science Advisory 
Committee stated ( 1990, p 87 6): 
Many academic and research members feel A.P.A. policies, 
statements and actions consistently ignore scientific 
evidence, or imply such evidence when it is clearly lacking. 
When the A.P.A. makes decisions science is not what matters, 
but proportion of the vote, percentage of members. 
The AP A seems not to have that necessary backing to enable it to unify 
the discipline. The problem is that psychology is evolving at such a 
rapid rate that there is no effective machinery that can guide the 
combined power of psychology's parts rationally and with enough 
agreement. Such rapid progress can be visualised thus: if you would 
imagine the fingers on a hand moving forward but expanding outwards 
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at the same time ....... The pace of change is now such that only narrow 
strategies are capable of making progress. We need sciences and parts 
of sciences which explore the area between the fingers of the sciences,, 
not only the desire to push the fingertips further out. Furthermore it 
takes a lifetime of study to push the fingertip a little bit further 
outwards and might have lost the capability to know all relevant 
information between the fingertips to make the necessmy 
breakthroughs. Is the human brain just simply incapable of doing that? 
There is a need for somebody to get the information from all separate 
branches of science together again. The lack of a coherent attempt to 
do this is a reflection of the emphasis given to production of 
knowledge rather than its organisation. Indeed, there appear to be few 
attempts to organise knowledge in such a way that its relevance to 
practice or to policy becomes apparent. Yet here is psychology's great 
chance as the natural performer of such a role. The effect of this effort 
of investigation would be twofold: 
1. Psychology would lose its physics envy and stop trying to 
be a physical science something it cannot be. This would 
earn it respect from other sciences and the public at lm·ge. 
2. And it would fulfil its necessary, pragmatic and natural role 
as a science whose relationship to both society and its 
fellow sciences was powerful yet helpful to the common 
good. 
Psychology has drawn its emphasis away from a serious concern with 
stimulating an informed, general and critical awareness of our society 
and culture amongst those it teaches. Psychology has done this by 
being highly refined in specialist knowledge to make itself and the 
individuals within psychology marketable for university employment 
only to be required to teach generalist courses at university. These 
generalist courses will inevitably lead to psychologists teaching views 
they may be at odds with, in which they hardly can be expected to be 
unbiased and provide a motivated display of teaching. As a result 
111 
psychologist's marking and teaching will reflect this reluctance and the 
students study will be consequently affected. 
Interdisciplinary and Cross Disciplinary Psychology 
Interdisciplinary psychology has its strengths and weaknesses as well 
as cross disciplinary, but by moulding the two perhaps the best of both 
worlds may be realised. 
1) Cross discipline attempts to link specific psychological and social 
structural variables. 
2) An interdisciplinary strategy focuses on phenomena that exist at the 
intersection of sociology and psychology. 
The area in psychology that promises the most in terms of 
interdisciplinary research is social psychology, or rather more cynically 
it is the mostly obvious candidate for the role. Social psychology is 
potentially the best place to bridge the gap between the analysis of the 
society and the analysis of the individual. Therefore defining social 
psychology simply as the study of social influences on the individual is 
inaccurate and inadequate. Psychology must learn to recognise that 
individual psychology is the cause as well as the consequence of social 
structure. There is a genuine need for a social psychology that explores 
the dynamic relationship between psychological and social systems. A 
good start for such a discipline would be to explain why this discipline 
has not be developed successfully in the past. 
Conclusion 
How psychology manages its relationship to society seems to be a 
question of maintaining dignity while somehow remammg 
pragmatically viable in the real world. The capitalist world's influence 
becomes readily apparent in a system where there is great demand for 
places in limited courses. Hence the paper at a university becomes a 
commodity, a scarce resource where limited numbers are allowed in. 
The unavoidable result is the spectre of elitism, differentiation between 
psychologists, supply and demand and power relationships and a 
mirroring of the capitalist system. 
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The position of psychology today owes itself less to the 
contributions of psychologists to society than the large numbers of 
students enrolling in it. The danger in psychology having such a large 
amount of students is that these numbers will determine what is taught 
subsequently producing not what is the strongest form of psychology 
but the most popular. Once the numbers go, the house of cards 
psychology will have built will have nothing tangible to stand on. And 
if the numbers never go? Psychology is still not being effective as it 
could, in that does not apply itself to the problems that are most 
pressing to human society but rather those that answer the needs of 
funding. The most pressing needs of society I would argue are 
economic, but their causes are also economic. We as a science are just 
as vulnerable to the economic causes if we become a pawn to them. A 
psychology motivated to get as many students as possible to gain 
economic security will become part of the problem rather than source 
of the correct answer. 
H) Conclusion 
The education of Psychologists and the educational institution are part 
of a economic system. The educational institution and experiences are 
moulded by this economic system. Specifically the educational 
institution at all levels can be summarised thus, 
• fragmented levels of power, control and payment. 
• Education produces people ready to fill different levels. 
Education teaches people that they can expect to fill a 
certain place in the marketplace, usually at an equivalent 
level of their parents, and prepares them mentally for both 
mundane and exploited roles. 
• Education reflects how capitalist work is organised. 
• In particular subjects are divorced from each other, and 
work tasks are set for each of them. The pupils have no 
control over the work set. What and how they will learn is 
determined by others. 
• Students do not learn for learning's sake but to get good 
grades. 
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• Sex, race and class all give different schooling experience. 
The status quo is maintained, as economically exploited 
groups are exploited in education. 
• Working class school's pupils are trained for obedience to 
authority. In lower class schools there still is a need for 
pupil leaders and achievement relative to others. In working 
class schools however this achievement is looked down 
upon by pupils whereas in upper class schools such 
achievement is desired. The lower class attitude learnt is not 
to stand out from the crowd, one will only be cut down. The 
upper class attitude, which is learnt, is to stand out from the 
crowd and achieve because you deserve it. The terrible 
irony in these features is that the students in the lower class 
enforce them upon themselves. 
Schooling and education transmits inequalities across generations. The 
logic of capitalism means that people must largely follow in their 
. parents footsteps. Education prepares people for this by justifying in 
the minds of individuals the inequality of society and how they fit into 
it. This justification is maintained as long as people believe naively that 
education gives everyone a fair chance to prove their worth; and that 
privilege and distinction stem from fair competition in the educational 
arena. This is an example of false consciousness which replicates the 
status quo. Overidingly career aspiration, personal definition of 
success, wealth, marital status, age, are the relevant factors m 
Psychological science rather than scientific concerns. 
Chapter Five 
Problems in Applying Psychology 
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A) Psychology Cannot Examine Itself Critically in a 
Meaningful Way 
Psychology has not developed its potential and the positives that at 
first attracted people to psychology. Psychology even largely ignores 
the lessons that it once learnt. 
Freedom Verses Control in Psychology 
Is the autonomy of science a privilege for the elite or a need of society 
itself? Is science unrestricted for the betterment of the whole of society 
or just one aspect at expense of the others? Should a healthy society be 
able to avoid controls over science? These are the issues surrounding 
the question of how free scientific activity should be. Control seems 
unavoidable but the qualitative motivation of those controls is crucial 
and they should disrupt science as little as possible while providing 
adequate protection for those they serve. A qualitative compromise 
seems the only pragmatic and sensible approach between avoiding 
destructive social effects and efforts to promote scientific creativity. 
The danger of beaucratisation must be ever present, as without 
sufficient freedom the Psychologist will not produce knowledge and 
techniques of benefit for society. 
The controls placed on psychology should then encourage science 
which helps society's members, but discourage and impede science 
which negatively effects society. Unfortunately under human control 
the areas to restrain are determined by social-political attitudes that 
reflect the most powerful ideology. Or a tangled buearucratic morass 
results where the people making judgments are snowed under, 
therefore allowing things to slip through that should not. Because the 
benefits and dangers of research are often unforeseeable upon who 
should the burden of proof fall? At all times the decision and process 
should be enforced in the open with access to the decision made to any 
that might want to know. There are inherent and greater dangers of 
keeping things quiet. 
Control would seem even more crucial in Psychology than other 
sciences as the restrictions on becoming a Psychologist only practically 
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extend to remaining out of prison and being alive. I suggest there 
should be more restrictions before being able to use the title of 
psychologist 
The goal of control is an effective yet responsible science but at 
what levels and what controls should be implemented is not so easy to 
decide. Firstly, the intent and motivation must be simply to encourage 
the good, discourage the bad. But to know with foresight which is 
which is difficult. What is clear however, is that the dangers of human 
ideology and power and the relationship of society to science, will play 
its part in determining what science will be and what it produces. There 
is no such thing as a group of independent scientists who operate only 
for science's sake. 
David Baltimore (1973, p 43) has this to say of restricting science: 
"Put it this way, the penalty for trying to control lines of investigation 
seems to me greater than any conceivable benefit." Yet Metzger (1978, 
p 110) believes that, "In the end the participants in this enterprise 
would come to realise that the wisdom needed to regulate science 
without destroying it has to be gradually acquired, and from many 
sources." 
So the arguments for freeing up and for restricting science are both 
strong. The old rationale of progress, however, is no longer always 
rational and logical, as progress is not always good. In fact progress, 
development, advancement, all the words that are used to describe 
what science does, are positively loaded. There is no neutral term that 
seems to describe what science does, all the words are loaded to equate 
scientific work with a common good. 
Baltimore (1973) states that restricting science is bad because it is 
natural for the human to be curious. But restricting science is not a 
case of knowing ourselves less, it is a case of knowing ourselves well 
enough to judge what is good. Brooks (1978) is another proponent of 
freedom of inquiry. He believes that the peer system works very well 
and there is so much evidence to support it that he fails mention any of 
it because there is so much of it he decides there is no need to discuss it 
any further. Brooks however goes on to say that judging which applied 
research projects are worthwhile is far harder. Nelkin (1978 p 191) 
cites a survey of 800 scientists, in which, "77% agreed that the pursuit 
of science is best organised when as much freedom as possible is 
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granted to all scientists." Of course most would agree with that, but 
would they say the same if they were asked 'do you want science 
organised this way', or, what is the best way for science to be organised 
if societal repercussions are taken into account? Indeed 'As much 
freedom as possible' could mean very little freedom. Organising is also 
not necessarily the same as doing. Nelkin (1978, p 192) points out 
further that no matter how noble a concept freedom of inquiry is, that 
that is not necessarily enough of a reason alone to bring it to fruition: 
"The concept of freedom of inquiry has a venerable history and 
is widely taken for granted, but there is no constitutionally 
guaranteed right to pursue knowledge or engage in scientific 
inquiry." 
A person of intellect finds the position of unmitigated research and 
investigation into ourselves attractive, logical and rational. A person of 
wisdom realises we are not ruled by the rational model and 
consequently we can reflect and change our destiny that our 
investigation can be qualitative and that we should stop to think 
whether progress its good or not. Likewise, psychologists can also 
decide to progress or not, not solely for progresses sake. In science 
total freedom of thought should be retained, but that does not extended 
to total freedom of investigation. Furthermore controlling science does 
not always mean limiting science, it can add to it. 
Conclusion 
In the past all progress was seen as inherently good. Now it is 
known that scientific progress can be harmful and Psychology through 
an understanding of the human is the best equipped, if somewhat 
poorly equipped science, to address this change in perspective of 
science. As technology increases more rapidly, there is little 
opportunity for evaluation of its effects on society and the old 
institutional forms seem incapable of dealing with the modern world 
demands. The old deal between science and society was that society 
would get certain material benefits from the work of researchers and in 
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exchange the scientists will get considerable administrative freedoms 
and finance from society. In that agreement the two sides were distant 
each giving up things that the other side did not really need. Now the 
public gives up substantial treasures and exchange requires a much 
more mutual involvement and understanding. The inexorable 
progression of science is now limited and under threat from its 
relationship to society. 
Psychological truth, as all scientific knowledge, is derived from a 
social context and is social in nature, so psychologist is flawed and 
limited in their ability to apply themselves to problems. Taken one step 
further, the human is pretty bad at analysing human phenomena, in fact 
you probably couldn't get a worse tool to analyse the human than the 
human. 
Psychology takes the path of least resistance by removing the 
possibility of appreciating its own relationship with society. The 
powerful social structural influences in society encourage psychology 
to develop new knowledge. But psychology does not debate whether 
that knowledge is right or wrong, useful or dangerous. Psychology only 
examines its knowledge production in a scientific way. But like all 
things humans create, scientific theory has a social life and existence, 
and so this scientific examination while being vital, is not by itself 
complete or adequate. Psychology must learn to be skilled in political 
and economic analysis to judge the true social influence of its 
knowledge. Even if scientific knowledge was purely scientific such 
knowledge would be of limited value as Prilleltensky (1989, p 799) 
comments "Social and political predicaments require solutions of a 
social and political nature." 
Basically psychologists are not addressing the problem of the 
psychology of psychologists, or for that matter the sociology of 
psychologists. Yet looking in the mirror, as Scriven ( 1980, p 68 ) aptly 
puts it , "is an essential step for improving ones appearance". 
B) Psychology Cannot Help People That Come to it 
as Well as it Should 
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Progress in psychological science has been clearly unable to keep up 
with the public's demand for a source of expertise in their problems. 
The public instead look to others to solve their most pressing concerns 
when psychology has a valid but by no means potentially dominating 
input. The problem is to create a psychology that can deliver solutions 
to most important problems humans face, and then in turn change the 
public perception of psychology to something that can provide 
solutions. To the limited degree psychology can already help people 
meaningfully, the public is generally misinformed. The public view of 
psychology largely consists of a stereotype, and although often 
undeserved, it is a problem which is inadequately tackled by the 
psychological community. 
Psychology almost entirely expends its efforts in treating the 
symptoms to help deal with the existing culture. Clinical practice 
reflects these this strategy, and so is unable to change the causal origins 
of the problem, thus becoming part of the problem itself. Psychology 
reacts to rather than anticipating these aspects of society which produce 
the problems. By avoiding a directive role with regards to social 
problems, psychology inadvertently upholds the status quo and helps to 
maintain the stability of the processes that bring it credence and 
financial stability. 
Psychology, because of its role as replicator and unconscious 
acceptor of the status quo, has applications which reflect this 
relationship. For example in world war two psychology did much to 
help the war effort and supported the powerful social institution of the 
military. Psychology did very little, however, for people in society and 
it did not investigate why people were killing each other and what it 
could do to stop such events. 
Psychologists as conforming and conventional members of society 
are the ones who identify and interpret behaviour as deviant. 
Psychology does not analyse the ordinary person or the elite but the 
marginal members of society, which reflects its role as replicater of the 
status quo. The status quo, the people and institutions with power to 
which psychology belongs are therefore able to determine what is 
deviant and what is accepted behaviour without coming under 
psychology's scrutiny themselves. The potential for psychology to label 
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the enemies of the status quo as deviant is not necessarily a bad thing, 
but there is no debate over whether this should happen. 
C) Psychology is Hamstrung when it comes to 
Helping Those that Need it 
Due to psychology's relationship with capitalism, the needs of the 
individual are not being met. Or rather they are being met in a way 
capitalist society deems proper. This is reflected in the psychologist's 
methods of valuing little what people as subjects and patients have to 
offer, such that they cannot even be trusted to give an accurate report 
on their own mental conditions for example. The irony is that the 
psychologist's interpretations of what they observe are no better, but 
yet are not called into question because they have followed slavishly 
the a methodology of science that claims all personal biases can be 
removed. 
One large part of the problem is that in developing a scientific method 
for itself, psychology, has produced a language which, for the ordinary 
person is hard to understand. This jargon was developed in response to 
the logic and methodology of discove1y. The logic of science demands 
that in categorising language needs to be used in as clear and precise 
unambiguous a manner as possible. As a consequence jargon was then 
invented. Unfortunately and ironically the jargon produced has been 
more a barrier to understanding than a help, as jargon has functioned as 
a means to exclude rather than to include as originally intended. The 
actions of creating jargon started out in the best interests of 
communication. But now such jargon removes as many people as 
possible from communication. What use is a psychology when people 
cannot understand what it is saying? It is very important I believe for 
psychology to be understood, because it is only within the individual 
concerned, that the power to help themselves is located. Psychology 
can change the symptoms or force the individual to change but what 
has really been achieved. The patient or citizen is unable to realise 
psychology's potential because they do not understand the principles of 
treatment and are treated as inferior for this understandable lack of 
comprehension. The ensuing power relationship established between 
psychologists and 'subjects and patients' takes its toll in the 
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effectiveness of the discipline and betrays the real reason behind the 
jargon. As Koch ( 1980, p 49) outlines it "My view proposes a relation 
of partnership between the psychological studies and the human race, 
rather than the patronising handouts of counterfeit knowledge." 
In physical science and medicine jargon is not as big a problem, but 
for psychology which relies upon interpersonal communication, it is 
crucial. An example is the unnecessary and rather bizarre use of 
scientising something for the sake of making it seem more pompous 
and grand but only having the effect of producing an unnecessary 
barrier to understanding. 
The 'The Fishbien Model' is an example. 
nX mX 
B=Bl(i=l bi ei) Wl + (J=l nbj mcj) W2. 
where, 
B =overt behaviour. 
B l=intention to perform the behaviour. 
bi =belief that performing the behaviour will lead to consequence. 
ei =evaluation of consequence. 
J= individual. 
nbj =if the perceived expectation of referent group or individual. 
mcj =the motivation to comply with. 
Wl & W2 =regression weights. 
nX =number of salient consequences. 
mX =number of salient normative beliefs. 
This equation is supposed to represent simply the idea that peoples 
intentions are influenced by what they think will happen, if they do 
what they intend, and others opinions of these actions. 
This idea has been transformed into scientific language, but I think it is 
no better for having being so coined. Psychologists do not need a 
pseudo language and jargon to distinguish themselves from the public, 
the public already recognise psychologists as being distinct. 
Psychologists must be clear to the public otherwise by definition they 
will fail. Psychology is not like a physical science. In psychology the 
relationship to the subject is altered by using jargon terms and if the 
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relationship to the subject is altered so is any experiment that uses 
them. If the patient does not understand, the relationship becomes one 
of power. The desire of a person to gain prestige at the expensive of 
clarity and understanding is an example of someone who desires the 
accolades but cares less for helping those that need it. The above can 
only belong to a psychology which is uncaring and aloof. 
Psychology appears at times to help minority groups, but does so 
largely on the grounds of fashion. From race, to class, to gender as each 
category becomes fashionable psychology gives the appearance of 
trying to help those in need. But what is not incidental is that such 
efforts are rewarded financially, and the particular group in favour is 
quickly dumped for a more financially advantageous group which is in 
vogue. To find adequate solutions, such problems may take a matter of 
months years but decades to formulate adequately. In a world of 
poverty, starvation, war and exploitation one would think the only 
psychological problems facing humans, (if one were to use 
Psychological research and efforts as a gauge) are those of memory, 
perception and biological processes. Braginsky and Braginsky's (1974) 
contents analysis of psychological publications from 1885-1971 found 
almost no mention of the effects on people of the world wars, the great 
depression, or the Vietnam war. 
D) Psychology's Applications Cause Suffering 
The topics researched and accepted by journals are in large part not 
what people are interested in. Newspaper articles are what people are 
interested in. If Psychology researched what fills our newspapers it 
would be executing relevant research. This does not seem the proper or 
credible way to determine research areas, but only because it does not 
pander to the pompous and self important elements of psychology. 
Psychology in its applications has largely dehumanised the human 
subject. This rather insidious feature of Psychology has been defended, 
albeit covertly and unconsciously, in the interests of making 
psychology a 'proper' science. This of course is patently not true for we 
cannot, by making the human anything but human, improve our study 
of the human. Perhaps the real 'psychology' behind the psychologist's 
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motivations for this are less than scientific. Namely that, psychology is 
performed by everyone, everyday and so psychology as a result of its 
desire for institutional grandeur has had to somehow separate its study 
from common everyday psychology. But since everyone uses the 
everyday kind of Psychology this presents a particularly tricky problem 
for psychology if it wants to somehow to convey its institutional 
psychology as being superior to the everyday kind. It has found the 
solution by reducing its study of the human to something that is not 
human. How humans think, are aroused, are motivated, even the 
humans themselves, are seen in non human terms. People to the 
psychologists are respondents, the independent and dependent 
variables of the experiment, or even the unwanted variable or noise 
when trying to find out about humans. In this way psychology has quite 
successfully achieved the goal of never being recognised as the 
common everyday psychology. It has also quite successfully removed 
the chance of becoming an effective science, as it happens, by 
removing from its sight, (in disgust one might also say) the human 
being when investigating aspects of the human being functioning. 
E) Intelligence Testing 
The testing of IQs represents a complicated relationship between 
psychology and society that needs to be viewed in broad historical and 
sociological terms. A belief which is most prevalent in psychology is 
that by computing the intelligence quotient of someone the 
psychologist can know something indelible about that person. 
Psychology views intelligence as inherent in an individual. It also 
believes that there is a close relation between intelligence and 
achievement and between intelligence and its measurement. However, 
it is wrong on all counts. 
Psychology has not even satisfactorily answered the question of what 
is intelligence, and what it is that IQ tests actually measure? In fact the 
concept of intelligence is clearly a social intervention reflecting a 
social set of values. Intelligence is not a thing in the individual; it does 
not reside within the individual. 
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Classical science has had a narrowing influence on the definition of 
intelligence. Science describes generally how people ought to think, 
not how they think. 
Psychology's applications in institutions such as the justice system, 
the educational system, psychiat1y reinforce capitalist notions of the 
individual's role in society. Psychology reinforces the capitalist role of 
the individual in the above mentioned institutions through education, 
evaluation and enforcement. Not only has psychology come to accept 
such roles as appropriate and normal, but all individuals whose 
socialised roles are thus effected come to view them as normal, 
functional and appropriate. Subsequently not only does psychology 
mirror society's exploitation of the individual but t mirrors the false 
consciousness of the individual. Rather, it is not such tools as 
intelligence testing themselves which are particularly dangerous or 
useful. It is however the motivations of the individuals using 
intelligence tests which makes them dangerous. For example, knowing 
a persons race means that you can not even remotely accurately predict 
his or her score on the supposed 'intelligence tests', such is the overlap 
between individual scores between supposedly 'different' groups 
extrapolated from their shared average. The value comes from such 
tests proving to be useful justifiers of segregation of pupils based on 
apparently 'inherent' characteristics. If psychology wanted an 
extremely accurate judge of who is likely to succeed in schools and be 
more intelligent why don't they just use parental income; it would do a 
better job. Any test is unjustified in its claims simply by time and 
situation limits. Kline (1988), makes a good point about the 
limitations of such tests. He comments on 'love' scales to investigate 
peoples beliefs about love, the statement with the greatest loading was 
"yes I would very much enjoy giving X a present", this statement being 
the most predictive of the subject loving X. The point being that even a 
couple of hundred items are only a small proportion of an accurate 
description of what it is to be in love. These scales do not measure love 
but only statements about love. Likewise intelligence tests do not 
measure intelligence but how well a person has been prepared to 
perform that particular test. 
Psychology may have through intelligence tests discovered that 
genetics and environment both play a part in intelligence performance. 
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Yet, most importantly psychology has not discovered what 
environmental factors, and to what extent those environmental factors, 
have influenced intelligence. 
Intelligence testing in New Zealand 
IQ testing measures something we label as IQ or intelligence. The 
results of TOSCA, ( Test of Scholastic Ability.), for example, which 
was used widely in New Zealand and is used to label certain cultural 
groups, namely Maori as having less intelligence than other cultural 
groups. Psychology's relationship to society here is on a knife edge. 
The alternative implications of such a results are: 
1. The test is inaccurate; there may be no difference in intelligence 
between cultural groups. There may be a difference but we cannot 
confirm because of the quality of the test. 
2. The test is accurate; there simply is a difference of intelligence 
between cultural groups which is innate. 
3. That there is no difference in intelligence between cultural groups 
because all that the intelligence test is capable of measuring 
accurately is biased to favour certain cultural groups over others. 
4. That the test accurately reflects a difference in intelligence in terms 
of the score, but that in itself only reflects a lack of resources and 
encouragement applied to one cultural group compared to another. 
So the test does not reflect any innate intelligence differences but a 
reflection of social structural forces and who those forces favour. 
5. The test is accurate but measures something other than intelligence, 
ie scholastic ability or other socially acquired skills. 
Clearly the different interpretations of TOSCA' s measurements leads 
to taking different sides in an immense debate. So while it is a 
relatively simple matter to create an IQ test the implications of this test 
on society are considerable and link with other fundamental arguments. 
Psychologists when they favour one explanation of the test results over 
the others in effect sanction one explanation over the others. This 
professional sanction carries implications for the groups involved in 
society in terms of resources, attitudes, labelling and expectations. For 
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in the process of determining IQ, psychologists enter deeply the into 
the relationship they have to society. The intelligence test is based on 
assumptions of either a formal or informal nature. So that while the test 
will initially mean to be neutral and value free, it can quickly be turned 
into a rather nasty piece of politics, used by one section of society to 
control and justify that control over another. 
If there is a physical innate mental inability in IQ score so what! Innate 
IQ can still be increased by the right environmental factors. It is instead 
used as an excuse to keep the downtrodden, downtrodden. It is a 
justification, because if there is nothing apparently that can be done, 
one sector of society is justified in getting more resources than the 
other. But the fact is that we most definitely can through environmental 
improvements improve IQ. If someone has a higher IQ than another, 
what does that mean? Does that justify any real distinction between the 
two people? 
The idea that we can measure intelligence, that we can hope to 
measure the intelligence of something when we can't even agree as to 
what intelligence is, is patently ridiculous. At the point of testing 
unending and unaccounted variables run their course; for example is 
the test affected by a particular mood of the tested, the emotion of the 
person, playing a particular role (for example an anti-culture rebel), the 
level of motivation to perform tasks, what the environment of testing 
is, who gave them the test, and are they having a good day? 
Consequently the assumption that intelligence measured at that point is 
fixed and does not change is plainly unrealistic. Intelligence 
measurements should only been viewed as a very weak sample of 
behaviour which is likely to fluctuate. Intelligence tests are a sample of 
the ability to answer certain question of a test, not intelligence and the 
two do not equate. Indeed do psychologists really believe intelligence 
is that simple a phenomena in that it can be measured in one thilty 
minute test! 
Ballard (1988) outlines numerous papers in which large 
discrepancies in IQ scores over time appear in the same children. This 
raises two points; either that IQ tests are not consistent or IQ is not 
consistent. Either way IQ tests would seem redundant as far as 
prediction is concerned. But that is exactly what they are used for, in 
industrial psychology to screen for future performance or in children to 
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screen for future performance. Why then do intelligence tests continued 
to be used? The answer lies with their ability as an efficient and quick 
way of justifying and achieving the social goals of capitalism and to 
encourage competition amongst human beings. The intelligence test is 
therefore a means and justification of exploitation and inequalities. IQ 
tests measure how well people answer questions in a test compared to 
others, that is all. 
Dawinist ideas permeate the work of the Intelligence testers, the 
Tremain adaptation of the Stanford Binet is an updated form of the 
racism propagated by the likes of Darwin, Blake and Balton. Indeed 
Tremain is quoted in Kamn (1974, p 6) as stating about people in the 
70-80 IQ group: " ... children of this group should be segregated in 
special classes, they cannot master abstractions but they can be made 
efficient workers". It is no wonder then that Olsen (1988, p 36) 
comments: "It is through the use of the normal curve distribution that 
social ideology becomes embedded with the logic of psychometric 
theory". It is debatable whether lack of achievement is the individual's 
fault or that of the system that produced them. It is clear that people are 
born into the world with differing chances of success, due to social 
advantages of birth. Regardless of the proportion of blame that can be 
attributed to social disadvantages for a persons failure, psychology and 
education has failed to counter this proportion. Intelligence testing has 
provided a scientific underpinning to racist laws such as the prohibiting 
of interracial marriages. This was justified by 'demonstrating' links 
between IQ and criminality, sexual promiscuity and general 
immorality, which were all thought to be correlated to race. Karier 
(1976, p165) shows an example of such 'thinking', contradiction in 
terms that it is, when he quotes Thorndike: 
It is the great good fortune of mankind that there is a 
substantial positive correlation between 
intelligence and morality including goodwill 
towards one's fellows. Consequently our superiors in 
ability are on average our benefactors, and it is often 
safer to trust them than ourselves. 
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Such attitudes obviously maintain the status quo and propagate false 
consciousness. IQ testing has become an important tool of industrial 
psychology in particular. The tests are widely used to help companies 
identify and overcome problems in the work place. So tests of mental 
ability, flawed as they are, provide justification for restructuring which 
means hiring and firing, demoting and promoting. The good 
performance on an industrial test of IQ is often a standard needed for 
placement in a good job. As a result the attitude that 'people who do or 
don't make it do so deservedly' is justified, or that 'every child's 
education was tailored appropriately to their intelligence. The social 
historical circumstances and needs of societies which are expanding 
industrially are to allocate roles within a specialised and fragmented 
division of labour. IQ testing is obviously a efficient tool for doing this. 
In testing pupils for intelligence the comparative score to others is 
emphasised, whereas the emphasis should be on getting that 
individuals score higher. 
Is intelligence genetically inherited or socially developed, and to 
what degree does each operate if it is a mix of both? If one thing is 
clear however, psychology does not know or at least agree to any one 
estimation. What we do know about is largely the social influence and 
it is this which we can address. Olsen (1988, p 48) points out that it is 
not coincidental that certain groups in society will do badly, and that it 
is not a question of random distribution but because of the social 
similarities that such groups will do badly: 
The access to knowledge and opportunities for learning differs 
systematically, and not randomly, amongst different class and 
race groups within the community. It is not inherited intelligence 
that will determine future performance. 
Test items are based on factual knowledge and therefore it is a 
question of what has been taught, not how well people can think that 
determines performance. The advantages of class which mean a better 
quality of teaching are presented as endowments, gifts of nature, so 
validating the social order. There is as Ballard ( 1988, p 227) says: 
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... well documented research which shows that lower tests 
scores by children from lower socioeconomic groups are 
directly implicated in restricting both the educational 
and vocational opportunities of these children. 
Such research as Gordon and Terell (1981), and Nash (1983) point to 
the futility of intelligence testing and Garcia ( 1981, p 1173 ) susinctly 
sums up the absurdity of a thirty minute intelligence test as a futile 
comparison of one person with another which continues "to serve 
social advantage under the guise of scientific truth." Moss ( 1988, p 73 
) goes even further to say that the test division in New Zealand has 
become a pawn of capitalism: 
The promotion of mental testing has often been seen in terms 
of the maintenance of social order in a capitalist society. But in 
the case ofN.Z.C.E.R.'s excursion into testing it is probably 
unnecessary to invoke such deep structural explanations. For 
it maybe more simply explained by recourse to the most 
pragmatic of capitalist needs, the generation of revenue and 
accumulation of profit. 
The ability of tests to make money is not unrelated to their popularity. 
But tests are only able to sell if they serve the market need. So it is not 
a completely a scientific influence which guides the development of 
the tests. 
Otis as a Test Case 
Otis was a test of IQ noted for its longevity in the New Zealand 
educational institution. The results obtained reflected the existing 
divisions in society and reinforced the notion that social position was 
the result of personal merit. The difference found between different 
cultural groups in New Zealand through the use of Otis could not be 
explained by class alone, but also by the fact that the test itself was 
inherently biased. A satirical test called Motis was produced at one 
stage, in which Pakeha children scored an average of 67.26 IQ points 
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whereas the mean for Maori children was 102. The reason for this gap 
was that the test used language and culture more familiar to Maori. The 
findings were reported tongue in cheek, but they outline and highlight 
all the insidious attitudes and problems of the original Otis test. In 
particular the (insulting and damaging) ideology which was behind 
explanations in the difference of score's between cultural groups in 
New Zealand on the Matis test is mimicked to copy those used in Otis. 
The authors feel that it is necessary to view the Motis 
results in an appropriate perspective. Of course the 
low performance of the Pakeha child does not 
necessarily mean that he is innately inferior, it may 
well be- and the authors would like to believe- that the 
pakeha child has the same chance at birth to be as 
highly intelligent as the Maori child. If the 
Pakeha's intelligence is inferior, his inferiority may be said 
to be cultural. In other words the Pakeha child may be 
thought of as 'culturally disadvantaged'. This means 
that the Pakeha child has simply not grown up in a 
home as rich in cultural opportunities as the home of 
a Maori child. Of course, the authors feel that it would be 
wrong to shame the Pakeha child by telling him that his 
parents haven't given him the advantages given a Maori child. 
After all, the Pakeha's inferior intelligence is simply not 
his fault. (Faulds 1988, p 106-107) 
The belief that future tests are an improvement on Otis is 
fundamentally flawed. Current tests are just as bad because all tests are 
based on opinions and ideology's. They all come from the same flawed 
source- and try to measure something they can not. 
The development of scaling, as recently seen in the school certificate 
in New Zealand, reflects the misguided attempt to be fair to pupils by 
trying to make them fit the normal curve. The belief that scores from 
exams will fit the normal distribution is nothing more than what 
amounts to philosophical fascism. If the normal distribution held true 
then why the need for such elaborate reworking of grades to make them 
fit the normal distribution? McNaughton (1988, p 26) observes how 
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such marking practices led the Committee of Inquiry of 1986 to 
conclude of such reworking of grades artificially to 'make' them fit the 
normal distribution: 
... that it probably defies ready explanation to any except the 
trained evacuator or statistician. In particular, people find 
arguments based on the results of groups of candidates, 
rather than those of individuals, difficult to understand. 
The fixed nature of marking in education goes against the goals of 
education to teach and change individuals to improve. That there 
should not be immutable barriers and inevitability about the results. 
The problem in streaming children may not be whether they should be 
separated or not but what happens to them when they are. The 
educational package given to lower class children is not as adequate as 
that given to upperclass children and they realise it. They know from 
an early age at school that they are up against it, it is no wonder they 
fail or become indifferent. 
The replacement test for Otis was the TOSCA ( or Test of Scholastic 
Ability). TOSCA. claims in one thirty minute test to measure scholastic 
ability. This claim is highly questionable; for example if a child was 
allowed more than thirty minutes to improve their score does this really 
mean a reduction in ability? There is no justification that speed of 
mental functioning is a critical element of intelligence, and if it was 
what rationale is there for one particular time limit rather than another? 
What difference in IQ does five minutes indicate? What TOSCA is 
rewarding in terms of intelligence is the impulsive rather than the 
reflective thinking style in problem solving. Predicting school success 
is the supposed proof of TOSCA's ability to show scholastic ability, 
finding out the parental income of the child probably predicts the 
academic achievement of a child even better but this, but it does not 
make it a test of intelligence. TOSCA and other tests claim to measure 
intelligence but testers would probably be surprised to discover that 
Binet, one of the founding fathers of intelligence testing, believed that 
his tests could not measure intelligence. Rather he wisely realised that 
intelligence could not be encapsulated by a single number and was 
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against the idea that such tests should be used to label or place limits 
on a child's learning. 
IO Gains 
Over the last decades there has been a relatively massive generation by 
generation gain in IQ. This seems to have been a great mystery to all as 
to why the world hasn't changed if people are so much smarter? In 
reality the solution seems so simple as to make those that struggle with 
the issue seem rather ridiculous. (Or perhaps they have not taken the 
massive IQ jump with the rest of us!) 
Once again the material reality of the factmy example demonstrates 
the point well. In a Factory there 1000 workers let us say, of which to 
remain profitable and compete with other factories successfully there 
can only be and needs to be 100 forepeople and 10 supervisors and 
finally 1 manager. If the next generation of people in the fact01y gain 
10 IQ points or 20 IQ points there will still only be 100 foremen, ten 
supervisors and the one manager. Yes, economic rationalism, the 
material world as Marx wrote is in the final analysis determinant. The 
world as in the factory analogy does not change in its fundamental 
analysis. The periphery may change but is still determined by the 
economic base. Comparative1y people are the same, in that some 
people are more intelligent some not as intelligent. Which means little 
in whether they are a manager a foreperson or a worker. The material 
environment determines that, more often than not, the child of a 
manager will become a manager, and the workers child becomes the 
worker. The meaningful relations of the world people experience stay 
the same across generations regardless of IQ. That is why the world has 
not changed, either there is no real change, or there has but that 
increase makes no difference to the economic realities of this world. If 
IQ tests don't measure anything meaningful, or anything related to 
future occupation then who cares whether the scores between 
· generations change, there is nothing to explain. The rich still look, act, 
feel superior and expect to succeed, the poor still look, act, feel inferior 
and expect not to succeed. People say there is a mystery because in the 
world of intellect there is no noticeable change in grades. But 
economic institutions like all else remain tied to economic reality. 
There are still only so many scientists the system can afford, so many 
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students in course. The marker of an exam still expects there should be 
less A's than B's ( they know that shouldn't effect their marking but it 
does none the less). Science, its methods, who does it, who is let into 
its privileged halls and its evaluations of theories and students, has less 
to do with intellect than it has to do with money. 
Conclusion 
From the study of IQ it can be concluded that: 
1) Psychologists see IQ tests as a significant scientific 
achievement. 
2) Psychologists believe that IQ tests have a significant impact on 
society. 
3) Although the IQ tests were meant to only measure intelligence 
they are now used to distinguish between certain groups of 
people based on such factors as race and gender, yet not 
locating cause in the tests themselves or the social environment 
but something innate and non changeable in those they 
measure. 
4) Psychologists do not differ from the more powerful segments of 
society; on the contrary Psychologists are interrelated with them 
as willing agents of reproduction of that social order. 
5) Psychologists are unwilling to, and do not, ask the following 
question. In what way is my thinking and research related to 
where I am in the social order? 
6) Failure to ask such questions leads to unintended results in the 
social impact of psychologist's work. 
7) Intelligence is defined, it seems, by the particular way of 
measuring it. 
8) Tests t1y to explain school learning in terms of something not 
learned. 
9) Tests absolve the institutions and schools of any blame for lack 
of academic performance. On a more general level, perceived 
lack of intelligence is a justification for why the poor remain 
poor, and why the status quo is retained. 
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The IQ tests assume there a few very smart people, a few very stupid 
people and the majority who fall in between. This mistaken and 
baseless belief helps cause a failure of the academic systems to get the 
best out of its pupils. IQ test backers dismiss arguments about what 
intelligence is as semantics, yet semantics is meaning and one cannot 
be too careful about meaning, especially not dismissive. IQ testing is a 
small circle inside the big circle of Psychological tools inside the 
bigger circle of tools that reproduce society. As an example a children 
score lowly on a test, for whatever reason (and there is the problem that 
this is not accounted for), they are put in a poor class, they get a bad 
job or no job and their children are brought up with the same 
experience of diminished access to the same tools. Finally, the crucial 
lesson learnt from a social structural analysis of education is that 
intelligence and achievement rarely match ability; they are not the 
same. 
Binet 
The problem of psychology not being a meaningful help to others and 
it self is as Kline (1988, p 1) outlines, caused by its dysfunctional 
relationship to society . 
.. as it now has been developed experimental Psychology 
is unable to come to grips with what is essentially human. 
The further it progresses, the further away it flees from 
what should be the natural objective of psychology 
As a result of this, modern psychology is not only 
valueless, but actually corrosive, destroying any 
possibility of insight into human behaviour. Kline (1988, p 1) 
The emphasis on the individual 'seems' right and proper and this is the 
conception and measurement of human intelligence which typifies 
psychology. When theoreticians developed their conceptions, they 
always had in mind the individual. Furthermore, when theories are 
validated a focus on the individual is used. The social context must 
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surely however be included in the model of human intelligence. Binet, 
for example, had an appreciation that the social contexts in which 
people found themselves affected intelligence scores. Binet thought 
there were two kinds of context; 
1) the context in which the assessment of the individual was made. 
2) the context for which the individual assessment was to be a basis 
for remedial action. 
Binet also recognised a third variable, that being the social context in 
which people develop playing an important role, but he did not take it 
seriously, preferring to put it in the background. Binet, one of the 
founding fathers of intelligence testing, however had figured that the 
social context played an important part in the development of 
intelligence in children and also in the measurement of that 
intelligence. 
It is all very well differentiating between those who can learn 
normally and those that can not based on intelligence. A political 
decision on their future is then made, however, which may put either 
high or low intelligence people at a disadvantage. For example, there 
was a social consequence of the scientific work of Binet. Binet was 
extremely pleased at the level of interest the American Psychologists 
were showing in his scales. Binet did not ask however why American 
psychologists were so interested in his scales, to do so is to ask what 
are the features of American society are, and the social position of the 
psychologists which made these tests seem so attractive to them. Binet 
could not as Sarason ( 1981 p 72 ), states see; "... the possible 
consequences for its work arising from his relationship to and 
understanding the network of groups and institutions of which he was a 
part." Or as Sarason ( 1981, p 73) also states 
Wolf is absolutely correct in concluding that those that came 
after Binet seized upon his methods and not on his thinking. 
But in one respect Binet was like the psychologists who came 
after him: he and they wanted to have some effect on their 
but had no real conceptual framework with which to 
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understand their society and their place in it. 
Psychology has not taken seriously the question of the impact the 
psychologists place in the social arrangements and the bearing that 
such arrangements has on what happens to them as a people as well as 
the social consequences of the psychologists work. This is an 
intellectual failure of psychology resulting from ignorance of the social 
effects on its work. 
Binet' s scales proved so popular because of the nature of the society he 
found himself in. Sarason (1981), outlines these reasons as being 
1) Feeble mindedness was seen as a cause of anti-social behaviour. 
2) Immigration could have a massive effect on the social order. 
3) The tests were very useful for deciding educational resource 
allocation. 
So we can see how the intelligence tests were used to replicate the 
existing social structure. Screening to see who would come into the 
country was dependant on who did well on the test. People could only 
do well on the test if they came from a similar social knowledge 
background. It became a tool of replication as those that understood 
through privilege and familiarity would be selected for the same. 
Indeed those that use such tools in the past and do so today see 
themselves not as reinforcing positions of privilege and power but of 
defending a position of 'truth', and advancing the 'progress' and 
stability of society. 
There is little agreement exactly, or even generally, what intelligence 
is. So it seems hard to image how we could produce tests to measure it. 
Conformation by studying the results is fundamentally flawed as the 
object of study, namely intelligence and whether a test is measuring it 
or not, can only be studied using that which is being investigated. 
An example of someone having only their own intelligence to study 
intelligence is Spearman's g. Spearman's g was believed by Spearman 
to have been the constant unilateral intelligence factor. Yet analysing 
scores of many children, gives a meaningless average based on a 
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haphazard amalgamation of information. To assume an underpinning 
cause must explain a positively correlated phenomena is risky 
reasoning. From Spearman's research different conclusions can be 
reached. Spearman argues the brain is constituted by specific abilities 
underpinned by a general energy, it could also be assumed that the 
brain has almost no specialised structure at all. 
F) Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology 
The traditional rationale behind clinical practice is not a balanced 
or appropriate. The traditional perspective conveys three messages 
1. The organisation or social levels of analysis and intervention are 
somehow peripheral to the real work of clinical psychologists 
which concerns the direct treatment of personal problems and acute 
cases of disturbed individuals. 
2. That psychological skills are a form of technological expertise 
which can be acquired through training in the theory and techniques 
of applied psychology. 
3. That the application of these skills is positively valanced and does 
not involve issues of power, conflict, morality or faith. 
The complexities of clinical practice are such to render such claims as 
highly questionable. Treacher (1979), and Smail (1982), as two of 
many articles which imply that tacit knowledge which rules the 
everyday activities of the clinicians actually is different to the formal 
theories of the discipline and at times contradicts them. But if 
psychology is socially aware and socially competent the potential for 
help is greatly increased. For this 'awareness' to happen psychology 
needs to develop a more questioning stance toward the underlying 
assumptions of both the formal models of clinical psychology and the 
implicit knowledge governing all aspects of practice. The clinician's 
underlying biases and beliefs of a social nature should be able to be 
exposed to conscious scrutiny. The gap between theory and practice 
will shrink as the relationship between society and psychology is taken 
into account in terms of the social and institutional contexts. 
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The use of psychologists in criminal courts to give evidence on the 
state of mind of an individual is highly questionable. A psychologist 
could easily be found to support any particular and differing view of 
the same case. Their participation is nothing more than an attempt to 
clothe a decision in scientific justification. 
The psychologist transforms the stereotypical ideas of society into 
clinical descriptions which serve as the basis of diagnosis. Two 
interesting studies highlight this relationship to society. Lee (1968), 
found that when a patient was described as lower class they were 
judged as being more mentally ill and given a poorer prognosis then 
when the very same patient was presented to another doctor as upper 
class. Efron (1970), found that the lower class patient regardless of the 
severity of the symptoms he presented was consistently judged to be 
extremely psychotic with very poor progress. An improved differential 
diagnosis was only found amongst upper class patients. 
Specifically, there is a weakness with diagnostic categories when the 
social structural is not taken into account as their use encourages 
professionals to think they understand the disorders without looking 
further into the problems. Braginsky and Braginsky (1974, p 129) 
summarise such clinical practices: 
In short then the diagnostic labels in terms of historical, linguistic, 
and empirical analysis tell us nothing about the recipients, but 
instead reveal a great deal about diagnosticians and the society they 
serve. 
In brief the diagnoses of Psychology are reflections of the values 
society endorses, not that this is necessarily a bad or a good thing. So 
diagnoses are not entirely objective reflections of the salient 
characteristics of those observed they also reflect the ideology of the 
observer. 
Diagnosis is a major tool of therapy. It unfortunately usually brands 
the person approaching diagnosis as having the problem when clearly 
this is not always, or entirely, the case. Psychologists if they were to 
successfully cure all people of mental diseases and deviant behaviour 
would then be out of a job. Speaking logically, therefore, it is vital for 
psychology's own existence to continually remind society how big a 
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problem there is out there, so that the problem does not disappear. 
Consequently for psychology to thrive, mental health must not; in fact 
as mental health improves, so Psychology must become weaker. 
Therefore, the lucrative nature of the benefits of those who serve the 
mentally unstable is a contradiction. Unfortunately whether the 
knowledge that the more successful psychologists become the less 
secure they become economically affects the psychologists work is not 
investigated. 
H) Conclusion 
Underlying many problems is the basic difficulty of understanding 
between the public and the discipline. Traditionally psychology has put 
its impetus into investigating and understanding the public but there is 
also the problem of the public understanding psychology. This issue of 
public understanding is a crucial factor, Bevan (1976, p 481) agrees: 
The publics confidence in science will depend ultimately on an 
understanding of these fields as social institutions and the 
activities associated with them, as a particular way of 
looking at the world. 
Solutions to the issues of communication will not be achieved by 
sounding off how wonderful peoples lives have become thanks to 
Psychology. The problem will not be solved by the prevalent belief that 
science and psychology simply know best, and are able to judge what is 
justified as good for the public. Underlying such an arrogant belief is 
the claim that in the quest for 'truth' investigators are neutral, and 
stand apart from the issue of moral consequences, that those 
psychologists, while performing Psychology are not part of the society 
they study. Throughout, history however, humankind has seen how 
one-sided approaches, whether political, religious or scientific, lead to 
abuse. Hence, psychology must take into account what the public think 
of its applications and the way it fulfils its ideals as a science. Physical 
science when researching does not always have this consideration to 
make but Psychology must always. Psychology's applications are 
capable of good and bad outcomes and psychologists as the instigators 
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of such activities are accountable to the society at large. As a 
consequence the belief of scientific neutrality and objectivity is no 
longer relevant to Psychology if its applications are to be appropriate. 
It is unfortunate that Psychology has not remained faithful to its 
stated aims of helping humankind. Instead psychologists remain asocial 
while falsely purporting to be relevant to society. 
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Chapter Six 
A Little Touch of Philosophy 
A) The Arrogance of Humans 
Science reflects human arrogance, because the 'after-the-event' 
analysis which humans have used predominantly throughout science 
has no power over the event in question. That is just because science 
may put forward a theory of the most likely way the universe was 
formed ( the most 'rational' and 'logical' way), this is no evidence for 
how it actually was formed. Just because an event may be the most 
probable one to occur, this does not necessarily mean that it will occur. 
However, the 'most likely outcome' is automatically accepted, with 
blind commitment without realising this limitation. But, to predict an 
outcome correctly everything must be accounted for, which, of course, 
is an impossible task. The more that is discovered about something, the 
more questions are raised. Naturally, humans find this idea hard to 
accept. By the same token, there is no way of detecting whether or not 
a seemingly unsolvable problem has an easy answer. For to arrogantly 
state that some issues are 'solvable' and some are 'not', is to profess 
some greater understanding of the world. Psychology often as Koch, 
(1981) has identified uses a process of simplification by denial that 
denies the possibility that the most unlikely event may in fact occur. 
This technique leads to a simple-minded absolutism which, while 
reassuring, is patently not acceptable. 
B) Truth 
141 
Their are a class of questions which humans must ask yet seem to be 
unanswerable rationally. So it seems inappropriate to try and answer 
them with the present conception of facts. And although psychology 
would try to claim they are not relevant, they are fundamental to its 
study, such as the mind body problem which underlies many of 
psychology's assumptions and practice. 
Truth has turned into a weapon from its role in the past of 
enlightenment, It is no longer good enough to equate progress with 
goodness, truth has turned into a weapon, it can, and will make people 
slaves. This is due to the social structural consequences of new 
discoveries. In the past they were seen as enlightenment but now the 
consequences have seen as terrible. Truth and its discovery must not be 
seen as a purely scientific achievement. Yet truth does not become a 
useless or false commodity, but a more limited or rather pragmatic 
reality. Rather, truth must measure up to pragmatic and humanitarian 
concerns. Consequently without knowing its limitations problems 
arise. For example, there tends to be no way to differentiate between 
truth and power without a social historical analysis. Truth still is and 
should be, the aim for science. Who knows what the future holds in 
terms of obtainable truths but it is best to aim for this ideal. 
C) Facts 
Psychology in its desire to become a natural science has produced 
what it calls scientific knowledge, and this knowledge as in physical 
science is produced in the form of facts. At least this is the perception 
society has of what science yields and in a way it is correct. Science 
does produce facts, but they are not completely scientific facts, they are 
produced by humans and their observations. Consequently, science 
cannot ascertain for certain that these are the ultimate facts of reality. 
George Steiner in his book 'Does the truth have a future' outlines his 
concern of a system which produces truths, which contradict each 
other, even when using the same scientific method. It cannot be 
ascertained, therefore, whether these facts are the fundamental truths or 
merely an opinionated good guess. So even in science, there appear to 
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be no absolute truths, only reasonable approximations to what is tacitly 
believed to be an underlying, yet invisible truth. Yet science fosters the 
image and belief that it indeed does produce the fundamental and non 
negotiable facts of the universe. It is in reality merely equating a best 
guess with a scientific fact. Even if science does discover a 'truth', 
humans, due to the in built limitations cannot ascertain that what they 
have discovered is the truth and not just the scientific truth. Indeed in 
our human terms, can there not be essential irrationalities so that we 
can never grasp their workings because they could never make sense. 
Hence, we do not know that there are not many more universals, 
constituted with different matter and consciousness. The implication is 
that psychology may not be describing or at least understanding the 
universe, but rather making it up to fit our humanness. Subsequently 
our inherent limits mean we do not describe existence but what we can 
understand, what fits in with our social institutions of which our reality 
is one. Millar comments on this problem ( 1980, p 132 ): " ... most of 
what passes for knowledge in psychology does so by virtue of its 
internal coherence, rather than by its correspondence to reality." 
Psychology has even more shaky grounds for claiming it has 
discovered fundamental truths rather than opinionated human and 
subjective ones. It only has the brain to study the reality of the brain 
therefore bias is inherently built into its analysis. Further weakening 
psychology's position is its use of statistics which only give a 
probability that indeed what they are saying 'is the truth', is the truth. 
But nevertheless both the physical and psychological sciences portray 
their scientific facts as absolute, unwavering, and are fundamental. And 
it is here in psychology's relationship to society where the damage 
occurs, because the public at large, are also convinced that this 
description of science is accurate. Such a societal perception is 
achieved through indoctrination and ridicule of alternative thought. Yet 
such assurance seems very unwise and undoubtably not the true nature 
of discovery's of psychology. Every question of every test and exam I 
have ever sat I could disagree with the answer that I was expected to 
give logically and rationally. This accepted answer is the one I have 
been taught to give also on the basis of logic and science. Any 
disagreement is just as logical because logic is simply opinion. Logic is 
opinion because it comes from humans which have faults in that 
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humans are limited by the physical make up of their brains. 
Consciousness and perception are the irreducible bases of all 
knowledge, and science and as they are imperfect and so is knowledge. 
The irreducible source of knowledge it must be concluded is oneself. 
This does not make knowledge useless or unhelpful or even 
unscientific. There is a physical universe which is independent of my 
experience of it, as with the noise made when a tree that falls down in a 
forest with no one around to hear it. Even though we can have no 
objective independent access to knowledge and truth does not mean 
that it does not exist and that we cannot meaningful affect it for our 
benefit. The limitations of our science cannot be overstated, however. 
Our strongest form of proof is inter-observer agreement, yet it is 
difficult to see how this is going to yield non-biased truth. For, it is not 
logically possible to arrive with certainty at any generalisation 
containing more information than the particular statements upon which 
that generalisation was founded. As processes such as group think 
mean the majority can be wrong. Psychologists have no way of gaining 
another conscious, which is not human, to confirm that their 
conceptions of any part of reality are accurate. In a scientific 
experiment Psychology relies on the trained observations of humans in 
the methods of science, but the psychologists conception that they 
know what is reasonable, of what is possible. Psychologists as humans 
see only what they want to see. 
Historically, humans are constantly amazed how wrong they can be, 
that people can fly, that there are atoms, that Newtonian physics will be 
shown to be inadequate; that in using the same methods to tell how old 
the universe is, we measure a star and discover we estimate that star to 
be vastly older than our estimation of how old the universe is; to 
believe the universe is infinite but yet is expanding, which means 
something that cannot get bigger, is getting bigger and exactly what 
would it be travelling into if it were expanding. To have learnt anything 
from the past is to have learnt that what is known now will be and is 
completely and fundamentally wrong. Science and society at large 
constantly laugh at how people in the past used to believe some 
ridiculous thing, but they forget, as though it is to threatening to 
remember, that in the future people will think the same of them. It is 
just a matter of time if anything is to be learned from the past that 
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current knowledge will be negated by new. The reason why such an 
arrogant attitude is retained is the influence of society on science and 
psychology. The fact that psychologists are human and that scientific 
institutions are social institutions which are full of social animals first 
and foremost. That psychologists both affect society and it affects them 
at all points of the scientific process. Psychology and science in general 
likes to have certainty and assurance, and a by product of this need for 
assurance and certainty is scientific arrogance. 
It is easy to think of any amazing impossibility and formulate in 
imagination a potential series of events that will see that impossibility 
becoming reality. It can be also estimated how improbable that event is 
likely to be, but what is such an estimation based upon? It is based 
upon a social historical reasoning process which reflects the time and 
place in society that the psychologist occupies. Just because a human 
has trouble conceiving an events possibility does not mean that it is 
unlikely to happen in the near future, or that it has already happened. 
Subsequently what humans consider to be good judgement does not 
necessarily constitute good judgement, as they cannot ascertain the 
reliability of their own judgements using the very system they are 
judging. 
Psychology could have a role of educating society to show how its 
facts are not universals but only best guesses, but its role has become to 
propagate the myth of the absolute fact that science believes it 
produces. So when Industrial Organisational psychology reproduces 
the status quo and exploitation of individuals it is seen as good, natural 
and unavoidable. Society accepts this false belief in the fundamental 
truth of scientific facts, and it serves social functions. One social 
function is to further the status quo. Is this process unavoidable or not? 
definitely not. Lucretius says, 
Give your mind now to the true reasoning I have to unfold. 
A new fact is battling strenuously for access to your ears. A 
new aspect of the universe is stirring to reveal itself. But no 
fact is so simple that it is not harder to believe than to doubt 
at the first presentation. 
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It is not argued, for example, that there is life on other planets, but 
that to say there is or not, based on probability or with any assurance is 
to me amusing, and paints the claimant a fool. We should continue to 
ask, no matter how dangerous the answer may prove to be or how 
ridiculous the question may seem to our present conception of what is 
conceivable. If our discoveries in psychology are seen as truths then 
those truths are leading to an ambush in the sciences. 
Within society, the citizen is confronted by bewildering bigness and 
complexities and finds it necessary to defer on all matters to those who 
know better. ( experts, professionals. ). Indeed, it would be a violation 
of reason to do otherwise, since it is universally agreed that the prime 
goal of society is to keep the productive apparatus turning over 
effectively. In the absence of expertise the great mechanism would 
surely bog down, leaving us in the midst of chaos and poverty. Yet the 
paradox of such a destruction of the invulnerability of truth would 
increase consciousness and freedom of thought. 
Science cannot provide the solution, ie an accurate prediction, to a 
problem containing three bodies, operating under just one force- that of 
gravity, even if we assume the bodies are exactly the same, that is 
perfect spheres, and that the force of gravity is precisely an inverse 
square force. So why then, do we think that we can predict the 
behaviour of billions of heterogeneous humans interacting with each 
other and in a substantially unpredictable ever changing environment; 
of which we are part of via forces which we do not understand. 
Consequently as an art of discovery psychology can give no lasting 
formal rules for the pursuit of truth which can be universally 
applicable. Yet Psychology still believes it can reduce the human to a 
simple structure. 
From a pragmatic standpoint the search for universals in psychology 
is fundamentally flawed. The basis of human life, for example, must be 
error tolerant if we accept the process of evolution to be true. Nature 
would not be so successful if it was infallible, in terms of random 
mutations which prove beneficial, and so infallible laws of the human 
would seem unlikely. Indeed the oddities of the world and humans are 
not silly, they are crucial. That there many possible solutions to a single 
problem, may reflect the nature of the problem. Yet that same problem 
in a different situation with another person may need a different 
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solution. In the present environment of competition psychologists must 
criticise everyone else's solution and push their own. So the correct 
solution will not quickly or ever be employed. Worse still is the public 
position. How do they know which red faced shouting scientist is best, 
when they all say they are. Most psychological treatments do not work 
to the patients satisfaction most of the time. As Tolstoy stated in his 
epic novel 'War and Peace', multiple causation seems to exist for all 
aspects of human activity. 
Facts are the outcome of a social world ruled by emotion, motivation 
and social meaning. Psychology to deal with the problems raised about 
truth ignores it as a problem. Psychology labels those that would 
discuss such problems as philosophers or educators rather than giving 
them the title of psychologist, as though somehow it is inappropriate 
for psychologists to talk about such problems. 
E) Conclusion 
A pragmatic realistic conception of truth, facts and logic should be 
adopted. It must be realised that knowledge cannot be understood 
absolutely. But this does not mean that psychology cannot know at all, 
indeed psychological knowledge can be useful and with the right 
analysis truth and power for example can be distinguished. When it is 
stated that something is true it should mean nothing more than a belief 
that it works. The absolute truth should never be claimed, but that it is 
the best that can be known. A proposition or theory should only be 




A) Implications to Psychology 
It has become increasingly clear that even the most rudimentary 
laboratory experiments involving people or animals are far more 
complex than simply the behaviours studied by the investigator. 
Braginsky and Braginsky ( 1974, p 53 ). 
Chaos is a relatively new theory. It believes that due to the extremely 
complex nature of some systems prediction is impossible; ie if the 
initial starting measurements are not exactly right inaccuracies will 
inevitably occur in any prediction. In 'chaotic' systems even the 
slightest inaccuracy will rapidly lead to a state where no prediction is 
possible. Another tenet of Chaos is that while systems may appear 
incredibly complex, they may in fact be controlled by a very simple 
formula. This, as we shall discuss, offers both new hope and ( 
paradoxically ) new problems to psychology. By looking at a familiar 
topic under the new light of Chaos theory we may be able understand 
both the theory and that example better, and indeed many areas of 
human psychology fit the model of bounded Chaos. Bounded in the 
sense that the chaotic behaviour is limited by boundaries. For example 
between two points on line within which the behaviour is chaotic but 
cannot go past either point. So the chaotic behaviour is limited and 
therefore some predicability is possible. Chaos has implications for the 
power of psychologists because psychologists largely deal with 
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bounded chaos. For example mental illness often resembles a bounded 
chaotic system and so people are labelled mentally ill when showing 
chaotic behaviour. This chaotic state of their mind supposedly alludes 
to some biological, but yet to be detailed, in terms of observables, 
faults. 
Chaos has shown us is that it is possible for nearly identical entities 
in identical environments to exhibit radically different behaviours, 
even when the underlying systems are extremely simple and 
completely deterministic. The basis of empirical science is undermined 
by such implications. Fundamental aims such as prediction and control 
are misplaced in light of theories such as Chaos. Certainly poor 
analytical results are to be expected when analysing chaotic systems 
with standard statistical methods. In short knowing an entity's state, its 
environment and the laws which govern its behaviour are not sufficient 
to predict behaviour, especially in a human chaotic system which is the 
topic of psychological study. So as Gregerson and Sailer ( 1993, p 777 
) believe: 
"The customary goals of social science eg, prediction and control as 
systems of behaviour are sometimes, if not usually unobtainable". But 
perhaps psychology is in a unique position of all the sciences to take 
advantage of chaos. For its subject matter, as are all sciences, is deeply 
effected by chaotic laws and so reduces predictive power, this finding 
is particularly devastating to the physical sciences. For psychology 
however the loss is not as great, partly because psychology has not 
achieved as much, its predictive power is less, so psychology has less 
to lose. But the best implication for psychology, is that many 
experiments dismissed in the past as destroyed by 'noise', (that they 
were limited by design or execution of that design) may be legitimate 
data reflecting reality. Those apparent non-scientific random events are 
in fact potentially controlled by universal laws. It seems then chaos is 
suitably applicable to society; therefore psychology, as the study of that 
society and those in it, would also benefit from using a chaotic 
standpoint. Many areas psychologists 'bang their heads against' or put 
in the too hard basket are potentially ruled by simple scientific rules yet 
to be discovered. Problems and inexplicable results which have 
traditionally frustrated psychology can now be explained by chaotic 
implications. Even something simple may be impossible to discover 
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even with all the possible data. The pre-chaos ideas of predicability and 
only the stable results being good ones will have to change. This has 
implications to sciences relationship to society. For it is by no accident 
that empiricism mirrors society, and that determinism suits the 
capitalist work ethic. Chaos and its implications of an disordered 
universe and human action is not the model the powerful elites of 
society wants of its science. Science, of which psychology is part of, 
has the function in society of telling us that life is on the whole simple 
and predictable. That in fact if we have enough information we can 
predict and control and do anything. This is very comforting to the 
populace and to scientist's egos. In practice it is very hard to predict 
anything that feels the effect of more than two forces. Yet science still 
presents a universe which is deterministic, obeying fundamental laws, 
but with a predisposition for disorder and complexity. The difference 
being that traditional science has always believed that we can solve it if 
we try, whereas chaos believes that perhaps even the most simple of 
systems may not be able to be understood or predictions made from 
them. This lack of ability to predict comes from the fact that if you are 
slightly erroneous in your estimates of the starting positions of data, 
then divergences between prediction and actual rapidly emerge. 
It is true that chaotic systems often operate to a pattern but that 
pattern has an infinite variety within. Chaos shows that small changes 
lead to bigger changes and that the universe is ruled by persistent 
instability. Accordingly any attempt to predict future events such as 
Newton's 'clockwork' universe, including the solar system and the 
trajectory of the planets will be futile. Likewise complicated behaviour 
does not always necessarily mean it is the result of complex laws. So 
Chaos is able to reconcile a haphazard changing infinitely varied world 
with simple-fundamental laws of the world. 
If errors grow at an exponential rate in a chaotic system, and human 
systems are chaotic, then this has interesting reproductions for our 
predictions as a science. Davies (1992, p 215) outlines method changes 
in psychology in regard how it interprets its experimental data as a 
result of chaos: 
For a while, it was commonly believed that apparently 'chance' events 
were always the result of our ignoring , or effectively averaging over 
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vast numbers of hidden variables or degrees of freedom. The toss of a 
coin or a die, the spin of a roulette wheel. These would no longer appear 
random if we could observe the world at the molecular level. The 
slavish conformity of the cosmic machine ensured that lawfulness was 
folded up in even the most haphazard events, albeit in an awesomely 
convoluted tangle. 
Determinism therefore seems to a completely inappropriate model for 
science to adopt for the human, rather a chaotic model of probabilities 
or bounded chaos is more realistic in every way. In a world educated to 
principles of chaos people will no longer cringe over foolish 
deterministic statements from the worlds disaster sights. As the 
responsible paity proclaims that they have 'taken steps to ensure that 
such a disaster will never happen again'. Its no wonder, with this kind 
of false optimism that such an accident will happen again much sooner 
than it would have. 
Samples of behaviour although appeai-ing complex may be in fact 
ruled by simple behaviour as in the mandlebrot set, created from a 
simple formula, the bounds appear to be infinite. The sample system 
Psychology uses is therefore particularly useless in a chaotic system. 
So to have a useful study of the human which is meaningful and 
helpful to that human the humans relationship to society in its fullest 
needs to be acknowledged. Acknowledging that relationship to its 
fullest means a conception of a chaotic human social context is needed, 
so techniques as sampling need to be seen realistically. For example it 
is little wonder to chaoticians that the biggest reputation political polls 
have, is for getting predictions wrong. Facts of ce1tainty derived from 
the scientific method should be seen as an illusion. 
Unfortunately in mainstream psychology there has been no analysis 
of the human in context of a social setting. What is need is the 
equivalent of an earth mover in psychology in terms of attitudes and 
methods. Of course the reason social settings and context is avoided 
consciously or not becomes clearer when the implications of chaos are 
considered. These are, that the enormous task of trying to come to 
terms with a complex chaotic system of rational of human thought is 
not pleasant for determinists, and the determinist submissions to 
journals pay the bills and get the promotions. But the human social 
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being is organised in a similar way to physical systems and physical 
systems are fundamentally chaotic in nature. Psychology must rid it 
self of the obsessive individualism which uses a micro level of 
analysis. The implications of Chaos and common sense are that, you 
can not study a society or the individuals in it by isolating a small part. 
By measuring that small sample and applying any trend found to the 
larger uninvestigated whole, justified by the fact it is a random sample 
is not in a chaotic system accurate. The sample will not necessarily 
match the whole, no matter how randomly it is selected and what 
statistical strength is gained. All that will be seen is a tiny part of an 
enormously complicated motion, resulting in a picture which appears 
as random and with no structure. Only by relying on generalisations or 
massive has such a experimental method of reductionism and statistical 
sampling remained. Its almost complete lack of success in Psychology 
bears testament to its poor methodological base. Humans are chaotic, 
they cannot be separated meaningfully from their society and that 
society is a bounded chaotic system to. 
Chaos theory attempts to reveal the subtle relationships between 
simplicity and complexity and between orderliness and randomness. 
Chaos's role in this Thesis is to show that human are essentially 'non 
linear' and subsequently any 'linear' method of analysis will be limited 
and inherently an incorrect method to use. 
B) Linear laws and Determinism 
Classical mathematics concentrates on linear problems for a very 
sound reason, it can't solve anything else. Unfortunately for 
psychology meaningful linear problems are unlikely to very common, 
if they even exist, in human society. Non-linear problems should be 
treated as non-linear problems and not as simplified linear problems. 
That universal laws may exist is not disputed but that it is potentially 
beyond the ability of psychologists to derive them from their data. 
Psychology puts an ideal representation of the problem to be analysed. 
Now it might be argued that for the sake of progress this has to be 
done, but Chaos has shown us that simplification no matter how small, 
will make a difference. Even in the unlikely event that there are no 
152 
errors in omitted variables and the measurement is perfect an 
unexpected result may ensue. So the traditional form of scientific 
method limits our applicability to the world and those in it. 
Psychologists do not, quite naturally, want to get less accurate research 
results even though this would mean accepting the reality of the 
situation. To avoid this a simplistic representation in a highly 
controlled environment (the laboratory) is used. Naturally even in this 
environment unexpected results are acquired but to still avoid chaotic 
implications this is blamed on noise, which implicitly blames the 
psychologist and their experimental design. Chaos in short could very 
well mean Chaos for the researchers, where no pattern emerging is a 
distinct possibility in what was before considered the simplest and 
most reliable of tests. Yet why is it that psychologists can get reliable 
results, and that strange deviations from the norm are not reported 
more often? When a psychologist gains a inexplicable result, the 
psychologist is viewed by others and themselves as having made a 
'muck up' of their research. More importantly, the work will not be 
published and therefore the results are thrown away and the experiment 
done again, or the data is 'fixed' in a less than scrupulous way. The 
outcome being that such research is not sighted. 
The belief in Chaotic systems is at odds with the status quo of 
Determinism, which believes that if you know all the relevant 
information you can predict the future with precision, that given the 
same set of data the same outcome should result.. Here are some 
problems with the traditional model of determinism 'Chaos' has 
found. 
1) Deterministic models can lead to non deterministic outcomes. This 
has obvious and great implications to those in society and how 
psychology as a science should teach them. 
2) This is because the scientist can never know, exactly, for sure the 
starting position or state of anything they are studying. In all systems 
this will eventually lead to gross inaccuracies in prediction and in 
Chaotic systems inaccuracies develop extremely quickly. So 
Determinist systems soon appear to act in a non Determinist way. 
153 
3) Determinism officially died with Quantum theory, where at atomic 
level a lack of Determinism is apparent in physical laws. Quantum 
physics has in fact built chance into the very fabric of scientific reality. 
Quantum theory has shown that the belief that the future can be 
predicted with enough information is flawed. But it still seems to 
persist in Psychology. Contrary to the popular belief of determinism, in 
chaotic systems the more data you have the more uncertainty there is. 
Although Chaos may appear to be complex and non-deterministic 
there is hidden within it a wealth of information. For example in the 
midst of apparent chaos, the phenomenon of Strange Attractors appear. 
Strange attractors are unexpected gatherings of data at one or many 
points. Plotted on a graph such groupings of data appear symmetric but 
are in reality data averaged to form a regular pattern. The lack of ability 
to predict behaviour in a situation is fortunately mitigated by 
boundaries and trends to limit this unpredictability. These bounds 
appear and are referred to as an attractor, so the attractors are boundary 
conditions which make probability statements in a chaotic system 
possible. Strange attractors are never repeating but yet always 
resembling themselves infinitely. Strange attractors may be what 
psychologists identify as rules, or laws of human behaviour. Due to the 
fact that they never exactly repeat and are only a trend, may explain 
why psychological laws power of prediction are not as great as physical 
laws. And why Psychology should not use the same rules of acceptance 
or rejection of a law. Therefore the pragmatic standard, of how useful 
to well identified goals are laws, is what is crucial and should 
determine which theory to accept and which to reject. 
Often rules which appear to be deterministic have only been phrased 
that way for public consumption while in reality being governed by 
chaotic laws. The phenomena of growth is governed by chaotic rules, 
yet the growth appears to be regular after the rate of growth is averaged 
out. Another example is where engineers found the wheels of trains 
were wearing out faster on one side of the trains than the other, but 
when the more modern model trains were allowed to go faster the 
disparity in rate of wear on the wheels disappeared with both sides 
wearing out just as fast. This puzzled the engineers who anticipated a 
greater problem, that one set of wheels would now wear out much 
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quicker than the other. The answer lay in the higher speeds of the train 
setting up a chaotic motion of the train on the tracks, (bounded in that 
the train cannot leave the tracks but can vibrate and shake), this chaotic 
motion on the average works out to be roughly symmetric as opposed 
to the motion at lower speeds in which discrepancies in one set of 
tracks, or one side of the train to the other resulted in a motion of bias 
to one side. In effect the higher speeds drowned out the influence these 
biases because the chaotic motion was entered into. For a display of the 
same process turn on the tap. At lower speeds of water flow the water 
comes out of the tap in a symmetric flow, as the speed of the flow is 
increased by turning the tap on further the water goes to more 
complicated flows and eventually to turbulence. 
Psychology reduces, as a science, everyday actions to a matter of 
simple trnth or falsity, this is inappropriate and dooms successive 
generations of psychologists to frustration. There is no scientific issue 
in Psychology that does not have two sides, both with their respective 
evidence. Both sides having sets of evidence gathered using the same 
scientific principles which are meant to be as qualitatively good as each 
other. Why when if both sides use the same fail safe method is opposite 
evidence and conclusions found? The answer may become clear if the 
discipline of chaos was adopted. Chaos states that two different 
answers are possible from the same phenomena, if the conditions are 
replicated experimentally the behaviour may not be replicated. 
Therefore it could possibly stop psychologists from coming to 
unnecessary anger, disbelief, confrontation with each other if they 
understood chaos. 
It is the relationship of psychology to society that keeps Psychology 
and society from adopting chaos as an improved framework for 
assessing results. The confrontational nature of capitalism in science, 
and also the attitude that science can understand all is retained because 
it reassures society and science. 
The universe seems to be constituted as one large chaotic system. 
Look into a Bacterium and you find it to be made of molecules, look 
into a molecule and you find it is made of atoms, look into an atom and 
if you find it is made of electrons and the nucleus, look into a nucleus 
and you find it is made of protons and neutrons, look into a neutron or 
a proton and you find it is made of quarks, look into a quark and you 
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find gluons and we reach our present limit, Undoubtably there is 
something smaller inside the gluons. We can also reverse the process 
by looking at planets, to a solar system, to galaxies. The point being 
that the universal both the very small and the very big extends beyond 
our comprehension and ability to account it. 
C) Statistics will have a different role 
A very interesting and radical look at the discipline of mathematics 
was made by Gregory Chaitin (1992), in which founding and vital 
assumptions of this discipline are rather incongruous with the facts. For 
example Chaitin ( 1992, p122 ) quotes the enlargement of the use of 
numbers, 
... our concept of number has been often enlarged-when it is 
necessary to find a numerical solution to a problem. 
The concept of a number is enlarged so that mathematical 
problems that should reasonably have solutions do have 
solutions. 
In elementary number theory, questions involving diophantine 
equations can give answers that are completely random and 
look grey, rather than black and white. p 197 
Chaitin has a rather disturbing and interesting analysis of mathematics, 
as he shows that mathematical truth is sometimes nothing more than a 
perfect coin toss. This statement would probably not go down very well 
with most mathematicians but it is the truth. The idea that every 
mathematical problem has a solution, it seems is a very shaky 
assumption, with many mathematical problems not having clear 
answers. Chatin ( 1992, p 197 ) goes on to comment that: "Einstein 
would probably be horrified to discover that God plays dice not only in 
quantum and classical physics but also in pure mathematics". 
Mathematics as a basis of rationality is rather ironically largely made of 
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irrational numbers, even geometry cannot be performed without 
referring to irrational numbers such as the square root of two. A typical 
real number has an infinite chain of numbers in decimal. Consequently 
a continuous line described by real numbers is a fiction, it is impossible 
to take a point on that line and be assured it is exactly an even number. 
There will always be input errors as soon as you t1y to apply 
mathematics to any applied problem, to any real problem. As a result 
mathematics is only accurate as long as it stays out of the real world. In 
particular the use of snapshot statistics, using small samples is simply 
not good enough. While the results are perfectly scientific and perfectly 
valid they do not necessarily equate to with the right results. Statistics 
need to be upgraded, psychology needs qualitative methods which help 
in understanding verses descriptive quantitative methods which are 
proclaimed to help in prediction but Chaos has shown this to be an 
absurdity. For example measuring the distance or position of two 
points on a line in reality requires an infinite amount of information to 
gain exact position, that is to have no error, this would take an infinite 
memory that cannot be known. 
If we accept that prediction is out of the question in chaotic systems, 
the problem of where psychologists can publish non predictive research 
becomes ominous. The ignoring of chaotic systems and allocation of 
research resources reflects the idealised goals of prediction and control. 
In chaotic systems we can only understand, in non chaotic systems we 
can understand control and predict. The key then is ascertaining 
whether the system you are studying is chaotic or not. For in 
Psychology it would seem certain that the human system of thought 
and action on a meaningful level of analysis ( one which takes into 
account the social context) often are chaotic. The positive implication, 
on the other hand is that what appears complicated may indeed be 
obeying simple deterministic laws. The possibility of discovering a law 
which explains the fabric of the universe made from a simple common 
formula exists. Yet as humans psychologists may be destined to never 
know if such laws are there to discover. 
D) Conclusion 
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In the past science served society's need for understanding, 
removing mysteries, and establishing law and order over uncontrollable 
events. The social structure then rewarded science, Psychology 
included, with institutional rewards for this kind of research. Perhaps 
now Chaos has been developed in response to a societal need to regain 
myste1y, chance, and to have an exciting future. The present generation 
may not be as interested in order as previous ones so Chaos theory 
serves a psychological need. Perhaps in society individuals feel a need 
to be free, free of an all knowing and determined world, and would 
rather have a world where there is uncertainty. That the individual in 
today's society feels too much rational control, from the power of the 
state and institutions, that have developed in society. This perhaps 
shows a more subtle level of the relationship between science and 
society. 
Chaos can be applied to any naturally occurring phenomena especially 
our own lives. Life being a bounded chaotic system in that there is a 
staring point with increasing options and diversity for that life as we 
get older till we reach a certain age where the physical bounds of the 
chaotic system start to increasingly limit the options and diversity of 
our life until the final point of death. 
Humans in essence tiy to break down what we cannot comprehend in 
its fullest scale to its smallest parts but this reductionism has not 
delivered an understanding to the problem. Yet we persist in analysing 
the individual without the social relationship and still talk about them 
as a whole. The approach of reduction into smaller levels of analysis, 
studying things in smaller and smaller units of analysis, works well for 
the physical sciences but with the human system psychology must 
consider the whole-whole. Because if the human system is chaotic then 
it will fracture endlessly, and it is no wonder psychology is unable to 
gain the necessaiy understanding through reductionism. 
If in science the goal is to predict and control then eve1ything must be 
known. But to know everything, that is an infinite amount, at an 
infinite precision would require an infinite memory and once a person 
or machine with such an ability started to think about something to see 
what would happen, they would change the problem pondered. So 
pursuit of prediction and control seems a rather ridiculous pursuit 
psychology to have as its guiding aim, but that is exactly what it tries to 
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do. Psychology in fact would call such claims to the contrary, that it is 
anything but 100% accurate, objective and predictive as slander. 
Psychology as a science must become honest with itself and its society. 
Namely psychology's demand for repetition before a theory can be 
accepted may be tempered somewhat by the knowledge that a chaotic 
series of data from an initial condition may be a non repeatable event. 
Chaos may simultaneously help us therefore to understand human 
behaviour while seriously questioning prior conclusions and methods. 
Chapter Eight 
8) Overview of What Psychology is and its Problems 
A) Overview 
There is a power relation between psychology and society. Psychology 
in this relationship does not help society with its real problems. 
Because of psychology's methods and philosophies of science adopted 
it does not even see such problems as a relevant concern. Psychology is 
still trying to discover universal laws in a reflection of its empiricist 
aims. Prediction and control as aims of empiricism are also more 
limited by findings of chaotic science. Psychology merely describes a 
problem rather than adding a meaningful analysis to it. To obtain a 
meaningful analysis several steps must be taken, most crucially the 
elimination of the value free fallacy. Refutation as a means to decide 
which theory is best is not working. Statistics are overused and 
psychologists pay almost exclusive attention to them when accepting or 
rejecting a hypothesis. Research standards are set by journals which 
simply reflect the status quo subsequently too much emphasis is placed 
on the amount of journal publications a psychologist has achieved. 
Individualism is rampant in psychology, whereas a interactive model is 
clearly the more realistic one. As both the individual and the society 
simultaneously interact and effect one another. The lack of social 
structural analysis is a critical flaw in psychology. Funding of 
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psychology plays a large part in what kind of science psychology is. 
Accordingly instead of science being determined by scientific means is 
it is instead determined by economic means. Psychology needs to 
become involved on a socially meaningful level otherwise it becomes a 
pawn to the social structural influences it ignores. 
B) What Psychology has to Offer Potentially and 
What can be Done 
The structural forces supporting the status quo are strong and if 
intellectual changes are to succeed they must be reinforced by 
structural changes to remove the abuses of those non scientific-societal 
influences. The scientific world and the social world are inseparable so 
the best scientific relationship between them must be obtained. 
Involvement in Public Funding on a Political Level 
The links between psychology and politics are strong but not very 
clear to psychologists. Therefore a thorough involvement and analysis 
of political psychology would certainly be worthwhile. Indeed on some 
levels politics is not far from psychology, both are largely concerned 
with the conditions and consequences of human action and motivation. 
Chaos it would seem is an entirely appropriate model of analysis for 
psychology to use in Politics, Kessel (1993, p 9): 
It is perfectly true that much behavioural research on politics is 
concerned with simple questions. But a simple question is not necessarily a 
simple matter. 
Another problem of getting planed change in society is power 
and politics. Realisation is dependant on mobilisation and 
utilisation of resources, the development of support, and 
neutralisation of opposition. Hall (1983, p 87). 
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The political process to date has been viewed particularly by 
academic psychologists as a environment which is totally inappropriate 
for Psychology. Inappropriate in that if psychology was to get involved 
it would taint the respectability of the discipline. Yet as Bandura ( 
1974, p 859) believes such involvement may unavoidable: 
As a science concerned about the social consequences of 
its applications, psychology must be also fulfil a broader 
obligation to society by bringing influence to bear on 
policies to ensure that its findings are used in the service 
of human betterment. 
Even the normally conservative Atkinson ( 1977, p 207 ) seems to 
admit that political evolvement is the pragmatic answer: 
The psychologists, job as a scientist is to search for data 
principles and laws that enlarge our understanding of 
psychological phenomena. There is no reason why 
psychologists should not advocate political viewpoints, 
but they should only advocate them as individual citizens. 
Hall (1983, p 88) shows how power and politics is crucial to 
Psychology; he asserts "the central features of organisation can be seen 
more vividly as structured by power relationships and in the interest of 
those with power." Therefore the establishment of an effective 
psychological Political force that works ( ironically ) to keep politics 
from influencing its science must be developed. Indeed the individual 
theorist and practitioner in psychology would ignore political 
influences to their own and others detriment. Psychology's 
organisational myth of innocence from such influences maintain and 
conceal those very powers. Our traditional models and interventions 
represent organised fictions that provide the rationality and order when 
there really is none. White (1980) argues that if Psychology is going to 
get involved in politics, this will require suppoti of one faction of 
politicians naturally their enemies will feel obliged to hit back at 
psychology. Therefore, our position may be attacked not on a scientific 
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basis but on a totally irrelevant basis. But psychology has no real power 
over those decisions now anyway so why not at least gain something. 
All Psychology can do now is squabble and fight for the pennies the 
politicians now give. Psychology should face up to its responsibilities, 
the responsibility of publicly advocating a political course of action; it 
can not remain scared to do so. Whether politicians attitudes are good 
or bad is a pointless consideration. If he or she advocates the position 
psychology wants, then the outcome and meaningful action is 
achieved. Actions are far more real than intentions. 
Some suggestions for a model of psychology in political life are as 
follows. 
• Become knowledgable about policy making and train those who 
will have to deal with policy makers in such a specialty. 
• maintain knowledge of up to date events. 
• Be patient and have a thick skin. 
• Keep educational and advocacy roles separated. 
• Seek directly, or through advocacy, public office at the highest 
levels. 
C) Reward and funding 
The following points outline changes necessary to avoid an undue 
influence from sources of funding to maintain scientific integrity: 
• Change the conditions of Journal Acceptance, editors should assign 
greater importance to external validity, social relevance, and 
potential for practical application. 
• Reward articles which are a change from the mainstream. Once a 
position has been stated once an endless Repetition of articles 
stating the same thing should not be accepted as is the case today. 
Only papers which look at the problem from a different light should 
be encouraged. 
162 
• Hiring, tenure, promotion and student grades should be evaluated 
on the basis of the best works of an applicant, not the one with the 
most, this would therefore reward quality rather than quantity. 
• Grants should be given to projects of social relevance. 
• awards should recognise multi-disciplinary work. 
• Post graduate student selection should encourage cross disciplinary 
majors. 
• A realistic emphasis on speaking ability should be required, it is the 
most used form of communication and most effective in any 
situation from business to teaching. 
• Require cross disciplinary specialisation and knowledge at all 
levels. 
• Encourage and reward joint degrees. 
• Psychology should always give definite answers even if that answer 
is a definite 'nobody knows'. 
All these points are fine, but they will require strong and unique 
leadership for them to achieve what they are meant to. As far as one 
can tell, there is little evidence of a powerful and decisive voice 
coming from psychology on even psychological matters. The litmus 
test is the average person on the street; if they are not aware of such 
leadership it has failed and in reality is impotent. Once again I have no 
magic wand to wave concerning strong leadership, but I do have some 
ideas of what kind of leadership psychology should pursue. Such a 
leadership would have to value both monetary rationality and social 
knowledge and consciousness. Such leadership would have to be 
democratic and fully accountable, but retain the power of effective 
action. Such leadership must draw on the power of all psychologists 
while serving all. Fundamentally and most importantly such leadership 
needs to protect the integrity of Psychology as a science which helps 
people. If such a leadership sounds unobtainable then this is an 
indication of the forces ranged against it to make it seem impossible. If 
psychologists see no hope of such an organisation coming to fruition 
they should start to try to implement it, for without even trying the 
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science threatens to disappear. Perhaps that is the goulish near future 
brought about by economic rationalism that is needed to kick start 
psychology again. The cause for psychology cannot be argued in 
government by a discipline which is so loose and divided. Whether 
psychology can gain a single unified voice is debatable but until it 
does, with all the waring parties agreeing to at least fight for the 
superordinate motive, the abilities of psychology are limited and 
belong to those that pay them. A healthy science does not necessarily 
mean a healthy society. Nazi society epitomised modernity, the nation 
stood at the pinnacle of world achievement in scholarship and 
technology. But because science believed it had nothing to do with the 
society it was in, yet funded and controlled by that society, as it is 
now, it was unable to resist becoming a pawn for that society. This 
failure to see the relationship between science and society led to in this 
case science being part of the final solution, and using crude anti-
Semitism in an intricate philosophical theory. Human psychology finds 
it comfortable to believe that such a disaster could never happen again, 
but it is only after the fact that people become aware, when they are no 
longer blocked from awareness by there own involvement in such a 
disaster of humanity, that it has happened. The potential of the human 
to inflict pain on others should never be underestimated, Milgram 
estimated in his famous experiments, that 1 out of 1000 people would 
shock their 'subjects' until the end, it turned out to be 26 out of 40 
were prepared to do so. Psychologists are human and will also shock 
26 out of 40. There needs to be no separation between scientific 
responsibility and moral responsibility. 
D) Psychology and Society 
It is a mistake to think of or to talk of psychology and then society. 
There is no psychology outside of society. Social and scientific forces 
work in tandem and psychologists should investigate this relationship. 
Instead psychologists remain true to the scientific method of logical 
positivism to try the impossible and weakening effect of removing 
human influences on their investigations and experiments. All concerns 
of society are valid concerns for psychology, otherwise the problems 
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that are attempted to be solved are the ones which seem solvable and 
the ones not attempted are found in the too hard basket. There is an 
absence of a method to use, to view a problem in light of both the 
individual and society simultaneously and not as distinct parts. 
However, there is needed a form of distinction between the two. The 
distinct elements are needed to be seen as separated but not 
independent. For example does the removal of the cold war tension 
effect the individual psychologies of people on either side? If there is a 
change is it mirrored between the two sides or not? And does the 
change in individual psychologies effect the social structural relations, 
for example, because the people fear war less they become complacent 
and therefore increase the likelihood of war? The world has never been 
as integrated with more and more interdependent problems. These 
problems are the domain of all and threaten our existence. And perhaps 
therein lies our salvation, with common problems the potential 
motivation is there for the world and science in particular to unite in 
superordinate goals. 
Bernal ( 1967) fifty years ago identified the crucial aspects of sciences 
relationship to society. Krober (1988, p 250) reviews these and affirms 
their relevance today as three fundamental relations to society. 
1. Bernal perceived science as an integral part of both the 
material and economic life of our times and of the ideas 
which guide and inspire it. 
2. Its application both to the satisfaction of human needs and 
to the processes of productive industry through which 
modern society can be satisfied. 
3. as the chief agent of change in a society, from unconscious 
technical changes to direct social change itself. 
Perhaps then if science serves society's majority of humans and 
industry it is easy to see where problems occur. In capitalism the two 
are looked in struggle and their respective interests are usually 
diametrically opposed. One benefits at the expense of the other. So 
science can not effectively benefit them both. When one side controls 
science they develop science to further their own interests over another. 
Science is something which is fought for, and the respective power in 
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society gains a certain amount of the scientific resource to further its 
own gains, eg the military in war mobilises science to increase its 
killing power but in doing so gives science a large boost in ideas and 
resources. Such relationships show there is no objective vacuum in 
which scientists work. 
The arguments against separating psychology from society to make 
sure psychology stays independent may not seem to make logical sense 
but require wisdom. If I may use the example of a cult that tries to 
retreat totally from the world, living in isolation; all they will achieve is 
to replicate the world's problems in that isolated settlement. In fact, 
such groups are often the locality of the worst aspects of humanity. 
Likewise psychology through empiricism has logically tried to distance 
itself from the outside influences on the pure task of doing science, 
only to be more vulnerable to such influences. The problem needs to be 
looked at not only from an analysis of logic, which is wonderful for 
producing methodology and analysing logical phenomena, but it only 
gives you a scientific analysis. Psychology must include the social 
structural influences in its analysis if it is to incorporate meaning into 
its work without being overwhelmed by such influences. As Heikannon 
and Alestalo ( 1983, p 122 ) intimate science has unavoidable social 
ties which effect what it is and what is done with its products; 
• The social goals and societal needs to which science can be 
expected to contribute. 
• The potential' s of the science and technology system for 
generating relevant knowledge. 
• The practical application of research results, and its 
consequences. 
To maintain the integrity of psychology from the soci_al structural the 
social structural must be included, not ignored. Social psychology is 
one of the few areas of psychology where there meaningful problems 
of humans in their social context has been investigated. Yet too often 
such experimental efforts are criticised for the complexity of the 
situation, in terms of possible variables, and such work has been 
devalued. The response has been to pay little attention to the human 
environment and in accordance with experimental design, the human 
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condition is studied away from the complexities of the real life setting. 
So we have a cartoon image of the human due to the unduly 
complicated nature of the human society frightening investigation 
away. The natural setting would ruin the experiment because it 'just 
makes things to hard', this is a very poor and limiting attitude. The 
principle of testing theory's outside their natural sphere is fine in the 
physical sciences, but in the human context this is not adequate. 
E) Psychology Should be a Science But has to 
Reconceptulise What that Is 
A balance must be struck in the science of Psychology that must take 
into account the immovable limitations of that science while not 
stoping these limitations from improving the methods that it already 
has. 
The justification of a scientific theory is a matter of working out its 
observational consequences and testing them directly. The truth of 
these consequences leads to indirect support to the theory that gives 
rise to them. But all observation is theory laden, so theories generate 
their own supporting evidence. Anti-positivist and anti-empirical 
critiques have to a certain extent represented an over reaction. The 
inadequacies of logical positivism have been refuted well, in that there 
is no distinction between observation and theory. However the position 
is too extreme in that the rationality of science has been undermined 
greatly. The criticism of science must be tempered by a commitment to 
find better methods and theories. For it is easy to criticise science and 
psychology for not being perfect, but nothing is that is human, so to 
remain pragmatic, psychology must be accepted as imperfect. The 
psychologist should not hide or aim to be perfect through a mystical 
impeccable science. Yet psychologists should not abandon trying to be 
a science however, as being a science entails many advantages. The 
motivation for being a science should be in the interests of the 
consumer of that science not in the interests of its members. 
Psychologists should be disciplined practitioners of the human 
being, in all their relevant motivations, emotions, behaviour and 
thought pertaining to whatever issue is at hand. The motivation of 
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psychologists must be to help people gain consciousness and that 
entails helping them understand their world, themselves and others. 
The psychologists must be open enough to help people with what are 
the relevant problems for them. 
Scientific laws are not the only or main explanation, rather they help 
to support the explanation. In history, for example it is hard to see how 
a scientific theory can add to a narrative, an input, that is, that would 
add any meaning. The content of an explanation is distinct from the 
grounds used to support its truth. This is indicated by constant 
reworking of what the current content of the explanation is as time 
goes by. Consequently, the notion that science is an objective process 
of determination of truth is a myth which has been propagated, and the 
sooner it is removed the better. These points are made to emphasise 
that science should be seen as a human process not solely a logical 
process. That is, that to understand anything to do with psychology one 
must use intent, motivation and the needs of the actors. 
The psychologist should not be seen as the expert, the professional, 
the superior, but the equal partner in maintaining integrity, mental 
health in the individual. 
Psychology is a science of social problems and as such has problems 
which rapidly develop and mutate; yet such problems require 
immediate attention. Science requires time to find solutions, however, 
which could take years to develop. The future relevance of jigsaw like 
pieces is not always clear, so both the potential immediate and future 
benefit should be stressed. Still the problems that a psychologist must 
face and the speed to which answers are developed are running at 
different speeds .. 
If psychologists are affected by their own biases, ie. if a phenomenal 
exists and the psychologist does not believe that it does the 
psychologist usually will not see it. Likewise, if the psychologist 
believes a phenomenon does exist when it really does not, they will see 
it. Where does this leave psychology as a science? Psychology using 
the same tools, exact same experiment often comes up with a different 
answers. This tells us that reality is probably far to complex for any 
scientific system to understand in terms of lasting universal rules of 
that society. Yet even with these difficulties it does not remove the 
ability and necessity of the psychologist to have to use their judgement 
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to decide a course of action. Pragmatically, psychologists must attempt 
to solve the problems that face society while acknowledging those 
unresolvable problems. 
Using what works best is the premium strategy a psychologist can 
use in light of the nature of its discipline and the particular problems 
they face. Rather than feeling arrogant about the abilities of 
psychological science, psychologists must rather view their science for 
what it largely is, an act of faith. For example if we think that 
knowledge can be gained through observation, we are therefore likely 
to believe that our senses give us an accurate picture of reality. But do 
we really know what we see is actually here and there. How do we 
know we are not just simply imagining, the answer is that we do not 
know. Science is an act of faith, the belief of truth is an act of faith. Yet 
by having scientific standards, methods and improvements it is an 
impressive and ever more useful act of faith. Humankind is consigned 
to such acts of faith; glorious or ridiculous is the individuals decision. 
Progress 
Psychology must learn to change from strength through diversity to 
strength through unity. If you put your hand out in front of you with the 
fingers together; then slowly move it forward, spreading the fingers out 
slowly as you move your hand forward, that is the progress of science. 
At the base of your hand is science at its most general and aged, the 
fingertips are the cutting edge of science, each fingertip representing a 
different branch, chemistry, physics, maths etc. At the start it made 
sense to spread science as far as possible to accelerate its pace. Today 
there seems to be no science, no mechanism to investigate the gaps 
between the fingertips, the branches of science at the cutting edge of 
science. How does the world practically gather the tips of the fingers of 
technology and science together. I believe it is crucial and will become 
more so to have a mechanism, a discipline to do this. Perhaps 
psychology could fill this niche in the scientific world. The problem 
today is not gaining knowledge to increase our pace of discovery, 
indeed the pace is astounding, but rather the problem is dealing with 
the applications of such knowledge, and the effects they have and 
putting the pieces together from all branches. It takes a scientific 
lifetime to push that fingertip a bit further outwards, to understand 
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enough to do so, but by doing so it moves further away from the others. 
The human today is incapable of knowing in depth all branches of 
science, to link them together. In the past brilliant minds have been 
sprinkled throughout history who can, but now are we victims of our 
own success, can anyone understand enough to link knowledge 
together to make the new breakthroughs which are meaningful to 
humanity? Is there a new and better consciousness waiting out there, 
which will allow us to overcome some seemingly insolvable 
contradictions and problems life? We need to re-link knowledge to 
find if it does. 
Sociological Psychology 
The history of psychology is presented as a history of scientific ideas 
from natural sciences, ignoring the social structural influences which 
had a far greater impact on its development, direction and sustenance. 
Koch ( 1969) summarised the progress of psychology as a succession of 
changing doctrines of what to copy in the natural sciences. A 
sociological analysis of psychology would entail the following points. 
Psychology serves the same function as religion used to, to offer 
explanations of things apparently out of society's control. To correct 
and punish the offensive person to society and give out the rules of 
what a person should be. Thus, psychology moved into the role vacated 
by religion of effectively fostering the interests of the state. So just as 
society turned to the hope of a liberating religion it then turned to a 
new promise of science, both however quickly became the instruments 
of the powerful elites in society. 
If there is so much interaction between science and society a 
knowledge of how science is based on social conditions is required. To 
do this you need a credible science of society and sociology of science. 
For example, lecturers at university would have to learn to know what 
they know. 
In deciding what will replace the empiricist philosophies Psychology 
should recognise its ties with society. Because, what explanatory 
models are chosen for psychology largely determines what will be 
achieved. Objectivity, an enshrined goal of science, is but a norm, a 
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regulative principle, which evolves. We change the world faster than 
we can discover it, or even understand our changes. Impact in the real 
world, on real human beings for the common good should be what we 
strive to achieve. Our explanatory models should be judged on that 
criteria. If we ignore our ties with society then we will not be able to 
achieve this. Or even worse still we will allow funding institutions to 
even further determine our direction. These dangers realised will not 
produce a psychology for the common good but for a select few. 
Indeed as the danger is identified in this relationship here also is the 
avenue of opportunity. Psychology could become the bridging science, 
investigating the problems arising from the transition from science to 
society. This role could realise psychology's potential for the common 
good, in its investigations of the nature of the relationship between the 
scientists and their lay public and their institutions. 
Psychology has, in the search for truth, lost its keys down the road 
but looks under the lamppost for them because its the only place bright 
enough to see them. And I guess psychology has to, but if it could just 
spread the light a little further, and keep in mind the truth like the keys 
are still out there. That the truth is what psychology is searching for, 
that should be the motivation for psychological endeavours, not 
making the area of lamplight as comfortable as possible. 
Meaning and bias and social structural influence should not be 
denied or even discouraged, indeed it could be adaptive in a 
relationship with Psychology, if that relationship is one of open 
acknowledgment and self critical examination from an informed 
conscious position. This is the only way to tie society and its social 
structural forces to improve Psychology and those it serves. Without 
such a relationship to society Psychology will not only not gain this 
improved relationship it will continue to serve the inequalities and 
contradictions produced by capitalism at the expense of science and the 
individuals it treats. 
Psychology is a revolutionary science and as such works best when it 
is revolutionru.y. I, therefore, ask psychology to shake itself free from 
its comfort zone and really question its, and others, positions and 
motivations. Psychology's aim as it stands now, control and 
prediction; the ironic aspect is that if it was achieved the public would 
become so upset about such an intrusion it would have to be canned. 
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The reason why the public fails to revolt against such positivistic, 
Darwinian and functionalist 'ideals' of tyranny is that psychology has 
failed to even get close to such 'goals'. 
The problem of subjective meaning and bias is a very hard one, maybe 
never solvable; but this does not mean it can be ignored, for such 
ignorance means psychology sides with the problem and contributes to 
it. 
F) Conclusion 
It has been shown what psychology's relationship is to society. Now 
an offer of what psychology's relationship to society should be like is 
made. What is important for psychology is that it realises its 
limitations, but it is suggested not to ignore problems as this is not a 
good strategy for reducing their influence. Psychologists should start 
looking at what keeps people together and what keeps them in conflict 
on a societal level. From there could stem an emphasis on encouraging 
interdependencies rather than differences amongst people. Making the 
system fit the people is more acceptable than making the people fit the 
system. Psychology does not achieve the former and should. 
Change for the better will require solutions of a political and social 
nature because that is where the greatest need of humanity can be 
found. Psychological theory must both recognise the claim of society 
on the individual and the claim of society on itself. With this new 
found concentration on the possible and actual mechanisms of society. 
Psychology could see that social structures are both enabling and 
containing of the individual. The new psychology would welcome 
social structural analysis of why inequalities are replicated. Psychology 
must understand its own constructs and social structural relationships 
to society to be able to change such structures and relationships 
adequately. 
Psychology should become active in bringing about consciousness to 
psychologists and the people it try' s to help as conscientization is a 
process of considerable worth. It aims to free peoples view from social 
structural influence, to give them an understanding of where they are in 
the social structure and why they are there. Conscientization is not 
designed to make people to think a certain way, but a process where 
172 
people are allowed to think, to have options and truly make informed 
decisions which will serve them. 
The science of psychology should not accept fact but simply see 
knowledge as the best alternative available at the time. Knowledge 
should be seen as a line drawn to a certain degree of acceptance, a line 
that has to be drawn for pragmatic reasons. Psychology should not t1y 
to hide the fact that it has no complete answers for all problems, but it 
should aim to achieve that complete answer. Using the best solution 
does not mean accepting it totally and the power of negativity should 
play its part in continually challenging the current methods and 
theories. Knowledge itself may not be the most unattractive feature of 
Psychology but rather the means and relations to society which it is 
created in. 
The Psychology of the future must find a balance of research designed 
to test the01y and solve society's problems. This may seem to lead to a 
double life for the psychologist, but it is no more than mirroring the 
nature of a great deal of psychologists who are simultaneously teachers 
and researchers at the same time, which mirrors the duel role of 
studying humans and being one. 
How people perceive the situation is far more important than 'true 
facts' and the sort of laws that hurl them out at an ever increasing rate. 
Psychology should remove the rule that discrete observable behaviours 
are the only data for physical study and that these behaviours can be or 
should be studied in highly controlled and artificial environments. The 
differences between humans are as large and infinite as the similarities 
between them. At all times we must remember our conceptual 
limitations and that we live in a world of apparent paradoxes. 
Psychology as a science will never be right by the 'fact' but by the 
pragmatic standard, and by being the best we've got. This pragmatism 
rests on the belief that there is an objective sphere of mind independent 
reality which exists in its own right. This proposition is not something 
we can learn from experience. It is a presupposition for our experience, 
interpreting inquires rather than a product thereof. We make this 
assumption on functional grounds rather than evidence. The 
assumption is needed to be in a position to learn anything at all, which 
is justified by functional necessity as a pragmatic standard. The 
validation of this pragmatic standard in turn is provided by hindsight, 
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when indeed the functional utility, pragmatic and explanatory efficacy 
of a theory becomes clear. Without such a standard of pragmatism 
psychology cannot survive. Psychology could not act effectively 
without rationally warranted confidence in its knowledge. Psychology 
cannot achieve such confidence without rational inquiry based on such 
a realistic premise. It is however a question of deriving what people see 
as the 'facts', because the perceived facts will largely determine their 
actions. Although it is nearly impossible to analyse or discover true 
facts, they still exist as the fundamental reality and therefore they will 
still play the crucial role. This does not seem a particularly fair set of 
rules to play with, the truth is causal but psychology can never know it 
because to know it psychology would have to know eve1ything at once; 
remember it isn't up to psychology to create reality, to determine it, its 
already here, just be thankful we have the capability to ponder it and 
find it interesting. 
All of what I have written has been written before, all knowledge that 
is discovered has been known before, my references show just how old 
this criticism of psychology is. The criticism of psychology's 
relationship to society is summarised often and well in references in the 
1950's, but it still stands. It still is a problem yet to be addressed by 
psychology, no one it seems wants to face it, the in built problems of 
psychology The very things which make psychology unique are 
acknowledged but then ignored. Psychology's relationship to society 
actively rewards it for not investigating these 'inappropriate' problems. 
But the problem remains, it grows to be more relevant each year as the 
potential for psychology grows and slips further away. 
Psychology is c1ying out for an ideal in which the well being of society 
is fostered. Acceptance into journals should be first, contribution to the 
well being of humans, followed closely by quality of work. It should 
not be a case of how well an author has used obsolete agricultural 
statistics to beat up a straw man. Many lofty goals have been 
suggested, and although they are indeed lofty this does not make them 
any less desirable to pursue. If psychology aims low, it will inevitably 
end up with little to show for its effmis. If it aims high it is more 
probable that it will have a significant effect on the well being of 
humanity. Without humanistic and meaningful goals and questions to 
guide research we are simply meaningless actors in an empty building; 
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at worst, insidious charlatans to a higher master, our institution, this 
institution being part of a wider oppressing society. The absence of a 
moral responsibility results in a fragmentation and a lack of focus on 
what is important. Psychology should become concerned with teaching 
the most effective methods, not the most accepted one. In addition, it 
must accept its complete relationship to society to attain its powerful, 
but nearly mythical potential. Let us become relevant, spurred on by 
our greatest gift, the conscious mind who despite there seemingly being 
no hope or solution stands and fights anyway. 
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